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ABSTRACT
Although there is a plethora of literature on social movements in the fields of sociology
and political science, fewer studies exist on the subject in the field of media studies, especially in
Africa. While scholarship on the role of social media is emerging in recent years, the literature
on the news media coverage of social movements vis-à-vis international human rights
organizations that also have a role in shaping the discourse is absent. The aim of this project was,
therefore, to understand the framing dynamics in the discourse around social movements by the
international news media, local activists, international human rights organizations, and

government officials. It analyzed the 2015-2016 Oromo protest movement against injustices by
the Ethiopian government to examine: (1) the major themes highlighted by these actors, and 2)
the framing dynamics between the actors’ frames. Qualitative framing analysis was used to
examine texts of international news media outlets, Facebook messages of prominent Oromo
activists, reports and statements of Human Right Watch and Amnesty International, and the
Ethiopian government officials’ response to the protests. The findings reveal that three major
themes—cause of the protest, government response to the protest, and call for action—
dominated the texts of the news media, activists, and human rights groups. These themes were
framed as various political and economic grievances, violence, and third-party intervention for
justice, respectively. The themes and frames of the news media and human rights organizations
largely supported the themes and frames highlighted by protest activists. Similar themes were
highlighted in the texts of the government officials but were used to counter-frame the frames of
other actors (ex: portraying the protesters as violent). The findings have significant implications.
They may guide democratic social movement activists in the social media age who want to
design similar protests against authoritarian governments in an international arena. The findings
bolster existing studies on the use of collective action framing and the relationship between news
media and activists. Additionally, the results suggest that international human rights organization
are also “signifying agents” engaged in creating meanings and shaping discourse about social
movements.
.
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1

INTRODUCTION

“Ethiopia’s Feyisa Lilesa gets a silver for running – and a gold for bravery” was the title
of a news article by the Daily Maverick published on 22 August 2016. The news story was about
an Oromo athlete who crossed his arms above his head as he finished the marathon race at the
2016 Rio Olympics to show solidarity with Oromo people who were protesting against the
Ethiopian government since 12 November 2015. Allison (2016), the writer of the news article,
described the significance of Lilesa’s action by comparing it with similar actions of only a few
athletes in history who used sports events as a venue to bring injustices in their countries to
global attention. He wrote:
Whatever happens next, Lilesa himself has joined that small pantheon of athletes who
realize that sport is about more than running and jumping and kicking a ball. It is an elite
group that includes the likes of Tommie Smith and John Carlos, who raised their fists in
that iconic black power salute in 1968; the Zimbabwean cricketers Andy Flower and
Henry Olonga who wore black armbands in a match against Namibia in 2003, to
symbolize the death of democracy in Zimbabwe; boxer Muhammad Ali, whose
outspoken opposition to the Vietnam War cost him his titles and his fighting license.
(para. 12).
Ethiopia experienced a history of several consequential protests and uprisings. For
example, the 1960 student movement played a crucial role in ending the regime of Haile Selassie
in 1974. The civil war in northern Ethiopia that lasted decades led to the overthrow of the
Communist regime of Mengistu Hailemariam in 1991 and cessation of Eritrea in 1993. The
Oromo protests that started in November 2015 forced Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn to
resign on February 15, 2018. It is this latter protest in Oromia that I am studying here.
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The recent Oromo protest is different from the previous two uprisings in Ethiopia for
various reasons. First, unlike the first two uprisings which were bloody, Oromo protests were
mainly peaceful. Second, the first two uprisings ended in regime change, but Oromo protests led
to what many political commentators refer to a “soft coup d’état”—a change of leadership, not
regime. Third, social media, which did not exist during the first two uprisings, were widely used
by Oromo activists. Fourth, although the main protests took place in Ethiopia, the Ethiopian
diaspora community in North America, Europe, Australia, and South Africa played a vital role in
bringing the issue to the attention of the international community. Fifth, it got sympathy of
international news media and human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International. These differences led me to want to investigate the communicative role
that the international media and human rights organizations played in the dynamic between the
protesters and the government that may help explain the outcome.
The Oromo protests succeeded in many ways. The new government led by Prime Minster
Abiy Ahmed introduced many political reforms. It released all political prisoners including
politicians and journalists. It lifted a state of emergency which was in place during the protests.
It changed the anti-terrorism law. It lifted a ban on media. For the first time in Ethiopian history,
there is no single journalist in jail.
This introductory chapter aims at introducing the whole project. First, it gives an overview
of the Oromo protest movement by highlighting how it started and summarizing the main
demands and strategies of the protesters. Then, by describing the purpose of the study, the
chapter also states the main research questions. The chapter also explains the significance and
scope of the study, as well as how it is organized.
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1.1

The Oromo Protest Movement
Since November 2015, Ethiopia experienced public uproar to the magnitude it had never

seen before (Allo, 2016). Local activists protested across many areas of the Oromia region, the
most populous federal state in Ethiopia. Protests started on November 12, 2015 against the
government plan, known as the Addis Ababa Master Plan – a plan that would have expanded the
territory of Addis Ababa, the capital city, into surrounding areas of the region (Amnesty
International, 2015). Oromo activists, who led the protests, viewed the Master Plan as a scheme
by government officials to displace farmers from their lands (Allo, 2016).
Due to its magnitude and violent response from government security forces, the protests
received significant international media attention. For example, on January 8, 2016; August 19,
2016; and October 11, 2016, The Washington Post published editorials with titles: "Ethiopia
silences its critics with a deadly crackdown on dissent;" "Ethiopia's regime has killed hundreds.
Why is the West still giving it aid?" and "Ethiopia meets protests with bullets," respectively. On
August 26, 2016, Thomson Reuters Foundation published an 11-minute documentary that
narrates factors that triggered the protests. On August 12, 2016, Jeffrey Gettleman of the New
York Times published a story titled: "'A Generation is Protesting’ in Ethiopia, a Long U.S. Ally."
The protests received wide coverage on social media as well.
The Oromo protest movement also captured the attention of different human rights
organizations. For example, Amnesty International put out a statement that said, “prolonged
protests over political, economic, social and cultural grievances were met with excessive force
and lethal force by police” (Amnesty International, n.d, para. 1). It portrayed the government’s
action as “crackdown on defenders of human rights, independent media, journalists, bloggers,
peaceful protesters, as well as members and leaders of the political opposition” (para, 9).
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Likewise, Human Rights Watch published several reports on how the government handled the
protesters of the Oromo protest movement. On January 21, 2016, the United Nations human
rights experts called on Ethiopia to stop its violent measures against protesters. The European
Parliament condemned the disproportionate use of force against protesters by Ethiopian security
forces. On March 9, 2017, the U.S. Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing on human rights
violations in Ethiopia (Tadias, 2017). Furthermore, many U.S. lawmakers including Al Franken,
Amy Klobuchar, Keith Ellison, Betty McCollum, Tom Emmer, and Mike Goffman wrote letters
to the State Department urging it to pay attention to how the government of Ethiopia was
handling Oromo protests.
1.2

Demands of the Protesters
The Oromo protest movement activists voiced a broad range of political and economic

demands. As the trigger of the protest movement was the plan to expand the jurisdiction of Addis
Ababa city into the territory of the Oromia region, the activists’ demand was a halt to the plan.
They used different slogans such as “No to the Master Plan,” “The master plan is a master
killer,” No to landgrab,” “Lafti teenya lafee keenya” [“Our land is our bone”], “Oromiyaan kan
keenya” [“Oromia is ours”], “Didne” [“We say, no”]. Although the Ethiopian government
claimed the plan was to provide better services and create economic opportunities, for the
Oromos it amounted to a landgrab that could displace them from their lands (Allo, 2016; Gaffey,
2016)
There were also other demands including the demand for the release of opposition
political party leaders such as Merera Gudina, Bekele Gerba, and Olbana Lellissa. As the
government security forces also killed some protesters during the protests, they also demanded a
halt to the killing of “innocent people”. The protesters also demanded the implementation of a
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Constitutional provision which recognizes the “special interest” (the legal rights) of the State of
Oromia on Addis Ababa City. Article 49/5 of the Ethiopian Constitution says:
The special interest of the State of Oromia in Addis Ababa, regarding the provision of
social services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as
joint administrative matters arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of
Oromia shall be respected. Particulars shall be determined by law. (pp: 104-105).
The protesters used slogans such as “Finfinneen handhurra keenya” [“Addis Ababa is our
navel”], “Finfinneen kan keenya} [“Addis Ababa is ours”]. However, when the death of many
protesters was reported, protesters changed their demand to the end to the regime. They used
slogans such as “down down woyanne.” Woyaane refers to Tigray People’s Liberation Force
(TPLF), a member party of the four-party coalition that rules the country. The protests mainly
aimed against TPLF as they believe it dominates all other parties in the ruling coalition.
1.3

Protesters’ Strategies
Oromo activists expressed their demands in different ways. Some took to social media,

especially Facebook to post news, views, and analysis on the protests. Others gave interviews to
international news media outlets such as Aljazeera, BBC, the Voice of America (VOA), Deutsch
Welle (DW), PBS, NPR, and diaspora-based Ethiopian media such as Oromia Media Network
(OMN) and the Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT).
Activists both at home and in the Diaspora also engaged in different forms of activism.
Singers released new songs; poets composed poems; artists drew pictures; religious leaders
condemned the government and prayed for the souls of those who died; and women challenged
men for not doing enough to fight the government. Oromo activists also organized rallies and
demonstrations in different places. Those in Ethiopia used streets, schools, religious gathering
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places, and funerals to protest against the government. Those in the diaspora protested in front of
the State Department and White House in the U.S. while those in the United Kingdom and
Australia protested in front of the office of the prime minister and parliament respectively. To get
media attention, they also demonstrated in front of CNN’s head office in Atlanta and the BBC
office in London.
August 21, 2016 marked a turning point in the history of Oromo protests when Feyissa
Lilesa, an athlete, crossed his arms above his head—a symbol of resistance—at the 2016 Rio
Olympics as he finished second in a marathon race. Many international media, curious about the
meaning of his symbol, went even further to cover about Ethiopia in general, and Oromo protests
in particular. Lilessa told BBC on August 21, 2016 that he used the international stage to tell the
international community that, "‘The Ethiopian government is killing my people, so I stand with
all protests anywhere as Oromo is my tribe . . . I raised my hands to support with the Oromo
protest.'" (para. 5).
As the intensity of the protests increased and received the attention of the international
media and international human rights organizations, the government heeded some of the
demands. For example, on January 13, 2016, it announced the cancellation of the Addis Ababa
Master Plan, which had triggered the initial protests on November 12, 2015 (BBC Africa, 2016).
In his speech to the parliament on October 10, 2016, Mulatu Teshome, the president of Ethiopia,
told lawmakers of his government’s plan to solve the issue of the State of Oromia’s special
interest in Addis Ababa city, another key demand of the protesters. The government also put out
official statements promising a broad range of both political and economic reforms to answer the
grievances of the protesters. However, the protesters did not trust the government’s promises, so
they called for regime change.
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1.4

Purpose of the Study
The story of Oromo protest movement summarized in the preceding paragraphs may raise

many fundamental questions that go beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, given the
intensity of the protest and the attention it received from the international community—both the
international news media and international activist organizations—two questions warrant close
attention. First, how did the news media and other actors (human rights groups and government
officials) frame the Oromo protest movement, in response to the package of grievances outlined
by Oromo activists that were designed to motivate collective action? Furthermore, what were the
framing dynamics among these actors in terms of posing similar and competing themes
regarding the protest?
The goal of this project was to discover the frames highlighted by the news media and
non-media actors (Oromo protesters, international human rights organizations, and Ethiopian
government officials). To this end, it sought to answer the following research questions about the
Oromo protest:
RQ1. What were the major themes of the international news media on the Oromo protest
movement? How did they frame those themes?
RQ2. What were the major themes of the messages of the key Oromo activists? How did
they frame those themes?
RQ3. What were the major themes highlighted by international human rights
organizations (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International)? How did they
frame those themes?
RQ4. What were the major themes of the Ethiopian government officials’ response to the
protest? How did they frame those themes?
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RQ5. How did the international news media frames compare with the frames of other
actors (activists, human rights groups, and the Ethiopian government officials),
especially in terms of reflecting the Oromo activists’ frames on the protests?
1.5

Justification and Significance of the Study
Scholars have studied the link between the news media and social movements. One of the

areas that attracted the attention of scholars has been the role of the news media on social
movements. The news media has the power to shape social events including social movements
(Tim, 1996). They cover the existence of social movements; create the conditions for collective
action; and provide definitions and interpretations on issues (Klandermans, 2014). They frame
issues to promote some aspects of the reality (Entman, 1993).
Another area that attracted attention is the interdependency between the news media and
social movements. For example, Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) have long argued that social
movements and the news media depend on each other, although they also stressed that the former
depends on the latter more so than the reverse. Social movement activists need the media to pass
their message across to their constituent members (mobilization), to create the impression that
the world is watching them (validation) and enlarge to the size of their protests (scope
enlargement) (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993). According to Gamson and Wolfsfeld, the mediasocial movement relationship is also characterized by a “struggle over framing” (p. 18).
This project is significant for different reasons. First, it focuses on the protests in Ethiopia
which makes it unique in many ways. Although there were many movements in Ethiopia such as
the student movements of the 1960s and the peasant uprisings of the 1950s, no study has yet
looked at the international news media coverage of social movements in Ethiopia. The
movements in Ethiopia and most African countries are different from the movements in most
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western countries in that they take place under authoritarian regimes where violent response to
suppress the protests has been the norm. Even from African countries, Ethiopia’s case is different
in that most social movements in Africa focused on the anti-colonization movement (Larmer,
2010), which Ethiopia did not experience, as it is the only African country that did not fall under
colonization. According to Larmer (2010), even those social movements studied in Africa used
the political science approach to understand the change in politics, rather than the discourse
surrounding them.
Second, unlike many studies that looked into one or two actors (for example, the news
media or protests), this project analyzes the frames of more actors (the news media, the antigovernment movement itself, government officials, and human rights organizations) to further
our understanding of social movements in general and the Oromo protest movement in
particular. It helps us to understand the dynamics of the frames of these actors all discussing and
constructing meanings on the same topic from different perspectives. Including the frames of
international human rights organizations—the actors involved in the discourse of the movement
but who do not receive enough scholarly attention—make this project more comprehensive and
unique from other studies.
The findings of this project can make several contributions. By explaining how
movements change their grievances into collective action through the framing process, it will
further our understanding of social movements in general and the Oromo protest movement in
particular. By comparing frames of more actors, some of which did not tend to receive scholars’
attention (e.g., frames of human rights organizations), the findings may also shed light on the
dynamics among the frames of different actors related to a democratization protest. The findings
might also serve as a stepping stone, or become an additional resource, for scholars who want to
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conduct further studies on the framing of social protest movements from a variety of primary
actors/stakeholders’ standpoints. Practically, the findings may help government officials and
social entrepreneurs to have a better understanding of how activists use media to air their
grievances, especially in the context of anti-government protests in authoritarian regimes.
1.6

The Scope of the Study
Different aspects of social movements and media could be studied, but the focus of this

project was on the framing of the major themes only. It did not focus, for example, on the type of
media the protesters used, how they used them, and why, or their motivations for selecting
different media. It instead focused on messages and how those messages were framed. Also, as
this project aims mainly at understanding collective action frames and frames of different actors,
not their impact, it did not do audience analysis, nor did it fully assess achievement of goals by
movement actors.
Although the protests in Ethiopia were not limited to only the Oromia region—it also
covered the Amhara region—the focus of this project was on the protests in Oromia only. The
protests in these states have different causes and questions. While the immediate cause of the
protests in Oromia was the expansion of a capital city into the lands owned by Oromos, those in
the Amhara region were caused by the detention of the Wolkayit Committee. Because of
cultural, linguistic, and historical differences between people in these regions, their questions
were also different. Also, due to its long duration and intensity of the protests, the Oromo
protests received more media attention than those in the Amhara region.
This project analyzed documents/texts only. It analyzed texts of Facebook posts of the
key Oromo activists, news media, human rights groups, and the Ethiopian government officials.
The detailed description of the data and selection process are in chapter three.
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As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the Oromo protest movement has achieved
its major goals such as cancellation of the Masterplan, change of the government (leadership, not
regime), the release of the political prisoners, lifting of the ban on the media, cancellation of the
Anti-Terrorism Law, etc. The goals they achieved include the change of government, the
cancellation of the master plan that triggered the protests, release of political prisoners, and
promise on political reforms. So, this project analyzed materials produced around big events
such as the August 6, 2016 "Grand Oromia Rally," and the Irreecha event of October 2016, and
August 21-Rio Olympics, where athlete Feyisa Lilesa raised his hands above his head to protest.
So, the result of this project may not explain the frames developed throughout the entire protest
movement and their evolution over the years, but it captures the most significant and
newsworthy events of the protest movement.
Lastly, the project used a qualitative approach aimed at understanding a particular issue,
how the Oromo protest movement was framed. So, the result cannot be generalized to all
movements in the world, different movements in Ethiopia, or even to Oromo protests that
happened many years back.
1.7

Author’s Perspective
My interest in conducting this project comes in part out of my familiarity with the politics

of Ethiopia in general and of the Oromo people in particular. I am a member of the Oromo
society who was born and grew up in Oromia, Ethiopia. Hence, I not only know the Oromo
language and culture, I also closely follow issues related to Oromo politics. I am also a long-time
friend of some of the activists who were the leaders of the Oromo protest movement. I take my
familiarity with the Oromo people—language, culture, and politics—as an asset to successfully
carry out this project. My knowledge of the language and culture helps me to understand the
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nuances of the Oromo protest movement’s demands, frames, and discourse. However, even
though I am supportive of the protesters’ struggles for democracy and human rights in this
authoritarian regime, I had no agenda for this project other than to gain a better understanding of
the protest framing dynamics to contribute to media studies and social movement studies. As
such, I strived to accurately and fairly describe all players involved.
1.8

Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters including the introductory and conclusion

chapters. Chapters two through eight are organized as follows:
Chapter two provides a discussion of the relevant literature. It starts by giving a historical
context to the Oromo protest movement, especially the political dynamics in Ethiopia that might
also have a bearing on the current Oromo protest movement. Then it presents the summary of the
literature on social movements and scholarly perspectives on how to study them, especially on
theories of collective behaviors, resource mobilization, political processes, and framing. It then
discusses available literature on the link between media (both traditional and social media) and
social movements. The chapter presents scholarly perspectives on issue framing dynamics
between social movements and government officials.
Chapter three discusses the methods. It has two main sections: the data and procedures.
The first section describes all the data used for this project. It explains justifications of why they
are essential to carry out this project. The second section discusses the procedures—description
of the steps used to collect and analyze the data.
Chapters four through seven constitute the vital part of the dissertation: analysis of the
data. Chapter four analyzes the data from the news media. It discusses all the major themes, and
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the frames that emerged from the data. Chapters five, six, and seven present the results of data
analysis from Oromo activists, human rights groups, and government officials respectively.
The last chapter (chapter 8) is the conclusion of the study which provides the summary
and interpretation of the findings. This chapter also discusses the results and their implication by
connecting findings to existing literature. After explaining the limitations of the study, the
chapter concludes by suggesting future areas of research.
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2
2.1

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
This chapter reviews literature that focuses on areas relevant to this project. The chapter

has five major sections. The first part gives background information and historical context that
gave rise to the Oromo people’s protest. The second section deals with the literature on social
movements and framing. It reviews the literature on the link between social movements and the
media. The third section of this chapter gives a summary of scholarly work on foreign media and
democratization. Mainly, it pays attention to the role of international media within the
democratization in undemocratic countries. The fourth section looks at the major theories of
international relations and the role of media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like
human rights groups. After discussing the literature on framing and counter-framing by
government officials in the fifth section, the chapter previews the research questions and gives a
summary to segue to the methods section.
2.2

Overview of Ethiopia and the Oromo People
Ethiopia is a multi-cultural country in East Africa. It has more than 80 different ethnic

and linguistic groups. Out of this, the Oromo, Amhara, Somali, and Tigray constitute 34.4%,
27%, 6.2%, and 6.1% of the population respectively (The World Factbook, 2018). The major
languages are Afaan Oromo, Amharic, Somali, and Tigrigna spoken by 33.8%, 29.3%, 6.2%, and
5.9% of the population respectively (The World Factbook, 5 September 2018).
Although a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-linguistic country, Ethiopia was
created as an “empire state” (Keller, 1995, p. 622). The creation of the modern Ethiopian state
began in the second half of the nineteenth century by emperors Tewodros (1855-1868) and
Yohannes (1872-89) and consolidated by Menelik (1889-1913). These emperors tried to
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construct a nation-state with a single Ethiopian national identity dominated by the Amharic
language and the Amhara culture. The Communist military government of Mengistu
Hailemariam which ruled from 1974-1991 also attempted to keep the Ethiopian nationalism
intact (Keller, 1995).
However, after the end of the long imperial rule of Emperor Haile Selassie from 19301974, a question for self-determination by different ethnic groups emerged and led to the rise of
ethnic nationalism (Keller, 1995). The question of nations and nationalities is associated with
“controversies regarding the legitimacy of those in power and their policies” (Joireman, 1997, p.
388). According to Joireman (1997), Ethiopian regimes before 1991 tried to downplay the issue
of ethnicity” in order to “foster pan-Ethiopianist feeling and breakdown the opposition posed by
organized ethnic groups” (p. 388).
However, the attempt to create a single national identity was unsuccessful as the question
of self-determination was also highlighted during the Ethiopian student movement of the 1960s.
Two of the major issues raised by the Ethiopian student movement were, among other things, the
self-determination of nations and nationalities and land rights with a slogan, “land to the tiller”
(Joireman, 1997, p. 389). While the question of the right to self-determination of nations and
nationalities was addressed in the current Constitution of the country, i.e., Article 39, the demand
for land rights was also tackled by the Communist regime of Mengistu Hailemariam that came to
power in 1974.
The Oromo people are known for their traditional institution called the Gadaa system.
According to Legesse (2000), Gadaa is a “system of generation [sic] classes that succeed each
other every eight years in assuming political, military, judicial, legislative and ritual
responsibilities” (p. 104). The Oromos consider the Gadaa system as “a classic example of a
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traditional African form of democracy” (Keller, 1995, p. 624). Like the modern democracy, it
has the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government (Keller, 1995). However,
the Oromo Gadaa system declined especially after the mid-nineteenth century due to the
expansion of religion (Islam and Christianity) and a ban on it by the Amhara dominated Ethiopia
(Keller, 1995).
The Oromo people consider the imperial rule between 1855-1974 as a colonial rule
(Keller, 1995). This conception is due to “its coincidence with the European scramble for Africa
and the creation of nation-states based on external models” (Keller, 1995, p. 625). During this
time, they experienced different forms of political and economic suppression: they were forced
to share their produce with the ruling class, mainly the Amharas; and were forced to change their
traditional religions to Christianity (Keller, 1995). They also faced economic subjugations under
imperial Ethiopia. As Keller wrote:
In the distribution of scarce resources, their needs were considered secondary to those of
the dominant Amhara groups as a matter of course, despite their great contribution as
regards Ethiopia’s chief export crops: coffee, oil seeds, hides, and skins. All Oromo areas
had become crown lands as a result of conquest and were used by the Emperor to reward
or remunerate those in his service in the periphery. Moreover, peasants and pastoralists
alike were saddled with a heavy cash tax burden in an economy that had yet become
market-oriented. After 1855, they found themselves subjects of Amhara overlordship in a
world that was now organizing itself along the lines of nation-states with permanent and
inviolable geographic boundaries. (p. 626).
The subjugation of the Oromo people under the Amhara elites led to the development of
sense of the Oromo ethnic identity (Keller, 1995), which also led to the rise of Oromo social
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movements (Jalata, 1995). According to Jalata, the growing sense of Oromo nationalism is
linked to the realization of the political, economic, and cultural exploitation by the Ethiopian
ruling class. Jalata (1995) described this exploitation as:
The Ethiopian colonial state created a leadership vacuum in Oromo society by destroying
a cultural and political leadership during its colonial expansion. It also delayed the
development of an Oromo national leadership by denying the Oromo opportunities
essential for developing an educated and Organized leadership. The division of power
have been ethnized and almost all Oromos and other colonized peoples were limited to
agricultural activities. Educational opportunities have been mainly provided for children
of the Ethiopian rulers in order to perpetuate Amhara-Tigrayan dominance. (p. 169).
The perception of political, economic, and cultural marginalization prompted educated
Oromos to create an organized movement in the 1960s such as the Mecha-Tulema self-help
organization in 1965. The Mecha-Tulema organization was founded by Oromos who demanded
fair share for their nation (Keller, 1995). Keller also noted that “by the mid-1960s, Oromo
intellectuals were demanding first-class citizenship” (p. 627).
The establishment of the Mecha-Tulema was regarded as significant. According to Keller
(1995), it sent three major signals to the Ethiopian government: 1) assimilation of the Oromo was
not successful; 2) Oromo elites preferred self-determination to multi-ethnic Ethiopian nationstate, and 3) it was impossible to suppress the sentiments of the Oromo nation by banning
political parties. On the other hand, it strengthened the sense of Oromo nationalism. As Keller
(1995) pointed out, “the movement sensitized the Oromo to the importance of their own national
culture as well as to the contradictions in the emerging politico-economic system” (p. 628).
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The Oromo people’s political movement is also shaped by their narrations of experience
(Levine, 2007). Levine classified the Oromo people’s narratives of their experience into three
types: The Traditionalist, The Colonialist, and The Ethiopianist narratives. The Traditionalist
narrative, according to Levine, is rooted in Oromo people’s key institutions, the Gadaa system.
Levine summarized the core of this narrative by saying:
It identifies Oromo culture-bearers as carrying a distinctive legacy of important sacred
values. It enjoins a course of action directed at sustaining and strengthening whatever can
be preserved of the traditional institutions of the Oromo Gadaa system. Toward that end
they should maintain a certain distance from the political center of the Ethiopian nation.
They should do whatever can be done to resist the alienation of their land, and to promote
the survival and rebirth of the herds so important to their traditional lifestyle. (p. 59).
The Colonialist narrative highlights the subdual of the Oromo people’s glorious
experience and the people who promote it. It “identifies the Oromo experience as essentially one
of victims of a century-and-a-half of unrelieved subjugation” (Levine, 2007, p. 59). It challenges
the “Ethiopian national center” and encourages “a struggle to ensure adequate representation in
the Ethiopian Parliament and in the federal bureaucracy, and to maximize full and genuine
autonomy for the Oromia region (p. 59).
The Ethiopianist Narrative, however, “identifies the Oromo as participants in a fivecentury [since 15th C] process in which diverse[sic] interacted to form a multiethnic national
society” (Levine, 2007, p. 60). It sees the Oromo expansions during the 16th century as
promoting “the process of building a modern multiethnic national state” (p. 55). According to
Levine, Oromo values such as “adoption, assimilation, and intermarriage” helped in the process
where “Oromo settlers blended readily with the peoples living in the areas that they penetrated”
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(p. 55). This emphasizes that Oromos participated in the nation building after the late 6th century
(Levine, 2007).
As discussed in this section, the Oromo people have struggled for their political,
economic, and cultural rights for decades. The previous regime of Mengistu Hailemariam
addressed their question for land rights. The current government has answered their question of
culture such as language use. But still, the Oromo people’s struggle against the Ethiopian
government has not stopped. However, the latest protest that started in 2015 has attracted global
media attention, as outlined in the introduction chapter. The next section provides a review of
literature on social movements and the link between social movements and media.
2.3

Overview of Social Movement Literature
According to Grossley (2002), several definitions of the term social movements have

been offered, however, "all of them are problematic" (p. 2). Grossley stated that one problem
relates to either defining it too broadly "such that they include phenomena which we would not
wish to call social movements" or defining it too narrowly (p. 2). Another problem, according to
Grossley, has to do with the ambiguity of words used to describe social movements which need
definition themselves.
According to Eyerman (2005), social movements refer to a "form of acting in public" and
politically motivated performances (p. 43). Eyerman also pointed out that emotions play a vital
role in communicating movement messages. Snow, Soule, and Kriesi (2004), on the other hand,
provided the following broad definition:
Social movements can be thought of as collectivities acting with some degree of
organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the
purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or
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culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they
are a part. (p. 11).
Common to these definitions is collectivity and goal-orientedness (to support or to oppose a
change) and action. So, my definition of Oromo protest movement refers to the actions taken,
and campaigns held by Oromo activists both online and offline to oppose the Ethiopian
government policies.
The literature on social movements provides different explanations on why social
movements occur. For example, theories of collective behavior link social movements with
"significant social and cultural breakdowns" (Morris, 2000, p. 445). Morris said that social
movements, according to this view, are phenomena characterized by spontaneity, lack of
organization and structure, and lack of any connection with institutions and organization. Social
movements historically were characterized by "emotions and irrational ideologies" which play a
key role as movements "occurred in highly charged contexts characterized by mass enthusiasm,
collective excitement, rumor, social contagion, and mass hysteria" (p.445). However, this
approach was criticized for focusing on individual psychology rather than political and
organizational factors (Oliver & Johnson, 2005). It was also criticized for ignoring agency and
agency-producing mechanisms such as "social organizations, strategizing, reasoning, analysis,
and rationality" (Morris, 2000, p.445).
Another approach to the study of social movement is the resource mobilization approach.
Contrary to theories of collective behavior, the resource mobilization approach regarded social
movements as "normal, rational, political challenges by aggrieved groups" (Buechler, 2011, p.
111). Resource mobilization theory links origins of social movements to resources (Sen & Avci,
2016). According to McCarthy and Zald (2001), four core assumptions characterize this theory:
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its emphasis on resources; its view of social movements as normal behavior; its assumption
about sources of resources; and its emphasis on the role of media. Resources include money,
energy, and time (McCarthy & Zald, 2001). This theory also views social movements as "normal
behavior emerging out of biographical circumstances, social supports, and immediate life
situations" (p. 535). Proponents of resource mobilization theory also argue that the sources of
resources are larger society, governmental and non-governmental institutions, and groups" (p.
535). For proponents of this theory, media play a major role in "mediating between the
movement and bystander publics" (p.535). In other words, resource mobilization theory argues
that individuals mobilize resources to alleviate their grievances (Sen & Avci, 2016). However,
this theory was challenged for too much focus on resources as a key factor, as social movements
may occur even in the absence of enough resources, especially money (Sen & Avci, 2016). It
was also challenged by social psychologists for ignoring the issue of social construction of
reality (Oliver & Johnson, 2005).
Another theory of social movements is political process theory. This theory emphasizes
the interaction between activists and mainstream institutional politics (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004;
Sen & Avci, 2016). Its core assumption is that a social movement is determined by “exogenous
factors” which “enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particulars sorts of claims to be
advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for
movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy” (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, pp:
1457- 1458). It also views a social movement "as a type of political movement" the origins of
which is based on "the availability of political opportunities" (Sen & Avci, 2016, p.127). In
other words, "the relationship between challengers and political systems is placed at the center of
analysis because the political system determines whether movements are able to develop in the
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first place" (Morris, 2000, p. 446). As opposed to the resource mobilization approach which pays
attention to the "formal organization, elite sponsorship, external resources, rational actors,
interest group constituencies, and manufactured grievances," the political process approach
emphasizes "diverse organizational forms, informal mobilizing structures, solidarity and group
consciousness within the mass base, indigenous resources …" (Buechler, 2011, p. 140). The
political process model faced criticism due to its view that "external political opportunities must
become available before challenging groups can generate collective action" (Morris, 2000, p.
447). Morris argued about the existence of a “reciprocal relationship” between social
movements’ ability to mobilize and political opportunities saying, “thus, in some instances,
collective action can generate political opportunities where none existed previously and in other
instances, political opportunities can clear the way for collective action” (p. 447).
Framing is also another major approach to the study of social movements, and one most
relevant to this dissertation project. Dove (2010) indicated that the framing perspective became
one of the major developments in the study of social movements in the 1980s. It "provided a way
to link ideas and social construction of ideas with organizational and political process factors"
(Olvier & Johnson, 2005, p. 185). Based on the concept of a frame by Goffman (1974), the
framing perspective "focuses on the various collective action frames that are used by social
movements to increase and maintain support for their goals and activities" (Dove, 2010, p.203).
Collective action refers to “the processes of consensus mobilization needed for people to decide
to participate in collective action” (Klandermans, 2014, p.41).
The framing perspective differs from other approaches such as resource mobilization and
political process theory in the way its proponents viewed social movements. Snow and Benford
(1988) argued that social movements should not be conceived as just "carriers or transmitters of
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programs for actions that arise from new structural dislocations" or as merely "resource
acquisition and deployment activities of movement organization" (p.198). Snow and Benford
(1992) further argued that there were two problems with the literature on social movements
before the mid-1980s: treating meanings and ideas as a given and ignoring "the extent to which
movements are engaged in ‘meaning work’—that is, in the struggle between the production of
ideas of meanings" (p. 136). Snow and Benford (1988) argued that social movements are
"engaged in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers" as well (p.
198). Social movements are conceptualized as "signifying agents" (p. 198). To elaborate on this,
they borrowed the verb ‘framing' from Gamson et al. 1982; Snow et al., 1986) which indicates
"an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality
construction" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). They explained this saying:
It is active in a sense that something is being done, processual in the sense of a dynamic
evolving process. It entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of social
movement organization or movement activists. And it is contentious in the sense that it
involves the generation of interpretative frames that not only differ from existing ones but
that may also challenge them. The resultant product of this framing activity is referred to
as collective action frames. (p. 614).
Snow and Benford (1988) contended that social movements assign meanings to events
and interpret them in such a way that they can mobilize their followers, get the support of
bystanders, and demonize their antagonists. Movements construct collective action frames as
they negotiate a common understanding of a problem that needs change, making attributions on
what or who to blame, “articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in
concert to affect change" (Benford & Benford, 2000, p. 615). That is, constructing collective
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action frames requires casting existing circumstances as shared grievances which also need to be
“transformed into demands” (p.52).
Snow and Benford (1988) explained that movements are engaged in three types of
collective action framing tasks: diagnosis, prognosis, and mobilizing participation. Accordingly,
while diagnosis refers to framing an event or some aspect of social life as a problem that needs to
change, the prognosis task of framing aims at proposing a solution to the problem. The third
task—the framing task of mobilization—is aimed at calling for "arms or rationale for engaging
in ameliorative or coercive action" (p. 199). Klandermans (2014) pointed out that the role of
collective action frames in mobilizing adherents depends on how well they attend these three
framing tasks. Snow and Benford (1988) also maintained that the success of framing is affected
by four factors: (1) the robustness, completeness, and thoroughness of the framing effort, (2)
"internal structure of the larger belief system with which the movement seeks to affect some kind
of cognitive/ ideational alignment," (3) "relevance of the frame to the life world of the
participants or phenomenological relevance, and (4) cycles of protest (p.198).
Another important task of social movements identified in the literature is frame alignment
(Buecheler, 2011; Johnston, 2002; Klandermans, 2014; Snow, Rochford, Worden & Benford,
1986). Snow, Worden, Rochford, and Benford (1986) referred to as the “linkage of individual
and SMO [social movement organizations] interpretative orientations, such that some set of
individual interests, values, beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and
complementary” (p. 464). They pointed out that frame alignment is a crucial requirement for
movement participation.
According to Snow et al. (1986), there are four types of frame alignment processes: frame
bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformations. Frame bridging refers
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to “the linking of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames
regarding a particular issue or problem” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). For example, in her
study of the “Million Hoodies Movement,” Hon (2016) found that the movement used frame
bridging to portray the case of Trayvon Martin as part of race issue experienced by not just an
individual (Trayvon Martin), but also by African-Americans. As Buechler (2011) put it: “frame
bridging essentially says ‘we are already on the same page; why not join us?’” (p.146). It
“activates unmobilized [sic] sentiment pools or public opinion clusters; it recruits people by
demonstrating that there already is a movement representing their views” (Buechler, 2011,
p.146).
Frame amplification, according to Benford and Snow (2000) involves “idealization,
embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs” (p. 624). “the
clarification and invigoration of an interpretative frame that bears on a particular, issue, problem,
or sets of events (p. 469). In “Million Hoodies” movement study, Hon (2016) indicated how the
movement used frame amplification by continuously updating members with encouraging
clarification by saying “‘Zimmerman is getting charged (April 11, 2012)’ and ‘Motion for
acquittal denied. Zimmerman will face the jury.’ July 5, 2013)’” (p. 16). Frame amplification is
of two types: value amplification and belief amplification (Snow et al. p. 469).
Frame extension involves portraying a movement's “interests and frame(s) as extending
beyond its primary interests to include issues and concerns that are presumed to be of importance
to potential adherents” (Benford & Snow, 2000 p.625). For example, Hon (2016) indicated how
“Million Hoodies” movement used frame extension by announcing, “‘National Hoodie Day and
International Day of Internet Action for Justice! Spread the Word! (April 9, 2012)’” (p. 16). The
fourth type of frame alignment process is frame transformation, which involves “changing old
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understandings and meanings and/or generating new ones" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 625).
According to Snow et al. (1986), frame transformation occurs when the frames promoted by
social movements do not resonate with the frames of their recruits.
2.3.1 Media and social movements
“The power of the media to shape social events is a fact beyond dispute” claimed Tim
Baylor in his article on “Media framing of movement protest” published in 1996. Klandermans
(2014) argued that the media cover the existence of movements; set the stage for collective
action; provide definitions and interpretations of the situations; and take part in the creation of a
common understanding of the situations. As Fahlenbrach, Sivertsen, and Werenskjold (2014)
argued, “although both sides [media and social movements] might follow up different or even
divergent motives and frames, there is structural bind between them that is first of all based on
the common need for public attention” (p. 2).
Both media and activists need each other. Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) pointed out that
social movements need media for three main purposes: "mobilization, validation, and scope
enlargement" (p.116). According to these authors, in addition to wanting the media to convey
messages to their constituents (mobilization), they also need it to create the impression that ‘the
whole world is watching us’ (validation). Movements view media as a key to broadening the
scope of the conflict as well. Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2012) also echoed similar idea saying,
"it is difficult to imagine that social movements could exist without the mass media" (p. 395).
According to Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993), making a conflict more public offers the movement
an opportunity to "improve its relative power, compared to that of its antagonist, and mass media
coverage is a vehicle for this" (p. 115). However, this is not always the case as the media
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sometimes do not pay attention to what movements would prefer. I will discuss this in detail in
the following section.
The media-social movement interaction is not limited to the covering of issues only; it
involves how those issues are covered as well. The interaction between media and social
movements is characterized by negotiation over meaning or what Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993)
referred to as a "struggle over framing" (p. 18). Getting “preferably favorable media coverage is
one of the critical preconditions for collective action” (Boykoff, 2006, p. 193) because it affects a
movements' ability to mobilize their constituents (Cooper, 2002; Barker, 2008). Gamson and
Wolfsfeld (1993) also argued that people who are engaged in "symbolic contests read their
success or failure by how well their preferred meanings and interpretations are doing in various
media arenas" (p. 119).
Research evidence suggested that media framing has an impact on social movements’
mobilization. For instance, Cooper (2002) observed the existence of a direct relationship between
media and social movement framing congruence and movement mobilization. Thus, high
congruence between media framing and social movement framing correlates with high level of
mobilization while low level of congruence correlates with low level of mobilization. Likewise,
in their study on “Mobilizing the White March,” Walgrave and Manssens (2005) found that the
Belgian press did not only define the theme of the movement, it also facilitated people’s
participation. Accordingly, the press “not only engaged in diagnostic or prognostic framing—
more ‘normal’ functions of the media—but unmistakably undertook—large scale and
unconcealed motivational framing efforts” (p.132). The authors described the support of the
Belgian press saying, they “presented themselves as actors and players in White March events
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with as it seems, their own agenda and objectives. Indeed, turning the White March into a
success seemed to be an implicit goal of several newspapers” (p.132).
Media framing and a social movement’s framing of an issue do not always match,
however. According to Ryan (2001), factors such as resources, journalists' beliefs, and mediarelated conventions are important factors that facilitate or hinder a movement's access to the
media. Furthermore, the match between movements’ frames and the cultural frame is also an
important factor. For instance, Baylor (1996) in his study on the television framing of American
Indian protests concluded that “even to stage confrontational events to get media attention to
promote a frame that does not already conform to some widespread and beneficial cultural
frame” may not succeed (para. 45). For example, the study revealed that while the Indian
protesters used the Civil Rights and the Treaty rights frames to focus on social and economic
issues, the media mainly used the “militant,” “stereotype,” and “factionalism” to negatively
portray the protests. Undrakhbuyan’s (2001) findings on the media coverage of World Trade
Organization and protests in Seattle in 1999 also indicated how media frames and protesters’
frames of an issue do not always much. In his content analysis of whose interests the media
advanced in their coverage of the World Trade Organization and protests, he found that
developed countries and corporations received more favorable media coverage than developing
countries and protesters. In fact, most of the newspapers (39.0%) portrayed the protesters as
violent compared to (7.8%) which supported their agenda. This corroborated Ryan’s (2001)
findings that resources play a major role in facilitating or hindering movements’ frame resonance
with media. Furthermore, the study suggested that ideology played a role in influencing how
media covered the WTO and protests in Seattle saying, “the agenda of major metropolitan
newspapers tend to reflect the agenda of a strong ideological force” (p. 21).
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Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) also identified three components of movement-related
factors that affect media attention: standing (the level of attention given to the movement by the
media); preferred framing (the salience of movement's frame in the media discourse); and
sympathy (the extent to which the content covered by the media receives sympathy from
concerned people). Gamson and Wolfsfeld added that movement standing by itself depends on
resources, organization, professionalism, coordination, and strategic planning of the movement,
which also influences the degree to which the preferred frame is salient in media discourse.
2.3.2 Social media and social movements
The literature on social movement-media interaction I reviewed in the preceding section
focused on traditional media. In recent years, however, the link between social media and social
movements also received significant attention, especially since the 2008 financial crises, Arab
Spring, popular movements in Britain and Spain, and Occupy movement, etc. (Allsop, 2016).
One major question surrounding this relationship relates to whether social media has an impact
on social movements (Kidd & McIntosh, 2016).
Scholars' views on the impact of social media on social movements are divided into three
main categories: those who have optimism about the impact of social media, those who are the
pessimist about it, and those who are ambivalent (Kidd & McIntosh, 2016). For optimists, social
media has a "revolutionary power" (Kidd & McIntosh, 2016, p.785). These group of scholars
view the role of social media as a "paradigm shift" as "empowering individuals and communities
challenging existing power structures in new ways" (Allsop, 2016, p.35). They present different
reasons for their claim. For example, Gangopadhyay (2015) listed advantage of social media
such as the speed at which participants of social movements can organize themselves,
availability of chat rooms to discuss and share information, and easy and quick ways of signing
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online petitions. Maghrabi and Salam (2011) also pointed out that internet-based
communications not only help movements to organize themselves, but they also enable them to
make a real impact on politics. These authors emphasized the vital role social media play in both
"fostering the development of social movements and promoting the growth in a new political
form" (p. 9). Pointing to recent years' politics in North African and Middle East countries, Balci
and Golcu (2013) argued about the role social media plays in overthrowing authoritarian
regimes. However, they also emphasized that social media cannot cause social movements by
themselves, but when used effectively can help movements to achieve their political goals.
Pessimists view social media not only as incapable of having an impact on social
movements but also as a hindrance to a positive contribution towards a social change (Kidd &
McIntosh, 2016). These group of scholars sees social media activists, also known as
"slacktivists," as "encouraging relatively ineffectual actions, rather than supplement more
traditional forms of activism" (Allstop, 2016, p.35). Louw (2013) pointed out a problem with
manipulation in social media use, "as with all media platforms, interactive digital media forms
are also susceptible to being used as weapons by large political actors who mobilize surrogate
warfare as tools of their foreign policy" (para. 3). Louw used the examples of how states and
non-state actors use social media to insert their agenda into social movements' discourse.
The third group of scholars, ambivalent, view social media-led revolution as difficult, but
also possible in some cases (Kidd & McIntosh, 2016). According to Kidd and McIntosh (2016),
social media is not a platform used by social movements only, they are also communication
channels effectively used by governments to disrupt them. Likewise, Tufekci (2014) contended
that movements might use social media to get public’s attention quickly, find a way around
censorship, and easily coordinate, but this may not translate into their success, as success
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depends on other factors such as the structure and organization of the movement as well.
Tufekci also explained that governments have tried to disrupt protests using legal means and
other strategies such as negatively portraying social media, restricting content, and inundating
the cyberspace with supporters and paid people.
Scholars also identified other factors that moderate the impact of social media on social
movements. For instance, Olorunnisola and Martin (2012) pointed out that social media can
empower movements, but their impacts are tempered by factors related to contexts such as
digital divide. Similarly, Garcia-Murillo, Wohlers, and Zaber (2017) argued that information
communication technologies provide movements with valuable benefits such as the decreased
cost of information, but the impacts are constrained by factors such education, income level,
legal matters.
2.3.3 Social media and collective action frames
Surzhko-Harned and Zahuranec (2017) argued that social media serve as an important
framing tool. Ince, Rojas, and Davis (2017) contended that social media are platforms not only
where movement activists “promote their messages, articulate their core beliefs,” they are also a
place where they frame issues (p.1818). Surzhko-Harned & Zahuranec (2017) argued that "when
traditional sources of issues framing such as elites and media lose their credibility, social media
can provide a powerful platform for framing events and issues" (p. 775). Moscato (2015) also
pointed out that social media frames of an issue also serve the purpose of traditional media which
include reporting, mediating, debating, entertaining, and taking positions on political and
economic issues. Surzhko-Harned and Zahuranec (2017) even went further claiming that
internet-based social media have “unmatched capabilities” as sources of news and framing tool
(p. 775).
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Social media enable people to construct their frames on contentious issues (Goh & Pang,
2016, p. 531). They allow citizens to “alter and manipulate the movement’s construction of
meaning” (Ince, Rojas, & Davis, 2017, p. 1827). They enable users to create a “distributed
framing” which is using hashtags to develop an “understanding of problems and solutions that do
not exclusively rely on leaders within the movement or other highly visible individuals” (p.
1818). In their study on how Twitter users interacted with “Black Lives Matter” movement using
hashtag, Ince, Rojas, and Davis found that users 1) added more framings to the original frames of
the movements, and 2) made moves to transition from “a movement that is small and focused on
a specific grievance to a mass movement that has more developed tactics” (p. 1825).
Studies have also indicated that social media frame issues using collective action framing
strategies. For example, in her study that looked at how the “Million Hoodies Movement for
Justice” framed issues on social media, Hon (2016) found all framing tasks of collective action
frames identified by Snow and Benford (1988): diagnostic framing, prognostic framing,
motivation framing, frame bridging, and frame alignment. Accordingly, the movement used two
diagnostic frames: the injustice frame to oppose George Zimmerman’s release from jail, and the
racism frame to explain his motivation behind the shooting of Trayvon Martin. The finding also
indicated that the movement used solidarity and gun control frame as prognostic frames, while it
used participation frames such as holding rallies, marches, and vigil as motivational frames.
Moreover, the result of the study revealed that the movement used different types of frame
alignment processes. For example, they used the case of Trayvon Martin as part of a racism
issue faced by African-Americans (frame bridging). They continuously updated members with
clarification of the next move (frame-amplification). They reached out to more supporters
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(frame-extension) and went beyond Trayvon Martin’s case to include other social issues facing
African Americans (frame-transformations).
Likewise, Goh and Pang (2016), who studied the protests in 2013 and 2014 in Singapore
against the government’s immigration policy, also found that protesters used the three collective
action framing strategies: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing strategies. Their
study indicated that the protesters used the injustice frame to raise awareness about the cause of
the problem, the victim of the problem, and the injustice. They also used two prognostic
frames—a call for government change and call on the government to listen to their concerns.
They also used three types of motivation framing: collective agency (to unite to assert their
identity), individual agency (get your voice heard), and the reason for participation (legitimate
cause, likely success). However, the same study indicated the existence of difference on the level
of emphasis on different framing strategies—motivational framing most frequently used,
followed by diagnostic, prognostic frame respectively. Furthermore, it revealed a difference
between organizers and individual protesters on the level of emphasis on sub-frames under each
frame; for example, while the protest organizers emphasized government for as a causal agent,
the individual protesters emphasized foreigners.
Scholars have also looked at the impact of social media frames of movements on
traditional media frames of the same. In the study that analyzed the frames of Canada’s
“Idlenomore Movement,” Moscato (2015) found evidence that frames of hashtag activism were
not only embraced by traditional media, they also helped audiences of the mainstream media to
identify grievances, challenges, and opportunities of the movement.
However, there is not always a congruence between social media framing of a movement
and the traditional media framing of the same. For instance, in their study on how social media
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and traditional media, especially the foreign media, framed the Ukraine's Euromaidan
Movement, Surzhko-Harned and Zahuranec (2017) found disparities between the frames of the
mainstream media and social media. That is, while traditional media framed the movement as a
“geopolitical struggle,” social media portrayed it as an “anti-regime revolution” (p. 758).
Likewise, a study on framing of the 2011 Egyptian uprising by Hamdy and Goma (2016) showed
discrepancies between the frames of social media and the mainstream media. Accordingly, while
government-affiliated newspapers framed the movement as a conspiracy against the state of
Egypt, social media portrayed it as “‘a revolution for freedom and social justice’” (p. 195). The
same study also revealed that independent media adopted the combinations of both frames.
As discussed in this section, there are different perspectives on the study of social
movements such as theories of collective behavior, resource mobilization approach, the political
process theory, and the framing. This section also discussed the link between social movements
and the media (both traditional and social media). The next part looks at the role of foreign
media in the democratization process by paying attention to the Western media coverage of
Africa.
2.4

Foreign Media and Democratization
The role of foreign media on democratization has been the subject of scholarly

discussions for decades. Studies revealed that international media play a significant role both in
the process and the outcome of the democratization effort such as encouraging and promoting
protests and weakening authoritarian governments through propaganda. This section provides a
summary of the literature on the role of foreign media in the process of democratization and
some overview of Western media coverage of Africa.
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Foreign media played a significant role in conflicts in other states. For example, the
Western media played a vital role in weakening the Communist regimes. They provided
audiences in those regimes with alternative information that was not available on domestic media
(Kern & Hainmuller, 2009). By so doing, they allowed the audiences “to compare communist
propaganda with credible information from abroad” (Kern & Hainmuller, 2009, p. 379).
According to Kern and Hainmuller (2009), foreign media also exposed to the world the presence
of protest movements, human rights abuses, and those countries’ involvement in foreign wars.
Furthermore, they enabled the audience in the Communist countries to make a comparison
between their life standards with those of people in the capitalist countries and familiarized them
with democracies and freedom in other countries (Kern & Hainmuller, p. 379).
Foreign media also foster opposition to the authoritarian regimes. For example, during
WWII, BBC worked hard to promote protests against the Nazi-Germany’s occupation in Europe.
(Gagliarducci, Onorato, Sobbrio & Tabellini, 2017). For example, in their study on BBC Italian
Service’s radio program’s coverage of the Nazi’s occupation of Italy during World War II,
Gagliarducci et al. (2017) identified two strategies the radio program used to foster protests.
First, it targeted groups or individuals who wanted to engage in resistance, and second, it
provided information and counter-propaganda messages to the broader section of the society. As
Gagliarducci et al. (2017) put it:
The Italian program was giving counter-propaganda messages against the fascist regime
along with information on the war events both within and outside Italy, as well as
encoded messages for the resistance. These “special messages” [sic] aimed at delivering
logistic and military information to resistance fighters (upcoming military operations,
shipments of supplies, weapons, movements of troops, etc.). (p. 6).
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The Western media generally pay less attention to issues in Africa (Kalyango &
Onyebadi, 2012; & McNulty, 1999). When they cover the continent, they focus on areas where
the Western countries have interests (Kalyango & Onyebadi, 2012). It is “almost always in direct
proportion to the scale of direct Western involvement (NGO or military intervention), or to the
degree of clamour for such interventions (the ‘something must be done response)”
(McNulty,1999, p. 269). For example, in their study of the 30 years of coverage of Africa by
three U.S. television networks (ABC, NBC & CBS), Kalyango and Onyebadi (2012) found that
Africa received less coverage (19%) than the networks’ coverage of Europe (54%) and South
America (27%).
Another area that attracted the attention of media scholars has been how the Western
media represent conflicts in Africa. The media representation of Africa is generally negative
(Gruley & Duvall, 2012) focusing mainly on conflicts and crises (Kalyango & Onyebadi, 2012)
and stereotypical tribalism (Gruley & Duvall, 2012; & McGulty, 1999).
Different factors affect the Western media coverage and frames of issues in Africa.
These include the interest of the Western countries (Kalyango & Onyebadi, 2012; McNulty,
1999; colonial stereotypes (Gruley & Duvall, 2012; Vladisavljevic, 2015), political context
(Baum & Zhukov, 2015), and journalistic professionalism (Nwosu, 1987).
For example, Kalyango and Onyebadi (2012) found that three U.S. based networks’
(ABC, NBC, & CBS) news events focused on topics that included the involvement of the U.S.
government and its militaries. According to these authors, this explains why only a few
geographic locations, e.g., southern and northern parts of Africa, received media coverage. They
concluded that the “coverage of Africa focused on the northern and southern part of the
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continent, possibly because several countries in both regions such as South Africa and Egypt are
geographically linked to the interests of the United States” (p. 681).
Some scholars have also found that colonial stereotypes influence the Western media
coverage of conflicts in Africa. For example, in their study of how The New York Times and The
Washington Post covered the conflicts in Darfur, Sudan, from 2003-2009, Gruley and Duvall
(2012) found that the newspapers represented the disputes stereotypically and linked it with
tribalism, using terms associated with it, such as ethnic and tribe. Gruely and Duvall also found
that the newspapers’ coverage of conflicts in Darfur lacked detail. Vladsavljevic (2015) also
made similar assertion saying: “…media representation of political conflicts in African states
have long involved negative stereotypes and relied on the themes of ‘ancient hatreds’ and
‘tribalism’” (p. 12).
The nature of the regimes, whether democratic or undemocratic, can also affect how the
international media cover conflicts. That is, the media underreport conflicts in undemocratic
states compared to their coverage of conflicts in democratic countries. For example, in their
studies of international newspapers reporting of the crisis in Libya in 2015, Baum and Zhukov
(2015) found media bias against opponents of the Libyan regime which included underreporting
protests and collective action by protesters, ignoring violence committed by the government, and
highlighting on violence committed by the opponents.
The way the news media cover Africa’s democratization process varies from media to
media. For example, Alalawi (2015) who studied how Fox News and Al Jazeera covered the
Arab Spring found a great discrepancy between the two media. That is, for example, Fox News
gave negative coverage to protests in Egypt against the incumbent President Hosni Mubarak. Fox
News associated the Muslim Brotherhood, the most organized political party that led the protest,
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with terrorism and extremism. However, Alalawi found that Aljazeera portrayed the Muslim
Brotherhood as a peaceful political movement. Alalawi concluded that Fox News informed the
American audience that the movement was radical and extremist and described the group as antidemocratic.
As reviewed in this section, foreign media play a significant role in the process of
democratization. But the Western press generally gives less attention to issues in Africa. Even
when they give attention, their coverage and framing of issues depend on different factors such
as the economic and interests of the Western countries and colonial stereotypes. The following
section discusses the literature on counter-movement framing by opponents and government
officials.
2.5

Theories of International Relations, News Media, and NGOs
International relations and media studies are two separate fields of studies. However,

scholars have attempted to establish a link between the two recently. Non-Governmental
Organizations such as human rights groups, which received less attention in the literature of
international relations, have also received some attention in recent years. This section will give a
summary of the major theories of international relations, and will then review literature that links
international relations theories, news media, and NGOs.
2.5.1 Major approaches to the study of international relations
Scholars of international relations have long tried to provide a theoretical explanation of
why and how states form a relationship—be it political, diplomatic, economic or otherwise—
with other states. Although there are many theories of international relations, four major
theoretical models dominate the literature on international relations. They are realism,
institutionalism, liberalism, and constructivism.
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The realist approach to study international relations stems from its assumptions about
states (Mearsheimer, 1992). According to realists, states are always in the state of anarchy; they
have some “offensive military capacity;” they always live in uncertainty; their motive is survival,
and they are rational” (Mearsheimer, 10). The realists hold the view that cooperation among
states is possible but that it is unsustainable (p.12). The main reason cooperation among states
cannot last long in the eyes of realists is due to two main reasons: cheating and relative-gains
considerations. Mearsheimer pointed out that “the bottom-line, however, is that cooperation
takes place in a world that is competitive at its core—one where states have powerful incentives
to take advantages of other states” (p.13).
The institutionalist model shares many of realist’s assumption about the world. That is,
the world is characterized by anarchy, offensive capacity, uncertainty, survival, and rationality.
According to liberal institutionalists, institutions lead to international stability and strengthen the
connection between institutions and economic cooperation. However, they part company with
realists on how to deal with a security dilemma that has roots in anarchy. Unlike realists, they
believe that it is not alliance formation or balance of power that allays states’ fear for security,
but it is institutional cooperation among nations (Mearsheimer, (p.16). According to Keohane
and Martin (1995), cheating and lack of trust among states can be dealt with through established
institutional rules. Liberal institutionalists give four reasons why institutions bring cooperation
that results in world stability: they increase transactions among states; result in issue-linkages
and reluctance to cheat; increase information flow; and reduce transaction costs.
The liberalist theoretical model holds the view that it is essential to pursue “policies that
can be termed to be in the common good, rather than what is good for the individual state”
(Kaufman, 2014, p. 53). This theoretical model accepts cooperation and interdependence among
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states. Many scholars in international relations believe that “because of its broad worldview and
its acceptance of interdependence, there are many in international relations who think that the
liberal model is more appropriate than realist theory in describing and explaining international
relations in a globalized post– Cold War world” (53). Like institutionalists, liberals accept the
idea that cooperation among countries is possible. However, unlike realists and institutionalists,
liberalists argue that a state is not unitary, i.e., there many actors and interest groups who can
affect international cooperation. According to liberalism, domestic interest affects international
relations. In her book: “Interests, Institutions, and Information” Helen V. Milner (1997)
described how domestic politics impact international relations. She argued that domestic politics
and international relations are inseparable: “A country’s international position exerts an
important impact on its internal politics and economics” and “conversely, its domestic situation
shapes its behaviors in foreign relations” (Milner, 1997, p.1). Milner also claimed that three
variables—interests, institutions, and information— in domestic politics have impact on
international relations (p.11).
The fourth approach to study international relations is constructivism. This approach
looks at relations within “a larger set of social and political interactions and the ways in which
those relationships help a state frame the answers” (Kaufman, 2013, p. 57). Constructivists argue
that ideas are socially constructed. Elaborating on constructivist claims Wendt (1994) said:
1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; 2) the key
structures in the state system are intersubjective, rather than material; and 3) state
identities and interests are an important part constructed by their social structures, rather
than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics. (p. 385).
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Scholars have indicated that the constructivist approach to international relations explains
the role of media in foreign affairs. According to Dell’orto (2013), “…while power, interests and
institutions matter, they need to be understood as constituted by ideas that exist within their
specific cultural and historical times” (p. 238). In the process of construction ideas,
communication is important because it is “a necessary locus for the negotiation of those
meanings within widely accepted, historically and culturally specific understandings” Dell’orto,
2013, 2018). That is, if ideas are socially constructed, as the constructivists argue, then
communication plays a fundamental role, as it is “a site for the formation of meaning around
foreign realities” (Dell’orto, 2013).
2.5.2 Media and international relations
In today’s world, people of one country have exposure to the media of a foreign country.
As O’Hefferman (1991), pointed out:
every country is penetrated by the media of other countries, from international magazines
and newspapers brought in by tourists and business travelers to news and entertainment
directly broadcast from satellite to homes, offices, and cable systems in dozens of
countries simultaneously. (p. 85).
Exposure to foreign media has significant bearings on international relations. According
to Moulana (2015), the international pollical affairs which were once characterized by
“geographical and physical level” are being replaced by “cultural and communication” where the
news media plays a role (p. 92). Mass communication is important in international relations
because “it remains an essential locus for the creation, definition and transformation of the power
relationships that lie at the heart of international affairs” (Dell’orto, 2013, p. 1). Dell’orto further
pointed out that media “…has been a crucial factor—an irreplaceable mediator—in international
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affairs historically and currently, by functioning as the public arena where meanings for things
literally foreign become understandable realities that, in turn, serve as the basis for policy and
action” (p. 1). The media helps create a country’s image in foreign countries. As Dell’orto (2013)
argued, they play a key role as the “images of national identities it helps create and negotiate
influence expectations and consequently policies” (p.2).
News media are also essential in international relations. as controlling the global agenda
is a “source of power” (Moulana, 2015, p. 93). Scholars have emphasized the role of media in
agenda setting. For example, in their study on the role of international news on setting agendas,
Wanta, Golan, and Lee (2004) found the link between international news coverage of
international issues and people’s perception. In their study on the link between the U.S. news
media coverage of international news and audience perception, they found that the more the U.S.
news media cover a foreign country, the more audience members perceive that country as
important to the United States. Additionally, their study also found that negative coverage of a
foreign country led to negative audience perceptions of that country.
2.5.3 Non-Governmental Organizations and international relations
Scholars give marginal status to the role of Non-Governmental Organizations in
international relations (van Boven, 1989). Van Boven then argued that although many
international organizations such as the United Nations rely on NGOs for information, the latter's
contribution to promoting human rights did not get the attention they deserve. Accordingly, it is
less well known that a good number of NGOs are performing many other functions for the sake
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. That fact that NGOs also make contributions—and
often very significant ones—to the development of human rights norms is an aspect of NGO
activities that is generally overlooked. (p. 207). Other scholars, however, acknowledged the role
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of NGOs such as human rights organizations. For example, Sikkink (1998) found that NGOs
such as human rights organizations can influence the other countries’ domestic policies by
“norms and ideas” (p. 517).
2.5.4 Non-governmental organizations and news media
Scholars of media studies mainly focused on the role of the news media in shaping the
discourse about social movements. This is so perhaps because the news media dominated
coverage of international issues. However, studies also indicate that the news media are facing
competition from Non-Governmental Organizations (Powers, 2018). This section reviews
literature on the relationship between NGOs and news media.
2.5.4.1 The role of NGOs in news production
In recent years, there is scholarly work that indicates the role of the non-governmental
organization in shaping discourses about social movements around the world. Non-governmental
organizations not only play a key role in shaping discourse about human rights situations, but
they also produce news, an area traditionally considered an exclusive domain of the news media.
According to Powers (2018), they “play an increasingly crucial role in shaping and in some cases
directly producing news coverage about some of the most pressing humanitarian and human
rights issues of our time” (p. 4).
Powers (2018) explained why NGOs are involved in news production. NGOs see
“communication as both a way to garner credibility as actors in international politics and a
means to raise funds—either directly (through public donations) or indirectly via (via
branding)—that are necessary for their survival and growth” (Powers, 2018, p.5).
The involvement of Non-Governmental Organizations in news production led them to
work with the news media as well. That is, NGOs hire journalists who prefer “a news-making
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sensibility to advocacy organizations” (Powers, 2018, p. 5). NGO’s working together with
journalists also affects the type of information they gather. As Powers pointed out:
Although the development of such sensibilities boosts these organizations’ overall
chances of garnering news coverage, it also ensures that advocacy groups produce
information that largely accords with rather than challenges media preferences. Donors,
government officials, and news organizations—each in different ways and for distinct
reasons—further reinforce these tendencies by incentivizing NGOs to focus their efforts
primarily on appearing in the mainstream news media. (p. 5).
2.5.4.2 News media’s dependence on NGOs
As NGOs need journalists, the news media also rely on NGOs. That is, news media use
NGOs as a source of information, because of what Wright (2018) described a shift in their
“political economy” (p.5). Wright explained the cause of the shift in the political economy,
saying: “the decline in revenues of the news organization caused by the decline in circulation and
shift of advertising to online media have led the news organization to cut back on the number of
foreign bureaus and journalists” (p. 5). Wright also pointed out the rise in “‘costs of news
production’ to compete with other news organizations is also a factor in change of the political
economy” (p.5).
2.6

Counter-Movement Framing by Governments and Non-Governments
Social movements cannot always impose their interpretations of events on others as their

construction of reality is challenged by others who do not support them. That is, the process of
framing in social movements is a contested arena (Benford & Snow, 2000; Mc Adam,
McCarthy& Zald, 1996; Noakes, 2005; Zald, 1996). It is “the subject of intense contestation
between collective actors representing the movement, the state and any existing
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countermovement” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996, p. 16). According to Benford and
Snow (2000), activists who are engaged in the construction of collective action frames cannot
“construct and impose on their intended targets any version of reality they would like,” because
they face different challenges from movement opponents (p. 625).
Boscarino (2016) defined frame contestation as “an explicit and confrontational
engagement with opposing frames and framers” (p. 285). There are framing contests between
movements and counter-movements; between movements and the media; and between
movements and authorities. The framing contests between movement and countermovement are
mainly to “demonstrate who has the most support and resources at their command” and “to
persuade authorities and bystanders of the rightness of their cause” (Zald, 1996, p. 269).
According to Benford and Snow (2000), counter-framing is any “attempts to ‘rebut, undermine,
or neutralize a person’s or group’s myths, version of reality, or interpretative framework’
(Benford, 1987, p. 75)” (p. 626).
Opponents of social movements challenge different aspects of movements’ frames. For
example, Benford and Snow (2000) pointed out that they mainly challenge the diagnostic and
prognostic collective action frames. But Zald (1996) argued they challenge the mobilization
frames as well. As discussed in the preceding section, media and movements are also engaged in
“the struggle over framing” (Gamson & Wolfsefeld, 1993, p. 18). Frame contestants use
different framing tactics.
Opponents of movement frames used different techniques to counter-frame collective
action frames. For example, in her study on the frame contestation between two interest groups
of energy policy—the Sierra Club and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)— Boscarino (2016)
identified four framing techniques: discrediting frames, utility frames, perversity frames, and
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character frames. For example, the study indicated that the EDF used the discrediting frame
technique against the Sierra Club’s utility claims by accusing it of “presenting misleading
information on energy usage” (p. 297). Also, while the Sierra Club used the “futility frame” to
“assert that the competing proposal was inadequate and would not solve the problem at hand,”
the EDF used the “perversity frame” by claiming “their opponents plan would actually
exacerbate energy issues” (p. 298). Both groups used character frames to “delegitimize” their
opponents (Boscarino, 2016, p. 299).
In their study on frame competition between supporters and opponents of abortion in the
United States, McCaffrey and Keys (2000) identified three strategies: “polarization-vilification,”
“frame saving,” and “frame debunking” (p.56). McCaffrey and Keys’ study indicated that the
New York State National Organization for Women (NYSNOW) used the dichotomy of ‘us vs.
them’ to polarize conservatives who opposed abortion. In their analysis of the polarizationvilification strategy used by NYSNOW in National NOW Times newsletter McCaffrey and Keys
(2000) said:
This newsletter [National NOW Times] suggested that there was ‘a nationwide criminal
conspiracy’ and that ‘these fanatics have instituted a reign of terror against women
nationwide.’ Antiabortion activists ‘have use illegal violent tactics to close clinics,
including smashing medical equipment, invading clinics and intimidating patients and
medical staff. (p.51).
McCaffrey and Keys’ study also revealed how NYSNOW debunked their opponents’ use
of the term, ‘pro-life’ saying “‘the pro-life is a term used to make anti-abortion, and anti-choice
seem positive and good’ (Mid Suffolk NOW June 1987’” (p. 53). In addition, the study showed
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NYSNOW used a frame saving strategy, for example by arguing they were ‘pro-choice, not proabortion.
Scholars also argued that state officials are also engaged in the activity of counterframing the collective action frames of social movements. That is, as social movements are
“signifying agents” engaged in the construction of meanings (Snow and Benford, 1988), states
are also “active signifying agents engaged in the construction and maintenance of official
frames” (Noakes, 2005, p. 105). McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996) argued states engage in
counter-framing activities, especially when they realize “the movement is able to establish itself
as a serious force for social change” (p.17).
Scholars established some similarities between social movements’ collective action
frames and government officials’ frames. The first being both social movements and states (state
agencies) are “signifying agents” engaged in meaning construction. The second, both
movements’ collective action frames and official (state) frames of an issue value frame
resonance (Noakes, 2005). Benford and Snow (2000) referred to frame resonance as “the
credibility of the preferred frame and its relative salience” with target audiences (p. 619).
Another similarity, according to Noakes (2005), is like social movements, state officials also
“draw on familiar repertoires of interpretations to construct official frames” (p. 101).
Accordingly, states not only ensure their frames have cultural resonance but also aim to preserve
“political legitimacy” and maintain “sentiments attaching citizens to the state’s activities” (p.
104).
Scholars also compared the impact of a movement’s collective action frames with official
frames. For example, Noakes (2005) argued that official frames of issues have a greater chance
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of winning than the collective action frames of movements because of the differences in the
amount of resources each has at its disposal. According to Noakes:
In terms of both materials and cultural resources, state managers enjoy significant
advantages over social movement entrepreneurs and that the official frames they
construct have a greater chance of triumphing in the struggle for cultural supremacy than
do collective action frames mobilized by social movement entrepreneurs. (p. 105).
2.7

Summary
As discussed in this chapter, the social movement by the Oromo people is decades old.

The question of self-determination and land rights raised during the Ethiopian student movement
in 1960 was also the question of the Oromo people. Although those questions were addressed
and enshrined in the Constitution, the Oromo people continue to protest against the government
policy on land and self-governance. However, this time, the Oromo people’s protests utilized
social media and received global attention more than at any time in history.
The literature on media and social movements gives important insights into how social
movements engage in the process of meaning construction to create collective action frames that
will gain positive media attention. It sheds lights on the core collective action framing tasks of
movements: diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation. In addition, the literature on government
officials’ framing of issues also indicates that as movements engage in constructing collective
action frames, government officials also engage in constructing official frames, which often
results in counter-framing contests.
From the literature on the media-social movement interaction, there are three major
takeaways. First, social movements need media coverage for validation, mobilization, and scope
enlargement. Second, the media and social movements engage in negotiation over meaning, or
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what Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993) termed “struggle over framing.” Third, media frames and
the social movement’s frames of an issue do not always match, but it is preferable for a social
movement for the media’s framing to be congruent with their own.
On the link between social media and social movements, while the question of whether
social media has an impact on movements remains controversial, there is an agreement among
scholars on social media being used as a forum to organize collective action. They enable
movements and the audience both to share information and to frame issues. Movements use
social media to frame issues using all framing strategies identified in the literature: diagnostic,
prognostic, and motivational framing strategies.
On the Western media coverage of the democratization process in Africa, there is enough
scholarly work that suggests the continent receives less media attention compared with other
continents. As discussed in the preceding section, the Western media give coverage to issues in
Africa where the Western countries have economic or military interests. This may suggest that
the Western media coverage of the democratization process in Africa is helpful to social
movements in areas where the Western countries have interests and when those interests are best
served by supporting the democratization process.
This project is aimed at examining how the Oromo protest movement was covered by
different actors, i.e., Oromo protest movement activists, news media, government officials, and
international organizations. It analyzes how international news media, Oromo protest movement
activists, and human rights organizations (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International)
covered the Oromo protest movement. The next chapter will discuss the methods used to inquire
into these questions.
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3
3.1

METHODS: MAIN STUDY

Introduction
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine, via a textual analysis, the major themes

of the Oromo protest movement as covered by different actors who play key roles in shaping
discourse about protest movements, namely, the news media, activist messages, human rights
organizations, and the Ethiopian government officials. It also aimed at looking at whether or not
the themes and frames highlighted by the news media were congruent with the themes and
frames emphasized by other actors. This chapter provides a detailed description of how the study
was conducted. It begins with listing and explaining each of the major research questions, and
then it describes the research design, i.e., the data sample and procedures (data collection and
data analysis).
3.2

Research Question
This dissertation examined texts produced by the news media, key Oromo activists,

human rights groups, and government officials in order to uncover the themes highlighted during
three key events in the Oromo protest movement and how each actor framed those themes. To
this end, it attempted to answer the following five research questions, discussed in these
subsections below.
3.2.1 Major themes of the international news media
As discussed in chapter two, the mass media play an important role in shaping the
discourse about social movements. They cover the existence of movements, “define and interpret
the situations,” and create a “shared definition of the situation” Klandermans (2014, p.42). They
also frame issues by defining a problem, interpreting the causes, evaluating the morals, and
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suggesting solutions (Entman, 1993). As regards social movements, studying news media is key
to understanding how they “coalesce, build, and maintain themselves, as well as how they decide
to frame their dissident messages.” (Boykoff, 2016, p. 193). So, this project sought to look at the
major themes of the news media on the Oromo protest movement and how those themes were
framed. By answering the following research question:
RQ1: What were the major themes of the international news media on the Oromo protest
movement? How did they frame those themes?
3.2.2 Major themes of the messages of the Oromo activists
As discussed in chapter 2, social movements are “signifying agents actively involved in
the framing of events and conditions, and thus in the production of meanings and ideas” (Snow
& Benford, 1988, p. 213). By engaging in the construction of collective action frames, activists
create a common understanding on the definition of a problem that needs change, attribution on
who is responsible, or what to blame, solutions to the problem, and actions needed to change it
(Benford & Snow, 2000). According to these authors, these core collective action framing tasks
can be defined as diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. In addition to studying the
news media texts, understanding the social movements also requires studying the movements
themselves. So, this dissertation sought to understand the themes highlighted by the social media
activists of the Oromo protest movement and how those themes were portrayed, by answering
the following research question:
RQ2. What were the major themes of the messages of the key Oromo activists? How did they
frame those themes?
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3.2.3 Major themes of human rights organizations
One area that receives little scholarly attention in social movement studies is the
discourse of international organizations such as rights-oriented NGOs. As discussed in the
preceding two chapters, international human rights organizations also play a key role in reporting
on issues that involve human rights violations around the world. The news media also use them
as a source of information, especially with the rights violations in the case of Ethiopia.
Therefore, this project also sought to assess the themes of the Oromo protest movement as
highlighted by two influential internatonal human rights groups, namely, Human Rights Watch
and Amnesty International, by answering the following question:
RQ3. What were the major themes highlighted by international human rights organizations
(Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International)? How did they frame those themes?
3.2.4

Major themes of the Ethiopian government officials
The dissertation also looked at the major themes of the response by the Ethiopian

government officials to the Oromo protest movement. Governments are not only the targets of
the protest movement, but they are also sources of information for the news media. Furthermore,
government officials are not passive onlookers; they are involved in shaping the discourse about
the protests against them as well. As Noakes (2015) argued, governments are “engaged in the
construction and maintenance of official frames” (p. 105). So, the project also answered the
following research question:
RQ4. What were the major themes of the Ethiopian government officials’ response to the
protest? How did they frame those themes?
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3.2.5 Comparison of news media frames with the frame of other actors.
As discussed in chapter two, social movements operate in a contested arena where
“intense contestation” takes place between “collective actors representing the movement, the
state, and any existing countermovements” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996, p. 16). Hence,
this project sought to understand the framing dynamics between the news media frames and
frames other actors (Oromo activists, international human rights groups, and the Ethiopian
government officials) by looking at the following question:
RQ5. How did the international news media frames compare with the frames of other actors
(activists, human rights groups, and the Ethiopian government officials), especially in
terms of reflecting the Oromo activists’ frames on the protests?
3.3

Data
In order to answer the research questions, texts produced during the Oromo protest

movement provide an ideal source of data. They are important to study messages in general and
how those messages are presented in particular. According to Lindolf and Taylor (2011), texts
give insights into how behaviors and interpretations are coordinated. They also argued that texts
are sites where power, legitimacy, and reality are claimed. Texts are important sources of data
for researchers who study frames and framing as well. According to Johnston (2002), “frames
are based on text” (p. 66). Johnston provided three main reasons as to why texts are important
sources of data for researchers who study frames and framing activities: 1) movement
participants always accomplish framing activities though texts; 2) researchers get access to
frames and framing activities mostly through texts; and 3) “verification of framing and framing
activities or of frame’s content is based on evidence embodied in what people say and do” (p.
66). For the purpose of this study, I adopted Johnston’s (2002) definition of texts, which are
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“symbolic behaviors and their structures” that include “written documents; verbal behaviors such
as conversations, speeches, slogans, songs; and sometimes visual representations such as
pictures, cartoons; and combinations of all three” (p. 66).
So, for a sample, this project analyzed news stories on the Oromo protests published by
international media; Facebook posts of the eight key Oromo activists; statements of the
Ethiopian government officials (press releases and interview transcripts); and reports, news, and
dispatches of the human rights groups (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International).
Explanation of why these materials were important and fitting to analyze is discussed here (3.3),
followed by more specifics on the sample in the next section (3.4).
3.3.1 News stories of international news media
The stories international news media outlets covered about Oromo protests are important
materials to analyze. According to Wanta, Golan, & Lee (2004), international news media play a
vital role in informing foreign audiences. These authors also pointed out that the media shape the
policy of foreign governments on issues. Moreover, it is a tool of diplomacy (Price, 2003). The
association between news coverage of an issue and public perception of importance of those
issues has been well established by studies on agenda setting. For social movements, getting
access to media coverage also helps protest movements to achieve the three major goals
identified by Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993): mobilization, validation, and scope enlargement. In
many cases, reports of international media are also used as sources for different human rights
organizations.
3.3.2 Facebook posts of the Oromo protest activists
In recent years, Facebook has become an important area of study. According to Wilson,
Gosling, and Graham (2012), social media like Facebook provide scholars with the opportunity
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to examine human behavior that was not easy to assess previously. These authors also pointed
out that activities of Facebook users such as connecting to others, expressing their preferences,
and updating their status provides scholars with important data. According to these authors,
Facebook's popularity also deserves scholarly attention. Mark Zuckerberg on his Facebook post
on June 27, 2017, stated that the number of Facebook users has reached 2 billion people per
month. Facebook's positive and negative impact on users demands scholarly attention as well
(Wilson, Gosling, & Graham, 2012). In addition, social media may play a role in changing
regimes through protests (Balci & Golcu, 2013).
Facebook posts of the key Oromo activists were used to conduct this project for several
reasons. First, Oromo activists used this platform extensively during the protests. They published
and shared different posts about the protests including textual messages, pictures, and videos.
Second, Facebook posts provide a primary document, i.e., messages produced or shared by the
activists themselves. Unlike studying only media reports on movements, analyzing materials
produced by protesters themselves help to get direct insights into their thinking. Third, in a
country like Ethiopia where media and information were under strict control of the government,
social media, especially Facebook, were an ideal platform to freely discuss political issues.
Fourth, prominent Oromo activists used Facebook more than any other media platform to
communicate about the protests. For example, activist Jawar Mohammed, whose Facebook posts
were analyzed, used this platform to share information about the protests with his more than 1.2
(now it reached 1.5) million followers.
3.3.3

Statements and reports of human rights groups
The Oromo protest movement also captured the attention of the international human

rights organizations. International organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty

56

International not only document injustices and violations against human rights by governments
around the world, they can be an additional voice for the activists. Their documents are often
used as news sources by news media.
3.3.4 Statements and press releases of the Ethiopian government officials
Analyzing responses from government officials to the Oromo protest movement was also
important. First, Oromo protesters’ major demands such as canceling the Addis Ababa Master
Plan, releasing political leaders, and stopping the jailing and killing of protesters were directed at
the government officials. Second, protesters’ call for collective actions (such as demonstrations,
stay-at-home campaign, and market boycotts) were aimed at pressuring the government officials
to answer their demands. Third, government officials also engaged in countermovement
activities.
The Ethiopian government officials issued numerous statements. First, they denied the
claim the protesters made that the Master Plan aimed at displacing farmers from their ancestral
lands, and instead, said it aimed at building infrastructures such as roads and social services
centers such as hospitals. Then they said the protesters’ demand to cancel the Master Plan was
the question of the few that did not represent the majority of people. As the intensity of the
protest increased, however, they accused organizers of the movement of hidden political
agendas. For example, at a press conference he gave on February 25, 2016, Getachew Rada,
Government Communications Affairs Office Minster, said the demands of the Oromo protest
movement “has no relation either with the integrated master plan or the lack of good
governance” and rather, “subversive elements have taken advantages of the grievances of the
people and diverted it into their own hidden political agenda” (The Ethiopian News Agency,
2016, para. 9).

57

So, analyzing government officials’ responses to the demands of the protesters was
important to get insights into the dynamics of collective action frames and government official
frames.
3.4

Data Collection
This section discusses procedures and techniques of data collection from each actor’s

sample texts. It also discusses the number of data (in terms of the unit of analysis) analyzed to
answer each research question discussed in the preceding sections.
3.4.1 Data from the news media
In order to answer RQ1, the texts of eight international news media were collected. The
news media outlets are: The Associated Press, The Agence France Presse, Reuters, The
Washington Post, The New York Times, CNN, BBC, and The Guardian. These media outlets
were selected based on: (1) the amount of coverage they gave to the Oromo protest movement,
(2) the fact that most of them are Western-based media (as activists want their stories heard by
audiences of influential countries), and (3) their popularity (audience size). The unit of analysis
for the data on international media was news stories (N=73), editorials (N=3), and op-eds (N=2).
News stories were selected as they are the primary information source that tells the public what
happened, citing many sources. Editorials are also chosen not only because they also tell what
happened, but they also reflect the opinions of the news organizations. Op-eds were selected
because, although they might not reflect the opinion of the news organization, they are at least a
primary platform for expert opinion.
Lexis/Nexis Academic was used to search for stories produced between November 12,
2015 (the day the Oromo protests started) and November 1, 2016 (a month after the Irreecha
incident) using keywords: "Oromo," "Oromo Protests," "Ethiopia," and "Ethiopia Protests,"
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"Feyissa Lilessa," and "Irreecha 2016," and “Oromia grand rally.” The names of key Oromo
activists whose Facebook pages I analyzed as they were cited by many media outlets. These
activists are: Jawar Mohammed, Etana Habte, Girma Gutema, Tsegaye Ararsa, Najat Hamza,
Henoke Gabisa, and Ezekiel Gebissa, and Geressu Tufa.
The search resulted in 132 articles in total. However, 54 articles that mentioned the
Oromo protests marginally were rejected, and the remaining 78 were analyzed. The number of
articles analyzed based on the source are: BBC (N=14), The Agence France Presse (N=13),
Reuters (N=12), The Associated Press (N=10), The Washington Post (N=9), The New York
Times (N=8), CNN (N=7), and The Guardian (N=5). Out of these articles, 73 were news stories
while three and two were editorials and op-eds respectively. In addition, 12 were also analyzed.
3.4.2 Data from the Facebook posts of the key Oromo activists
To answer RQ2, Facebook posts of eight Oromo activists were collected: Jawar
Mohammed, Etana Habte, Girma Gutema, Tsegaye Ararsa, Najat Hamza, Henoke Gabisa,
Ezekiel Gebissa, and Geressu Tufa. These activists were selected based on their prominence:
their participation, number of their posts, their appearance in different media, and the number of
followers they have. They were seen working together in different ways. Most of them appeared
together on Oromia Media Network (OMN)—a U.S.-based satellite television station they
control – to give their opinions and analysis on Oromo protest movement. Most of them also
appeared on international media such as BBC. They not only appeared together in media, they
also shared and “liked” each other’s Facebook posts.
The unit of analysis of the Facebook data was activists’ posts (written texts, photo
captions, videos and audio) and shares (written texts, photo captions, videos and audio). The
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posts and “Shares” of the activists reflect not only their thinking, but also what they want their
follower to pay attention to.
The search term “#OromoProtests,” Irreecha 2016, “Feyisa Lilesa,” and “#GrandOromia
Rally” were used to collect posts produced and posted during three significant events during
Oromo protests: the August 6, 2016 Grand Oromia Rally, the October 2, 2016 "Irreecha
Massacre," and Feyissa Lilessa' s August 21, 2016 Rio Olympic Marathon. The August 6, 2016
Oromia Grand Rally was a major event. Activists called an Oromia-wide rally to protest against
the government for its marginalization of Oromo people and human rights abuses. As a result,
hundreds of thousands of people participated in the demonstration in more than 200 cities and
towns, which led to the death of more than 50 people (Opride, 2016)
The August 21, 2016 Rio Olympic Marathon is a significant event in the history of the
Oromo protest movement. Athlete Feyisa Lilessa, an Oromo, who crossed his arms above his
head—as a symbol of resistance—at the 2016 Rio Olympics brought the Oromo cause to the
attention of global media. As a result, Oromos called him a “hero” who took a risk to himself and
his family who were in Ethiopia at the time. His action created curiosity among international
media, which as a result, gave significant coverage to the Oromo protests. The European Union
invited him on November 10, 2016, to explain the human rights situation in Ethiopia.
The October 2, 2016 Irreecha (the annual Thanksgiving festival of the Oromo people)
also marks an important event in this history of Oromo protest movement. At the event where
more than 2 million people gathered (Al-Jazeera 2016), a clash broke out between the people and
government security forces, and resulted in the death of 55 people, according to the government,
but 678 deaths according to the Opposition political party (Allo, 2017). Following this, activists
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called for “five days of rage” and angry protesters attacked many private and foreign-owned
investments. Like the Rio Olympic event, this event also received significant media attention.
For the Grand Oromia Rally and “Irreecha Masacre,” I analyzed materials posted five
days before and after the event. The purpose of including the pre-event, during, and post-event
materials is to examine how activists framed issues up to, during, and after these events and to
see whether frames changed. For Rio Olympic event however, however, there was not a plan for
it, and hence, there were no materials produced for it.
The search resulted in N=1,539 posts in total. In order to reduce the number for a
qualitative in-depth analysis, however, the data were arranged according to the date they were
published and every 5th number was picked, which resulted in N=308. 52 more posts which were
counted more than once because they were shared by more than one activist, and the remaining
256 posts (texts: N=235; pictures: N= 11; & videos: N=8) were analyzed.
3.4.3 Data from International human rights organizations
As the data produced by human rights groups were limited in number, all available
materials that were published between November 12, 2015 to October 2016) were analyzed. In
total, N=18 reports, ten from Human Rights Watch, and eight from Amnesty International were
examined. The unit of analysis for the data from human rights groups was reports and dispatches,
and letters.
3.4.4 Data from the Ethiopian government officials
The data to analyze the major themes of the Ethiopian government officials’ response to
the Oromo protest movement were press statements and interview texts of the officials. Since the
responses of the government officials were limited in number, all publicly available materials
that were produced from November 2, 2015 (the day protests started) until October 22, 2016
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were analyzed. In total, eight texts: four interview transcripts from government officials were
analyzed: one by Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn; three by Getachew Reda, Director of
the Ethiopian Government Communications Affairs; and four newspaper interview transcripts by
Addis Ababa and Oromia government officials.
3.5

Data Analysis
To answer the research questions discussed in the preceding section, the qualitative

research approach, specifically, qualitative framing analysis was used. Framing has been defined
in different ways by different scholars. For example, Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, Bliss,
and Ghanem (1991) cited by Weaver (2007) defined media frames as “the central organizing
ideas for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of
selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” (p.143). This definition emphasizes providing
context as an important aspect of news content. It also highlights different techniques used by
news media to frame issues: “selection,” “emphasis,” “exclusion,” and elaboration.” According
to Entman (1993), “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”
(p. 52). While Tankard et al. (1991) provided a description of what frames are—“the central
organizing ideas,”— Entman’s definition offers description of what framers want to achieve—
“to promote a particular problem,” and how it should be defined, understood, evaluated, and
recommended.
From the above definition, it is important to note that all issues are not equally important
for the news media and, therefore, the ones that are deemed more important are picked and
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highlighted while the ones that are considered to be less important are given less emphasis or
rejected altogether.
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter and chapter 2, framing has also been a
prominent approach to studying social movements (Johnston, 2002, p. 62). Borrowing the
concept of a frame from Goffman (1974), Snow et al. (1986) defined frames as “interpretative
schemata” which “enable individuals to locate perceive, identify, and label…occurrences within
their life space and the world at large” (p. 464). Johnston (2002) described the function of frames
as interpretative schemata which “indicate what to look at and what is important, and thereby
indicate what is going on” (p. 64). He further said: “A frame may also indicate, by directing
attention away from other things, what is not important” (p. 64).
This project used the qualitative frame analysis to answer the research questions. Reese
(2010) described qualitative frame analysis as an interpretative research approach that
emphasizes “the cultural and political content of news frames and how they draw upon a shared
store of social meanings” (p. 18). Johnston (2002) described qualitative frame analysis as a
description of “collective action frames and their roles in movement development” (p. 72).
Qualitative frame analysis is “based on relatively small samples that should mirror discourse”
(Matthes, 2009, p. 351). With regards to social movements, it relies on “convenience samples of
movement documents and/or transcribed ethnographic interviews with movements activists as
the database” (Johnston 2002, p. 72). Frames describe texts “with detailed quotes” in depth, “but
without quantifications” (Matthes, 2009, p. 351). Qualitative frame analysis involves “data
reduction” which “orders a wide variety of written or spoken textual materials by categories that
represent more general factors” (Johnston, 2002, p. 69).
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Qualitative frame analysis has its limitations. The results are not generalizable. It does
not also provide the cause and effect relationship between variables, such as “exposure to media
frames and issue opinions” (Brewer & Gross, 2010, p. 173). In spite of its limitation, however, a
qualitative approach to frame analysis helps scholars understand how people “use their reasoning
skills, their experiences, their knowledge, and their conversations with fellow citizens to
engage—and sometimes reconstruct—the frames that they encounter” (Brewer & Gross, 2010, p.
173-174).
This project used the four procedures qualitative research methods suggested by Glaser
and Strauss (2006/1967): 1) code data to identify categories that emerge from data; 2) integrate
categories and their properties: place categories according to their properties and rules that define
them; 3) delimit theory: look at any overlapping categories and the changes to be made; and 4)
write the theory- findings.
The raw data were categorized into four broad categories based on their sources—
international news media, Oromo activists, human rights organizations, and the Ethiopian
government officials. Texts were printed, and video and interviews were transcribed. Further
categories were also made based on the names of the news media organizations, activists, human
rights organizations, government officials, and the date of publications of each data (news
stories, editorials, reports, etc.).
In order to identify the themes, concepts, and meanings, the data were coded using the
three coding stages—open coding, axial coding, and selective coding used in grounded theory
(Corbin & Srauss, 1990) which were also used by scholars who study the frame analysis of news
content (e.g., Gorp, 2010). Open coding was used to identify the initial concepts, ideas, and
meanings of the data in sentences. Then axial coding was used to see the relationship between
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the codes identified during the open coding stage. Selective coding was used to determine the
relationship between the major codes identified during the open coding stage. Then each
category identified at the selective coding stage was integrated based on their common feature,
properties, conditions, and contexts. As discussed in the next chapters, for example, killing,
torture, beatings, arrests, and disappearances were categorized under the major theme of
“government response to the protests” while different categories such as economic, political, and
cultural complaints are categorized under the theme of “the cause of the protests.” Once the
themes emerged, their frames were also identified based on the text.
The next four chapters are the analysis of the data from each actor—international news
media, Oromo activists, and human rights organizations, and the Ethiopian government officials.
They are organized based on the research questions outlined in this chapter. Hence, chapter 4
presents the result of the analysis of the international news media. Chapter 5 analyzes Oromo
activists' Facebook messages. Chapters 6 and 7 give the analysis of data from human rights
organizations and Ethiopian government officials respectively.
Each chapter starts by introducing the major themes uncovered from the study followed
by a detailed analysis of the themes and how they were framed with examples and evidence from
the texts analyzed. Each chapter wraps up with a summary of the findings to segue to the next
chapter.
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4
4.1

ANALYSIS: NEWS MEDIA

Introduction
This chapter answers RQ1: what were the major themes of the international news media

on the Oromo protest movement? It discusses the major themes highlighted by the international
news media and how they were framed.
The results of the analysis of the texts news media indicate that the Oromo protests
received significant media attention. The news media focused on various themes, but the major
ones are the root causes of the Oromo protest (the problem), how the government handled it, and
suggested solutions. However, there were variations among the different media outlets and
among sections of the same media outlet (such as news story, editorial, and opinion piece) on the
degree of attention given to each theme.
All news media gave significant attention to both the root causes of the protests and how
the government handled the protesters and framed them alike as grievance and violence
respectively. However, they gave similar solutions but varied on how they framed those
solutions. For example, while the Washington Post both in its news stories and editorials was
more direct in calling for a solution such as third-party intervention (to stop the violence), the
news media outlets such as Reuters, The Associated Press, Agence France Press, The New York
Times, BBC, Al-Jazeera English, CNN, and The Guardian made indirect calls reflecting the
views of activists, opposition political party leaders, and human rights groups.
However, solutions suggested by the news media were aimed at ending the violence
against protesters rather than addressing the root causes that prompted the protests in the first
place. To be clear, they focused more on justice for victims of the violence than a halt to the
Masterplan or other administrative issues that were also important to the protesters. In this
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regard, the news media departed from the protesters’ demands. This section highlights the
following news media themes in detail: causes of the protests, government response, and calls for
action.
4.2

Causes of the Protests
The news media gave significant coverage to the causes of the Oromo protests. In

covering the cause of the protests, they focused on 1) the immediate trigger of the protests, and
2) on long-standing issues. While they described the Addis Ababa-Oromia Special Zones
Integrated Masterplan, also known as the Masterplan, as the immediate trigger of the protests,
they also highlighted long-standing economic, political, and cultural issues. The news media
framed the causes of the Oromo protests as grievances. The four main grievance frames will be
discussed next: economic, historical, political, and a chain of causes.
4.2.1 Economic grievance
At the heart of the economic grievance was the Masterplan, the government project that
would expand the territory of Addis Ababa into the surrounding areas of the Oromia region. The
news media portrayed the Masterplan as an attempt by the government to take away lands from
Oromo farmers against their wishes. To this end, they used different descriptive and vivid words
and phrases such as “landgrab” (e.g. BBC), “confiscation” (e.g. The Washington Post), and
“annexation” (e.g., CNN).
The news media used the landgrab frame to describe how the Oromo people viewed the
Masterplan. For example, CNN published an opinion piece on its website on August 9, 2016
authored by Awol Allo, an Oromo activist himself, who claimed that the Oromo people viewed
the Masterplan as a “blueprint for annexation” (Allo, 2016, para. 6). On January 12, 2016, the
BBC ran a short video clip taking the views of Mohammed Ademo, another Oromo activist, who
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portrayed the Masterplan as “…. the landgrab disguised as a development plan” (BBC, 12, 0:45).
Similarly, on 2 October 2016, The Washington Post’s Paul Schemm wrote an article in which he
described the Oromo protests as a protest against land confiscation. He alluded to the
contradiction between the numerical majority of the Oromo with marginalization and loss of
land, saying: “The Oromo, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, making up a third of the population,
have for the past year been protesting their marginalization and the confiscation of their land for
factories” (Schemm, 2016, para. 4).
The news media also described the intent of the “landgrab” as a wealth transfer from
Oromo farmers to investors. For instance, on September 13, 2016, Rick Maese of The
Washington Post ran a short video on its website in which Athlete Feyisa Lilesa, an Oromo
activist, said: “The Ethiopian government forced Oromo farmers off their land to sell it to foreign
investors” (Maese, 2016, 0:39). In its article published on January 14, 2016, Schemm, the writer
of the article, repeated the views of the Oromo people, saying: “protesters from the Oromo ethnic
group say the government is trying to take away their lands and use them for everything from
industrial development to luxury housing projects” (Schemm, 2016, para. 4).
The news media associated the “landgrab” with its likely impact on the Oromo people.
Particularly, they highlighted people’s fear of displacement/eviction without alternative means of
livelihood. For example, on January 14, 2016, the BBC aired the views of Mohammed Ademo
who said that the Masterplan would “evict farmers with little compensation” (BBC, 2016, 0:49).
According to the BBC, the protests were triggered by the fears that the Masterplan would evict
the Oromo farmers. Likewise, the Associated Press published a news story on December 23,
2015 where Elias Meseret, the writer of the news story, quoted Merera Gudina, the leader of the
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Oromo Federalist (OFC) party who said the Masterplan would ‘“rob famers of their land and
rights…”’ (Meseret, 2015, para. 10).
The fear of the impact of the landgrab was further explained by linking the loss of land to
the loss of everything else. For example, the Agence France Press (AFP) described land as
“everything” for the Oromo people. Boulo Justin, the writer of the news article, used a direct
quote form Felix Horne, a researcher at Human Rights Watch who said: “for famers of Oromia
and elsewhere in the country, their land is everything” (Justin, 2015, 2015, para. 22). AFP further
cited explanation from Horne who said the land is ‘“critical for their food supply, for their
identity, for their culture”’ (para 23). Similarly, The Washington Post portrayed land as a ‘means
of livelihood” for the Oromo people. Paul Schemm, the author of the article, wrote the worries of
Tarecha Guttama, an Oromo farmer, saying: “surrounded by three generations of family he
supports on his farm, he said can’t imagine what he would do if the order ever came to confiscate
his land for an investment project” (Schemm, 2016, para. 22).
Some news media also used past experience as evidence to give legitimacy to people’s
fear of the impact of the Masterplan. To this end, they used quotations from Oromo politicians
and activists and explained how the lives of the Oromo people who lost their land in the past
were affected. For instance, on August 11, 2016 Sally Hayden of Reuters quoted Merera Gudina,
the leader of the Oromo Federalist Congress, an opposition party, as saying “many farmers who
have been moved from land already are now living in poverty, with some women forced to turn
to prostitution” (Hayden, 2016, p. 22). In her Reuters’ news article published on August 25,
2016, Hayden also highlighted how the people describe their past experience due to the landgrab.
She quoted athlete Feyisa Lilesa who described people’s experience such as being hired as a
guard to someone on their own land as:
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When the city expands the [authorities] would take away their land and build hotels or
buildings, the owners of the land would them become guards [for] someone else’s
property…that’s what the Oromo people have had to deal with again and again. (Hayden,
2016, para. 15).
In its news story published on October 7, 2016, Reuters also highlighted the story of
Mulugeta, another Oromo protester, whose life was affected by the landgrab. Maasho (2016), the
author of the article quoted Mulugeta as saying: “I went to apply for a job at a steel factory that
was built on my family’s land, but I was turned away when they discovered I was the son of the
previous land owner” (para. 13).
4.2.2 Historical grievance
In addition to the immediate trigger, the Masterplan, the news media also portrayed the
cause of the Oromo protests as having deep roots in history. They used the historical grievance
frame to highlight complaints about marginalization and discrimination in the political and
economic arena. For example, the BBC on January 13, 2016 described the Oromo protests as
something that evolved over time. It referred to unnamed “observers” who said: “Oromo protests
build on long-standing complaints that the community has been excluded from political and
economic power” (The BBC, 2016. para. 13). The Washington Post’s Schemm (2016) also
provided a broad historical context by linking the establishment of Addis Ababa city and Oromo
people’s past grievances to how they view the Masterplan now saying:
Addis [Ababa] was established 150 years ago by Ethiopia’s dominant Amhara people in
the heart of Oromo territory, and its expansion has come at the expense of the local
Oromo farmers. The announcement of a “Masterplan” to manage the city’s expansion
was seen as the latest attempt to take more land (para. 14).
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Likewise, Reuters quoted Feyisa Lilesa as saying, the “conflict over Oromo land began
more than 100 years ago and the marginalization of his people is equally longstanding” (Reuters,
25 August 2016, para. 4).
4.2.3 Political grievance
The news media also framed the cause of the Oromo protests as a political grievance.
They emphasized the control of the political and economic sectors by one group, especially the
Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a member party of the coalition of the ruling party of
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Force (EPRDF). TPLF represents the people of
Tigray who constitute only 6 percent of Ethiopia’s population. The news media used the
political grievance frame to highlight inequality, majority rule over minority, and lack of
democracy.
The political grievance frame was also used by the news media to pinpoint the Oromo
people’s complaints over inequities. The Washington Post, for example, drew attention to the
blame on the ethnic group Tigrayans for the inequality of good work opportunities, and
marginalization. Schemm (2016) of the Washington Post described this complaint saying the
protesters have “increasingly singled out Tigrayans for their woes, accusing them of getting the
best jobs and dominating the economy” (para 10). Likewise, the New York Times’ Kushkush on
September 13, 2016 used human rights groups as a source and wrote: “Human rights groups have
said an authoritarian government, dominated by the Tigray ethnic group, has marginalized
regions outside the capital, including Oromia and has engineered economic projects on lands
without local input” (para. 6). The Washington Post’s Paul Schemm on January 14, 2016
described how the Oromo people feel about inequality, saying they “feel they are treated like
second-class citizens…” (para. 15).

71

The news media used the minority rule over the majority frame to underline the
dominance of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the political and economic spheres.
Agence France Presse’s Karim Lebhour on August 10, 2016), for example, stated that political
dominance by the minority group from Tigray is a cause of the protest by stating: “the protesters
have different grievances but are united by their disaffection with the country’s leaders, who
largely hail from the northern Tigray region and represent less than 10 percent of the population”
(Lebhour, 2016, para 11). Lebhour cited opinion leaders such as Getachew Metaferia, an
Ethiopian professor who lives in the U.S. who said: “the state [Ethiopia is] ‘controlled by an
ethnic minority imposing its will on the majority,’ is a crucial factor in understanding the
protests” (para.14). Victor and Gettleman (2016) of the New York Times also used the minority
rule over the majority rule frame using population size of the Oromo and Tigray people and the
control they have on the political, economic, and security sectors. They wrote: “Protests in the
Oromo ethnic group, Ethiopia’s largest, say they feel marginalized. The Tigrayan ethnic group
makes up about 6 percent of the population but dominated in politics, the military, and
commerce” (2016, para.11).
The Washington Post’s Maese (2016) used the minority rule over majority rule frame to
show the Oromo people’s marginalized voice in the political arena despite their numerical
majority. Maese pointed to the contradiction between the numerical majority and their role in
politics by stating: “By most estimates, Oromos make up about 40 percent of the population, but
few hold positions of power” (para. 6). Similarly, Agence France Presse in its October 5, 2016
edition used the minority rule over the majority frame, saying: “the protesters accuse the
country’s leaders, who largely hail from the northern Tigray region, of monopolizing power”
(para. 17). Furthermore, it used the minority rule over majority to emphasize the feeling of
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discrimination and marginalization as historical. It took a direct quote from Human Rights
Watch’s statement that said “‘many Oromos have felt marginalized and discriminated against by
successive Ethiopian governments and have often felt unable to voice their concerns over
government policies’” (para 10).
The news media also framed the cause of the Oromo protest as lack of democracy in the
country. Particularly they focused on issues such as elections, the authoritarian nature of the
government, and people’s frustration about it. They magnified protesters’ claims about “rigged’
elections. For example, on December 25, 2016, Paul Schemm of the Washington Post used a
direct quote by an Oromo farmer who complained that government officials were not the ones
the people voted for, saying: ‘“During the past elections [in 2015], those that came to power
were not the ones chosen by the people…. we don’t know where the ballots of the people go’”
(para. 27). Schemm on The Washington Post’s edition of January 15, 2016 also tried to draw
attention to the 2015 national election in which the ruling party won all parliamentary seats
whereas opposition political parties did not win even a single seat. Schemm linked the accusation
of vote fraud to the May 2015 election “in legislative elections in May [2015], not a single
opposition candidate won a seat, prompting accusations of widespread vote fraud by the ruling
party” (para. 27). Likewise, on October 3, 2016, Schemm also wrote that “government-allied
parties won every seat in parliament in the 2015 elections” (para. 21). Schemm on January 15,
2016 also associated the cause of the Oromo protest with authoritarianism. For example, it cited
activist Seyoum Teshome as saying the country was under the authoritarian system. In a similar
manner, Jocey Fortin of The New York Times on December 16, 2015 used the lack of democracy
frame to indicate the government’s nature of authoritarianism. She criticized the government by
alluding to the 2015 national elections, saying: “In a telling sign of its dominance, the governing
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Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front and its allies won all 547 seats in national
elections in May” (para. 9). Furthermore, Fortin (2015) used a quote by Merera Gudina, the
leader of Oromo Federalist Party, who said: ‘“people are frustrated to live under this
government, frustrated with the election, frustrated with their local governments, frustrated with
their whole lives”’ (para. 13). She described the contradiction of the government system itself
saying:
The central government presides over a federalist system that, on paper, ensures equal
rights for more than 80 ethnic groups in Ethiopia. But many Oromo activists complain of
political and socioeconomic marginalization that stretches back generations. The
masterplan has become a rallying point. (para.14).
Some news media also highlighted protesters’ claims that government officials violated
their constitutional rights. For example, the Masterplan was also portrayed as a violation of
federalism. Fortin (2015) of The New York Times emphasized this by quoting Hallelujah Lulie,
an activist, who said:
However, beyond the issue of the proposed master plan, the protests are caused by
broader issues, including the proper implementation of federalism and the capital’s
relationship with the Oromo Community that surrounds it. The movement, which is
informed by historic injustices, also targets bad governance and calls for respect for
human and political rights. (para15).
Generally, the news media gave significant coverage to the cause of the Oromo protest
movement by focusing both on the immediate trigger and long-lasting issues. The following
quote from Merera Gudina, the leader of the Oromo Federalist Congress, by Hayden (2016) of
the Reuters summarizes most of the findings discussed in this section: ‘“people are demanding
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their rights…. people are fed up with what the regime has been doing for a quarter of a century.
They protest against landgrab, reparations, stolen elections, the rising cost of living, many
things”’ (para. 3).
4.2.4

Chain of causes
The news media also highlighted a chain of causes; the protests were sustained by new

demands. That is, although the news media portrayed political, economic, and historical issues as
contributing factors to the Oromo protests, they also highlighted that government responses to
the protests were escalating factors. For example, the protests were originally prompted by the
Masterplan, but as the government started arresting and killing some protesters, new demands
such as the release of political prisoners and demand for justice for those who were killed by
security forces were added to the list of demands. Hence, the protests did not stop even after the
government announced the cancellation of the Masterplan, the initial demand.
Agence France Presse in its article published on October 3, 2016 summarized how the
Oromo protesters expanded their questions to include other questions saying: “the project was
binned; however, a brutal crackdown on the protests kindled simmering anger against iron-fisted
leaders who largely hail from the northern Tigray region and represent less than 10 percent of the
population” (para19). Similarly, Elias Meseret of The Associated Press on October 11, 2016,
described how the protests continued due to a chain of causes despite the cancellation of the
Masterplan. To quote it directly, he wrote: “while the government later gave up the idea [of the
master plan], the protests broadened into a demand for more rights and for the release of detained
activists, opposition figures and journalists” (Meseret, 2016, para. 2). Reuters’ Maasho (2016) on
August 8, 2016 also covered how the protesters’ demands shifted from a specific demand, the
cancellation of the Masterplan, to the government itself saying:
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Unrest flared in Oromiya for several months until early this year over plans to allocate
farmland surrounding the regional capital for development. Authorities scrapped the
scheme in January. But protests flared again over the continued detention of opposition
demonstrators. (para. 2).
4.3

Government Response
Two lifeless bodies lay on the ground as the terrified crowd, armed only with sticks
against gun-toting Ethiopian security forces, fled the fierce crackdown on protesters.
Blood seeped a sheet covering one of the bodies on the road outside Wolenkomi, a town
just 60 kilometers (37 miles) from the capital Addis Ababa. (Boulo, 2015, para, 1).
The above quote from Agence France Presse’s Justine Boulo on December 22, 2015 is

just an example of another theme—government officials’ response to the Oromo protests—that
received significant attention from the news media. Under this theme, the news media
highlighted the use of force by security forces that resulted in the arrest, torture, and death of
protesters. The news media used the violence frame to describe the government response against
the Oromo protesters.
In order to highlight the level of violence, the news media used different descriptive
words and phrases such as “crackdown”/ “bloody crackdown” (e.g., Al-Jazeera); “brutal
crackdown” (e.g., BBC); “politics of death” (e.g., Reuters); “shot dead” (e.g., The Associated
Press); and deadly protests” (e.g., Agence France Presse). They published news stories with
titles that directly show the type (e.g., arrests and killings) and level of violence against the
Oromo protesters. The following Table 1 shows some examples of the news media that used
titles that show the violence.
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Table 1 Examples of the News Media that that Show Violence Against Oromo Protesters

News Media
Al-Jazeera English

•
•

BBC

•
•
•

Reuters

•
•
•
•

Title
“Ethiopia’s crackdown on dissent takes rising toll: Rights groups say
140 people killed in recent as government moves forward with
controversial development plan (10 January 2016)
“‘Ethiopia accused of bloody crackdown on protesters….” (22
February 2016)
“Amnesty warns against “brutal crackdown’ on protesters” (17
December 2015)
“Ethiopian government ‘kills 140 Oromo Protests’” (8 January 2016)
“Ethiopian forces ‘killed 400 Oromo protesters’” (16 June 2016)
“Ethiopian opposition figures arrested over land protests” (25
December 2015)
“Ethiopian students demand end to police crackdowns in rare protest”
(8 March 2016)
“Politics of death: The map maker who finds the bodies in Ethiopia’s
land battle” (28 June 2017)
“At least 90 protesters killed in Ethiopia: residents, opposition” (8
August 2016)

The Associated
Presse

•

“Several dozen shot dead in weekend protests across Ethiopia” (8
August 2016)

Agence France
Presse

•

“Rights groups criticize Ethiopia suppression of deadly protests” (17
December 2015)

The Washington
Post

•

“Ethiopia silences its critics with deadly crackdown on dissent” (8
January 2016
“Ethiopia meets protests with bullets” (11 October 2016)

•

4.3.1

Different types and levels of violence
The news media used vivid and descriptive language to highlight the nature of the

government violence against the protesters. In the excerpt quoted earlier, Boulo (2015) of
Agence France Presse, for example, described the death of protesters as “two lifeless bodies lay
on the ground….” In the same excerpt, she also described the ensued emotion using the phrase
(“…terrified crowd…”). She further highlighted imbalance of force between participants
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(“…armed only with sticks against gun-toting Ethiopian security forces”). To the level of
violence, it used the phrase “fierce crackdown on protestors.” Boulo also tried to create further
images of the violence in the readers’ minds by saying “Blood seeped a sheet covering one of the
bodies on the road….” (para, 2).
Like Agence France Presse, The Washington Post also used similar descriptive language
to highlight the violence against Oromo protesters. For example, Paul Schemm, the author of the
news article, published on August 9, 2016, used a picture of many pairs of shoes with the caption
that read: “protesters’ shoes lie scattered on the sidewalk in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on Aug. 6
after demonstrators were arrested and taken away by police.” In this news story, Schemm gave
salience to how the government treated the protesters, for example, by forcing them to walk
barefoot and beating them: “the detained protesters walked barefoot through the rain, escorted by
grim-faced police officers who casually beat them with batons to keep them moving” (para.2).
By referring to what was going on in different parts of the country as a “bloody story” and citing
the Human Rights Watch’s estimation of 400 deaths over months, he portrayed the action of the
government against protesters as “harsh” (para. 13).
In its editorial published on October 11, 2016, The Washington Post was even more
direct in describing government officials’ violent response to the protesters. For example, in its
choice of the title: “Ethiopia meets protests with bullets,” it clearly indicated the means of the
violence, i.e., bullets. By referring to the death of protesters at Irreecha festival in Bishoftu on
October 2, 2016, the editorial framed the government response as “tragic and emblematic of the
government’s wrongheaded use of force” (The Washington Post Editorial, 2016, para. 2). The
stampede at the Irreecha festival resulted in the death of more than 52 people after security forces
used teargas and live ammunition to disperse protesters.
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In another editorial published on January 8, 2016 with the title: “Ethiopia silences its
critics with a deadly crackdown on dissent,” The Washington Post also highlighted the
government response as “devastating violence” (para. 1). It used the “devastating violence”
frame as a choice the government officials made over “dialogue” to address the protesters’
demands. CNN also used the violence frame to describe the security forces’ response to the
protesters. For example, Awol Allo, in an opinion piece published on August 9, 2016, described
the level of force against the protesters as “overwhelming.” He wrote that “the government used
overwhelming force to crush the protests, killing hundreds of protestors and arresting thousands”
(para. 8).
Likewise, The New York Times highlighted a violence theme. For example, in its news
story titled: “A Generation is Protesting in Ethiopia, Long a U.S. Ally” (16, September 2016),
Gettleman used a 32-second video by posted Upadhye (2012) captioned: “Demonstrators
demanding political change in Ethiopia have been met with violent resistance by the
government.” The video shows security forces beating protesters with sticks. At one point it also
shows a police officer kicking a protester in the face with a military combat boot. In order to
highlight the violence theme, the New York Times article also hyperlinked to another video of the
Human Rights Watch posted on June 15, 2016. The video shows, among other things, police
officers whipping protesters with sticks and forcing others to do handstands.
Gettleman (2016) of The New York Times also drew attention to different types of
violence against protesters. For example, he quoted human rights groups saying: “opposition
within the country has been limited, with dissents effectively silenced. Many have been exiled,
jailed, killed or driven to the far reaches of the desert” (para. 5). In its other article published on
September 13, 2016, Kushkush, the author of the article, used the violence frame to emphasize
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how even children and pregnant women were victims. For example, it quoted Athlete and activist
Feyisa Lilesa who said:
I had been witnessing the suffering of my people….This is not new to me, but we have
not seen what we are seeing now when young children and pregnant women and elderly
are being killed; things got worse by the day in the last nine months (para. 11).
In the New York Times’ edition of August 21, 2016, Victor Daniel and Jeffrey Gettleman
also referenced human rights groups saying: “…they [protesters] have been met by brutal
crackdowns by the government including the shooting death of unarmed protesters” (para. 10).
Reuters also used the violence frame to describe the government response to the protests.
For example, in its news story published on October 2, 2016, titled: “Dozens killed in stampede
in Ethiopia after police fired warning shots at protests,” Maasho (2016) posted a video. The
video clip shows many men and women in cultural attire converging on Hora Harsadee, a
lakeside where the annual Irreecha festival is celebrated, singing the Irreecha songs. After a few
seconds, the video shows many young people shouting “we need justice” by crossing their arms
above their head—a symbol of resistance used by Oromo protesters. Then, the video shows
police firing teargas to disperse the protesters which led to a stampede, which in turn resulted in
the death of more than 50 people. Then, it showed people being plunged into ditches and many
of them trying to come out of the ditches, some falling down. In the same text, Reuters used
pictures of some injured protesters lying on the ground with a caption: “Injured protesters wait
for help after several people died during the Irreecha, the thanksgiving festival of the Oromo
people in Bishoftu town of Oromia region, Ethiopia, October 2, 2016. REUTERS/Tiksa Negeri.”
Maasho (2016) also used description of a witness who “saw people dragging out a dozen or more
victims, showing no obvious sign of life” (para.9). It also quoted another witness who said,
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“Half a dozen people, also motionless, were seen being taken by pick-up truck to a hospital...”
(para. 9).
4.3.2 Violence frame to blame the government
The news media used the violence frame to portray government security forces as
perpetrators of the violence. As shown in the preceding paragraph, Reuters’ Maasho (2016) used
a video showing security forces firing tear gas on peaceful protesters. Likewise, the Associated
Press’ Meseret (2016) on October 2, 2016 accused the government security of committing
violence against peaceful protesters at annual Irreecha event of 2016. He quoted Mulatu
Gemechu, an opposition leader, who said the protesters were “peaceful and did not carry
anything to harm police” (para. 11). Meseret also cited its own reporter at the scene as a witness
saying: “Before the stampede, an AP saw a small group of people walking in the crowd and
holding up their crossed wrists in a popular gesture of protest. The reporter also saw police firing
tear gas and, later, several injured people” (para 12 – 13).
In its March 9, 2016, the BBC also characterized government security forces as the
perpetrators of the violence. It describes how the attempt by police to force peaceful people to
turn off a nationalistic song turned into a violence that resulted in death and injury as follows:
A bus filled with a wedding party taking the bride to the groom's home was stopped at a
routine checkpoint on 12 February near the southern Ethiopian town of Shashamane.
Local police told revellers [] to turn off the nationalistic Oromo music playing. They
refused and the bus drove off. The situation then rapidly escalated and reports indicate at
least one person died and three others were injured after police fired shots (para. 2-4)
The Associated Press’ Elias Meseret on August 22, 2016 also mentioned a video clip he
said the Associated Press obtained (but it didn’t post) claiming it showed security forces
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committing acts of violence including “beating, kicking and dragging several protesters” (para.
11). On June 16, 2016 Emanuel Igunza of the BBC cited the Human Rights Watch as a source to
allege the government was “using excessive force” against protesters (para. 19). Referring to the
same source, he said “some of those interviewed [by Human Rights Watch] allege they were
hung by their ankles and beaten while others described having electric shocks applied to their
feet while in detention. Several women also claim to have been raped and sexually assaulted”
(para. 20 – 21).
4.3.3 Violence frame to describe the impact
The news media also used the violence frame to describe the impact of the government
officials’ response on the daily lives of the people. For example, on December 22, 2015, Boulo
(2015) of Agence France Presse included in the news a story of a woman whose only son was
killed by the government security forces as an example. The woman equated the death of her
only son to her own death saying: “‘That was my only son,’” [she was referring to one of the two
dead bodies described by AFP as “two lifeless bodies mentioned at the beginning of this section]
a woman sobbed. They have killed me’” (para. 3). In its article published on February 25, 2016,
Agence France Presse also indicated how the presence of security forces affected the daily lives
of the people saying: “Oromia ….is dotted with machine-gun mounted vehicles and Ethiopian
soldiers who locals say have disrupted daily life with incessant checks, harassment, and
intimidation” (para. 2). It also used a direct quote from an unnamed “mother of two aged in her
forties” who said: ‘“I am very scared for our children, for our youths. Our life has become hell
and it has no meaning’” (para. 4).
Other media outlets such as Al-Jazeera English, CNN, and The Guardian also highlighted
the violence theme. Unlike other news media, these media outlets depended more on information
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from human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and activists
such as athlete Feyisa Lilesa.
4.4

Call for Action
Ethiopia’s human rights abuses and political repression must be addressed frontally by
the United States and Europe, no longer shunted to the back burner because of
cooperation fighting terrorism. With the state of emergency, Ethiopia’s leaders are
borrowing a brutal and counterproductive tactic from dictators the world over who have
tried to put a cork in genuine popular dissent. It won’t work! (The Washington Post,
Editorial Bord, 2016, para.5)
“Oromo Protests: Why US must stop enabling Ethiopia?” (CNN, 9 August 2016)
The above two excerpts are from the Washington Post’s editorial published on October

11, 2016, and an opinion piece published on the CNN website on August 9, 2016 respectively. In
addition to the causes of the Oromo protests, and government response, the news media also
gave significant coverage to the solution to the problem. The suggested solutions include a call
for independent investigation, framed as justice, and a call for a pressure by a third party, framed
as third-party intervention.
In its editorial page published on October 11, 2016, the Washington Post Editorial Board
blamed the Ethiopian government officials for rights abuses, the state of emergency (announced
on October 9, 2016), the death of protesters at the 2016 Irreecha event, and the death of more
than 500 people during the protests. The editorial characterized the violence by the government
as a threat to a foreign investment, which it described as “the pillar of the Ethiopia’s
development agenda” (para. 4).
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4.4.1 Blame third Party
The Washington Post’s Editorial Board published on January 8, 2016 played the activist
role; it blamed the United States government, especially the Obama administration for not doing
enough to stop the violence against protesters in Oromia. For example, by referring to the
statement by the United States that stated it was “very concerned over the situation in Ethiopia,”
the Washington Post Editorial Board blamed the USA for stopping “short of explicitly urging the
Ethiopian government to refrain from violently cracking down on protesters” (para. 4). It also
criticized the Obama administration for characterizing Ethiopia as ‘“a model and voice for
development in Africa”’ (para. 5). It further suggested that the United States’ unconditional
praise for the ruling party in Ethiopia would undermine its own commitment to democracy
saying:
But as long as Ethiopia’s authoritarian master plan for development included the
suffocation of political opposition, a blatant disregard for human rights and cracking
down on media, U.S. praise of the EPRDF [Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front] regime will continue to undermine its claim to support democracy on
the continent. (para. 5).
CNN in its opinion piece published on August 9, 2016 also blamed the United States’
support for the Ethiopian government. Awol Allo, the author of the piece, criticized the United
States’ view of Ethiopia as a “critical partner on the Global War on Terror” (para. 18). He
claimed that this made “administration officials go out of their way to create fantasy stories
which cast Ethiopia as democratic and its leaders as progressive” (para. 19). Allo was referring
to statements of three officials of the United States: Susan Rice, the then U.S. ambassador to the
United Nations; Wendy Sherman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and President
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Barak Obama. In 2012, in her speech at the funeral of Meles Zenawi, the former prime minster
of Ethiopia, Rice described the late prime minister as “uncommonly wise – able to see the big
picture and the long game, even when others would allow immediate pressures to overwhelm
sound judgment” (Rice, 2012, 02:16). In 2015, in her press conference with Tedros Adhanom,
the minster of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Wendy Sherman described
Ethiopia as “a democracy that is moving forward in an election that we expect to be free, fair,
credible, open and inclusive” (Sherman, 2015, para.2). In 2015, when he visited Ethiopia,
President Obama described the government as “democratically elected government” (Obama,
2015, 0:22:49).
4.4.2 Third-party intervention
One of the solutions suggested by the news media was intervention by a third party. That
is, instead of directly calling on the parties in conflict—Ethiopian government and the Oromo
protest movement activists—to address the issues, it called on other actors such as the United
States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United Nations. The Washington Post
Editorial Board on October 11, 2016 called specifically on the United States and Europe to
address the violence. It argued that cooperation of these countries with Ethiopia on the fight
against terrorism should not hold them back from addressing the human rights issue. It tried to
draw attention to the implication of the state of emergency saying: “Ethiopia’s leaders are
borrowing a brutal and counterproductive tactic from dictators the world over who have tried to
put a cork in genuine popular dissent” (para. 5).
4.4.3 Intervention—use your money
The news media called on the West to use its aid money to help Ethiopia to stop the
violence against the Oromo protesters. For example, in its editorial published on August 9, 2016,
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the Washington Post Editorial Board carried a title with a question mark, also suggestive of a
solution: “Ethiopia’s regime has killed hundreds. Why is the West still giving it aid? By
juxtaposing the loss of life (the killing of hundreds by security forces) with the aid money that
goes to the same government that kills protesters, it put a moral challenge to the West. By
referring to the killing of at least 90 people by security forces in the weekend of August 6-7 (it
hyperlinked to Reuters’ news story published on August 8, 2016), the Washington Post Editorial
Board suggested the West use its aid money to influence Ethiopia saying: “the weekend’s
bloodshed should prompt the West to reconsider its aid to the regime [of Ethiopia] (para. 2). The
Editorial Board also suggested cooperation with Ethiopia to fight terrorism should not be at the
expense of the human rights situation in Ethiopia. Hence, it criticized the United States for
focusing on cooperation on terrorism while ignoring the human rights situations saying:
The United States has long relied on Ethiopia as a partner in the fight against al-Shabab’s
terrorism in Somalia and sends the country tens of millions of dollars in development
assistance, tiptoeing around Ethiopia’s human rights abuses and resistance to democratic
reforms…. The Obama administration should encourage a credible investigation into the
killings and publicly make clear that Ethiopia’s continued crackdowns are unacceptable.
(para. 4).
BBC in its post published on March 9, 2016 also suggested the role of the third-party
intervention to stop violence against protesters. For example, in its discussion of the
government’s arrest of the leaders of the Oromo Federalist Congress, it took a direct quote from
Jawar Mohammed, a prominent Oromo activist, who challenged the governments of the United
States and the United Kingdom saying: “Also what is the UK and US doing? As major donors to
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Ethiopia they should be taking the lead to get the government to work out an agreement [with
opposition political party leaders]” (para. 28).
Some news media also highlighted the need for third-party intervention to ensure justice.
For example, the Washington Post Editorial on August 9, 2016 called on the United States to
“encourage a credible investigation into the killings and publicly make clear that Ethiopia’s
continued crackdowns are unacceptable” (para. 4). It also called on the European Union to look
into its ‘“cash for cooperation”’ relation with Ethiopia. By “cash for cooperation” it meant EU’s
support for Ethiopia with aid and trade benefits in exchange for the latter’s help in solving the
migration and refugee issue in Europe. It characterized the violence in Ethiopia as a challenge to
the EU saying: “Now Ethiopia is providing a litmus test of the stated E.U. commitment to human
rights” (para. 4). It demanded the EU to make the “cash for cooperation” with Ethiopia
conditional on addressing human rights violations and maintaining justice. Hence, it wrote:
If Ethiopia continues its pattern of abusing its citizens and stifling dissent, and if it fails to
credibly investigate the recent killings, the European Union should make clear to the
regime that it risks being dropped from the migrant agreements. (para. 5).
The news media in their news section also highlighted the need for third-party
intervention. However, unlike the editorials and opinion piece seen in the preceding paragraphs
which made a direct call for third-party intervention, the news media in their news sections
highlighted a call made by activists and human rights groups for third-party intervention. For
example, Agence France Presse in its news story published on September 13, 2016 cited athlete
and activist Feyisa Lilesa who said the United States can influence Ethiopia. Blanc (2016) of the
Agence France Presse quoted Lilesa as saying: ‘“I want to tell the world what is happening”’
(para. 12). Likewise, Aaron Maasho of Reuters in the news story published on October 9, 2016,
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highlighted the call by U.N. experts for international investigation into the government response
to Oromo protests. In its news story on October 5, 2016, Agence France Presse also cited an
official of Amnesty International who called for investigation into the violence by government
security forces against protesters. It quoted Michelle Kagari, Amnesty International’ regional
office as saying: “given the contradictory accounts [different numbers on casualties at Irreecha
event], it is critical that an investigation be held to unearth the truth and identify law enforcement
officers criminally responsible” (para.8).
4.5

Summary
As indicated at the outset, this chapter answered RQ1: What were the major themes of the

international news media on Oromo protests? How were they framed? In sum, three major
themes were identified: the cause of the protest, the government's response, and the solution (end
to violence).
The news media portrayed the trigger of the protest as mainly political, economic, and
historical grievances (although, acknowledging a chain of causes), while they used the violence
frame to describe the government's response by highlighting killings, jailing, arbitrary arrests,
and tortures of the those who participated in the protests. In the call for action (solution) theme,
the news media called for an investigation into the violence and called for third-party
intervention to end the violence. They framed the solution theme as getting justice for the
victims. However, as indicated earlier, the call for action by the news media was mainly aimed at
ending the violence, not addressing the political and economic causes that prompted the protest.
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5
5.1

ANALYSIS: OROMO ACTIVISTS’ SOCIAL MEDIA POSTS

Introduction
This project also sought to uncover the major themes of the Oromo social media activists

and their frames in answer to Research Question 2. Hence, this chapter presents the findings of
the analysis of the texts of the Oromo social media activists on three events: “the Oromia Grand
Rally,” the Rio 2016 Olympics, and the Irreecha Festival of 2016. Oromo activists highlighted
different themes during these events. The major themes highlighted by Oromo activits are cause
of the protest, government action, and call for action.
Analysis of the texts produced before and after the #GrandOromiaRally indicate that
activists focused on different themes related to political and economic rights; violence against
the protesters by the government security forces; justice; environmental issues; and state
terrorism. On the Rio 2016 Olympic event, they focused more on the implication of Lilesa’s
action on the Oromo protests by highlighting the global attention the Oromo protests was
receiving; praising Feyisa Lilesa and discussing the impact of his action on the Oromo protests.
Following October 2, 2016, however, the major themes that dominated the activists' messages
were an expression of different feelings that include anger at the news media for not covering the
incident enough or misrepresenting it, grievance, hope, and determination.
5.2

#GrandOromiaRally
The Oromo protest movement held what they branded a “Grand Oromia Rally” on 6

August 2016. The rally was significant in the history of the Oromo protest movement for three
main reasons. First, the protests covered a large area of the Oromia region. It took place in
around 200 cities and towns (Opride, 2016). Second, the government security forces responded
with with force that resulted in the death of many protesters. Third, it received significant
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coverage of the international media. This section presents the major themes of social media
discussion both before and after the rally.
In the pre-rally social media discussion, activists focused on six major themes: political
rights, economic rights, an end to violence, justice, environmental protection, and state terrorism.
However, analysis of the post-rally activity indicates a shift of the themes of discussion to what
occurred on the day of the rally: violence against the protesters; expression of solidarity,
determination, and hope; warning to the government; and defending and praising the protesters.

Figure 1 Slogans of Oromo Protesters Before the #GrandOromiaRally
5.2.1

The pre-rally discussion
On 5 August 2016, one day before the rally, they posted a statement titled: “The grand

Oromia rally for freedom, justice, voice, and peace,” for “immediate release.” In the statement,
the activists portrayed the aim of the rally as an expression of “deep-seated mass grievances,
country-wide anguish []and suffering, widespread violations of rights” (Ararssa, 2016a, para. 1).
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In the statement activists also provided the plan to hold rallies in more than 200 cities,
advising protesters to stay connected and share information. They also made a call to others to
join them: “We march in the company of all people who, like the Oromos were wronged by the
regime’s ruthless dictatorial, at times, even terroristic practices” (Ararssa, 2016 para.5)
They justified the rally by pointing out that it “comes at a time when the regime lost all
kinds of reason by placing elite political benefit over public service, self-interest over justice, and
oppression over inequality, and most importantly, privileging members of one ethnic group over
those of others” (Ararssa, 2016, para, 5).
Before the rally, the Oromo social media activists also shared some demands in the form
of slogans to be carried by protesters on the rally (see figure 1 above). The analysis of these
slogans showed that activists highlighted six major themes which were: demands for political
rights, economic rights, an end to violence, justice, environmental protection, and an end to state
terrorism. The following table (Table 2) summarizes the major themes, specific demands, and the
pre-rally slogans shared by Mohammed (2016a).
Table 2 Summary of the Major Themes, Specific Demands, and Slogans

Themes

Specific
demands

Political rights
Self-rule

Freedom
of the
press

Slogans
“Agaaziin Oromiyaa keessaa haa ba’u” [“Agazi out of Oromia”]
“Self-rule now”
“No to military rule”
“Genuine federal self-rule now”
“Oromiyaa raayyaa waraanaatin bulchuun haa hafu” [“stop military
rule in Oromia”]
“Bulchiinsa raayyaa waraanaa didneerra” [“No to military rule”]
“End Agazi rule in Oromia”
“Finfineenn haandhuura Oromiyaati” [“Finfinnee is the core of
Oromia”]
“Finfinnee bulchuu barbaanna” [We need to rule Finfinnee”]
“Unchain press media and information”
“Gaazexxeessummaan yakka miti” [“journalism is not a crime”]
“Blogging is not a crime”
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Religious
rights
Human
rights
Language
and
Identity

Economic
rights

Lands

Violence

End to
violence
(killing)

End to
violence
(arrest)

End to
torture
Justice

Justice

“Bilisummaan amantii haa kabajamu”[“respect religious freedom”]
“Migi namoota maraaf haa kabajamu” [“respect the of all”]
“All human right for all now”
“Mirgi mursi jiraachuu haa kabajamu” [“respect right to life”]
“Our language, Afaan Oromo; Our land, Oromia; Our identity,
Oromummaa are non-negotiable”
“Afaan Oromo for Ethiopia, Ethiopia for Afaan Oromo [“Afaan Oromo
for Ethiopia, Ethiopia for Afaan Oromo”
“Afaan Oromoo Afaan hojii federaalaa haata’u” [“we want Afaan
Oromo to be the federal language”]
“Oromia is not for sale”
“Qonnaan bulaa lafa isaarraa buqqaasuun haa dhaabbatu” [“Stop
evicting farmers from their lands”]
“Buqqatootaaf beenyaa gahaan haa kaffalmu” [“fair compensation for
people evicted from their lands”]
“Oromo ajjeessuun haadhaabbatu” [“stop killing the Oromo”]
“Ajjeessuun haa dhaabbatu” [“stop killing”]
“Ajjeechaa fi hidhaan nurraa haadhaabbatu” [“stop killing and
imprisoning”]
“Stop killing Oromos: Oromo lives matter”
“Stop the massacre of our children”
“Ajjeechaan daa’imman keenyaa haadhabbatu” [“stop killing our
children”]
“Stop the killing”
“Bloodshed breeds bloodshed”
“Hidhamtoonni siyaasaa haa hiikkaman” [“release political prisoners”]
“Baqqalaan Garbaa haa hiikamu” [“release Bekele Gerba”]
“Release political prisoners”
“Baqqalaa garbaafi Iskandir Naggaa haa hiikaman” [“release Bekele
Gerba and Eskinder Nega”]
“Yoonaattan Tasfaayee fi Olbaanaa Leellisaa haa hiikaman” [“Releae
Yonatan Tesfaye and Olbana Lelisa”]
“Hidhamtoonni siyaasaa marti haa hiikaman” [“release all political
prisoners”]
“Yoonaattan Tasfaayee fi Olbaanaa Leellisaa haa hiikaman” [“Release
Yonatan Tesfaye and Olbana Lelisa”]
“Hidhamtoonni siyaasaa hunduu haa hiikaman” [“release political
prisoners”]
“Stop the torture”
“Maa’ikelaawiin haa diigamu” [“demolish Ma’ikelawi”]
“Stop the abuse in Gambella”
“Lubbuun Obbolaa keenyaa yakka 1 malee ajjeefamanii haqa haa
argatu” [“Justice for our brothers who were killed without any crime”]
“Yakkamtoonni lubbuu balleessan seeraaf haa dhiyaatan” [“Criminals
who killed lives should be brought to court”].
“No dumping waste in Oromia”
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Environmental
protection
Stateterrorism

“Iddoowaan daraaraa lafa qonnaan bulaa keenyarraa martinuu haa
diigaman [“shut down all flowers farmings on our farmers’ land”]
“Nuti Oromoota, miti shorokeessitoota” [“we are Oromos, not
terrorists”]
“We are Oromos, not terrorists”
“Stop terrorizing people”
“Ummata shororkeessuun didneerra” [“stop terrorizing people”]

5.2.1.1 Political demands
Oromo social media activists focused on rights in general, and some specific rights they
want respected. They highlighted four major rights: political, economic, and freedom of speech.
Activist focused on rights generally. For example, from the slogans posted on social media one
reads, “All human rights for all.” Another one reads: “Bilisummaa, walqixxummaa fi dimokrasii
barbaanna” [we need freedom, equality, and democracy].
Activists demanded political rights such as administrative rights, particularly self-rule
respected. They demanded the Agazi force, the special military force perceived to ensure the
interests of TPLF, to leave Oromia, their state: “Agaziin Oromiyaa keessaa haa ba’u” [“Agazi
out of Oromia”]. They demanded an end to interference in the administrative affairs of their
region saying, “self-rule now” and “genuine federal self-rule now.” The self-rule rights also
included the right to rule Finfinnee (Addis Ababa), the capital city, which is geographically in
Oromia but has a semi-autonomous administration. On the issue of Finfinnee (Addis Ababa),
most activists point to the Constitution, which recognizes the Oromia region’s special interests
(legal jurisdiction) on Addis Ababa, but which has never been materialized.
Oromo social media activists also highlighted that freedom of the press was one the
reasons to take part in the Grand Oromia Rally. They used the slogan, “Unchain press media and
information.” “Unchain” implies both the status of the press freedom and activists demand to
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free it. One slogan reads: “Blogging is not a crime.” They also demanded the release of journalist
and blogger, Eskinder Nega.
Among the demands of the Oromo social media protests was the respect of religious
freedom. Ethiopian Muslims were protesting against what they believe government’s
interference in their religious affairs (IRIN, 2012). So, the activists demanded respect for
religious rights: “Bilisummaan amantii haa kabajamu” [“respect religious freedom”].
The Oromo people have long complained about cultural grievances. These grievances
were also reflected in their slogans for the Grand Oromia Rally. For example, in one slogan they
highlighted the importance of their language and identity. Our language, Afaan Oromo; our land,
Oromia; and our identity, Oromummaa [“Oromo-ness”] are non-negotiable. Among their slogans
are also their demands to make Afaan Oromo the federal language of Ethiopia: Afaan Oromoo
Afaan hojii federaalaa haa’ta’u [“We want Afaan Oromo to be the federal working language of
Ethiopia”]. Note: Afaan Oromo is the official language of the Oromia region, but it is not the
federal language. So, many Oromos complain that their children cannot find a job in the federal
government offices, as they require Amharic, the federal working language. They also
highlighted that both Afaan Oromo and Ethiopia need each other: “Afaan Oromo for Ethiopia,
Ethiopia for Afaan Oromo.”
Oromo social media activists also used slogans that demanded respect for human rights in
general. These demands were reflected in their slogans such as Mirgi namoota maraaf haa
kabajamu” [“respect for the rights of all”], “all human rights for all.” Oromo social media
activists also demanded the rights of non-Oromos such as Mursi.
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5.2.1.2 Economic demands
As discussed in the news media analysis part, the immediate trigger of the Oromo protest
movement relates to the land, the Addis Ababa Masterplan. So, the Oromo social media activists
highlighted it at the Grand Oromia Rally. They highlighted that their life is inseparable from
their lands: “Lafti Keenya lafee keenya” [our land is our bone”]. They framed the Masterplan as
a government plan to sell their lands to investors. They portrayed it as a scheme to sell the entire
Oromia region: “Oromia is not for sale.” They emphasized that Oromia belongs to Oromo
farmers: “Our land for our farmers.” In addition, they demanded compensation for those evicted:
“Buqqaatootaaf beenyaa gahaan haa kaffalmu” [“fair compensation for people evicted from their
lands”].
5.2.1.3

End to the violence
Most slogans by the Oromo activists focused on an end to state violence against the

Oromo people. They listed different types of violence including killings, arrests, torture. They
demanded the killings to stop in general: “stop killing.” They emphasized the target of the
killings. One slogan reads: “Oromoo ajjeessuun haa dhaabbatu” [“Stop killing the Oromo
people”] while another reads: “Stop killing Oromo: Oromo lives matters.” Another slogan
further specified it saying, “Stop the massacre of children.” Another slogan warned the
government that killing does not solve the problem, it would rather intensify it: “Bloodshed
breeds bloodshed.”
Activists also shared slogans that demand the government end arresting people. They
used a general call on the government. Some of the slogans referred to the prisoners as “political
prisoners” suggesting they were arrested not because they committed any crime but for their
political views. They mentioned some politicians such as Bekele Gerba, the opposition leaders of
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the Oromo Federalist Congress party, Eskinder Nega, a journalist and blogger, and Yonatan
Tesfaye, a blogger.
Oromo social media activists also demanded an end to torture saying, “Stop Torture.”
Along with the demand to end torture, they also demanded the closure of Ma’ikelawi, saying,
“Demolish Ma’ikelawi.” Ma’ikelawi is a crime investigation center in Addis Ababa where police
forces “use coercive methods on detainees amounting to torture or other ill-treatment to extract
confessions, statements, and other information from detainees.” (Human Rights Watch, 17
October 2013, para. 3). According to the Human Rights Watch, “detainees are punished or
rewarded with denial or access to water, food, light, and other basic needs” if they do not comply
with investigators’ demands (para.3).
5.2.1.4 Demand for justice
Another theme highlighted by the Oromo social media activists was Justice. They called
for those who killed the people to face justice. One slogan referred to the victims as “obbolaa
keenya” [our brothers”]: “Lubbuun Obbolaa yakka 1 malee ajjeefamanii haqaa haa argatu”
[“Justice for our brothers who were killed without any crime”]. While they described the victims
as “our brothers,” they portrayed those who killed them as “criminals” as in “Yakkamtoonni
lubbuu balleessan seeraaf haa dhiyaatan” [“Criminals who killed lives should be brought to
court”].
5.2.1.5 Environmental protection
Farmers in Oromia have long complained about the dumping of solid waste from Addis
Ababa into Oromia saying it poisoned water and killed their livestock. In 2016 they forced the
government to shut down the landfill in Sandafa, Oromia (Davidson, 2017). Likewise, they
complained about flower farming in Ethiopia, accusing the growers of using chemicals that cause
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health issues and environmental damage (Hanshaw, 2006). Hence, the Oromo social media
activists used the environmental issue as a rallying point during the Grand Oromia Rally. They
reflected it in their slogans. For example, one slogan reads, “No dumping waste in Oromia.”
Another slogan says “Iddoowwan daraaraa lafa qonnaan bulaa keenyarraa martinuu haa
diigaman” [shut down all flower farming on our farmers’ land”].
5.2.1.6 State terrorism
Oromo social media activists opposed the government’s framing of the protesters as
terrorists. They held slogans that not only deny they are terrorists, but also that portray the
government itself as a terrorist. So, “a terrorist is not me, it is you.” In one of their slogans they
contrast what the government calls them, the terrorists, with who they are, the Oromo: “Nuti
Oromoota, miti shororkeessitoota” [“We are Oromos, not terrorists”]. In another slogan, they
asked the government to “Stop terrorizing people.”
5.2.2 The post-rally discussion
Analysis of the post-discussion among the Oromo social media activists indicated that
four major themes were highlighted. They are violence against the protesters; expression of
solidarity, determination, and hope; warning the government; and defending and praising the
protesters.
5.2.2.1

Violent response to the “peaceful protesters”
One of the major themes highlighted by the Oromo social media activists was the

government’s response to the protests that took place on the day of the Grand Oromia Rally.
Oromo activists mainly focused on the response of the government security forces that resulted
in the deaths, injuries, and arrests of protesters in different parts of Oromia. They portrayed the
response as violence against peaceful protesters.
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Activists highlighted the violence in different ways. They posted reports of the violence
from their own “sources,” and from the news media. They also shared others’ posts that talked
about the violence.
5.2.2.2 Report on the violence
Oromo social media activists reported “news” on the violence from their sources. [Here I
used “news” in quotation because they cited anonymous sources, their friends, or other
informants that contacted them through their inbox]. Activists highlighted different types of the
violence they claimed security forces committed against the protesters. Table 3 shows examples
of the report and types of violent response to the protesters.
Table 3 Examples and Types of Violent Response Against Oromo Protesters
Activists
Girma Gutema

Etana Habte

Dates of report
6 August 2016a
8 August 2016c
10 August 2016d
11 August 2016e
6 August 2016c
9 August 2016d
12 August 2016e
8 August 2016d

Henok Gabisa
Najat Hamza
Tsegaye Ararsa

10 August 2016e
12 August 2016f
11 August 2016a
8 August 2016k
6 August 2016b

Jawar Mohammed

Types of violence
Detention
Arrests, beatings, killings,
Injuries
Dispersing, beatings, imprisoning
Killings, injury
Killings, beatings,
Arrests (of children)
Killings, injury, and disappearance of
protesters
Disappearance, arrests,
Beatings
Death, injury
Killings
Arrests, beatings,

In addition to reporting news of the violence against the protesters from their own
sources, activists also shared reports from the news media, especially international news media.
For example, Gabisa (2016b) shared a link to a video by The Reuters (published on 6 August
2016). The link to The Reuters video shows police officers dispersing the protesters by beating
them with clubs and kicking those who fell on the ground. Gabisa (2016c) also shared a link to
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CNN website which published an opinion piece contributed by Awol Allo published on 9 August
2016. In the opinion piece, Allo detailed the killings, arrests, and tortures committed against
protesters by security forces of the Ethiopian government.
Likewise, Hamza (2016a) shared BBC’s news report video published on 6 August 2016.
The video reported the killings of hundreds and arrest of thousands of protesters. It also showed
security forces trying to disperse the protesters by beating them. In the video, Emmanuel Igunza,
the reporter of the BBC also mentioned questions raised by protesters such as demand for the
release of protesters, an end to the killings, and respect for human rights. Hamza (2016j) also
posted a link to the Guardian’s news story titled: “Dozens shot dead in anti-government protests
across Ethiopia says opposition.” The Guardian reported the death of 33 people citing an
opposition leader. In addition, Hama (2016l) shared a link to NPR interview transcript held
between Audie Cornish, the host, and Gregory Warner, NPR correspondent from Nairobi, Kenya
aired on 9 August 2016. Cornish reported the killing of more than 100 people by the Ethiopian
government’s security forces. Likewise, Mohammed (2016b) also posted a link to a video by AlJazeera aired on 6 August 2016. Catherine Soi, a reporter from Addis Ababa, reported that there
was tight security in Addis Ababa and other parts of the country due to the protesters. She also
mentioned the arrest of many protesters.
On 12 August 2016 Habte (2016f) shared a link to a short video by The New York Times.
The video posted by Upadhye (2016) shows police officers beating protesters. The video screen
has a caption that reads: “police forces have shot and killed scores of unarmed protesters in
Ethiopia.” The description, “unarmed protesters” seems to resonate well with the news media,
Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International, as discussed in the next subsection. Along
with the link, Habte tried to introduce his Facebook followers to what the video was all about:
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“The New York Times published a short video showing violent crackdown on Oromo youth last
Saturday (06/08/16) at Mesqel Square.” Habte (2016b) also shared a link to a news story by
Reuters with a title: “At least 30 protesters killed in Ethiopia's Oromiya region: opposition”
(published on 8 August 2016). By citing an opposition political party official, Aaron Maasho, the
author of the news article, reported the death of at least 33 people in Oromia. He wrote that those
were “shot by security forces” (Maasho, 2016, para.1). Similarly, Ararssa (2016k) posted a link
to Al-Jazeera with a title: “UN Calls for a Probe into Ethiopia Protesters Killings” published on
10 August 2016. Among other things, Al-Jazeera’s Charles Stratford, a reporter from Addis
Ababa, reported the death of 90 people and arrest of hundreds (without giving the exact number).
The Oromo social media activists not only shared news media that reported the violence
but also disputed the news media they thought did not cover the violence appropriately. For
example, they disputed the characterization of the cause of the rally. For example, Habte (2016a)
blamed the international media for limiting the cause of the rally to “unfair distribution of
wealth” saying:
#GrandOromiaRally That increasing number of international media reporting on today's
Oromia wide movement as having been solely caused by "unfair distribution of wealth"
is a clear mark of clouds of ignorance refusing to fade away even after nine months of
#OromoProtests, but it is at the same an undertone of how effective we have been in the
presentation of key issues of our nation's narratives of struggle.
Habte (2016c) shared a link to Agence France Presse website which published a news
story on 8 August 2016 with a title: “7 dead Ethiopian police and protesters clash.” He disputed
the number of people killed without giving his own number. “Confusion on the side of
international media continues, especially on the number of deaths.” The following picture is a
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screenshot from Hamza (2016b)’s post in which she disputed a report by Reuters, describing it as
“Irresponsible Reporting! Deplorable narrative! @Reuters.” She demanded Reuters to
“#ReportFactsNotFiction.” Hamza did not specify which reporting she disputed or the narrative
she did not like. However, the violence reported by the news media was covered in the news
story. Aaron Maasho, the writer of the story, reported that security forces “used tear gas and
blocked roads…try to quell protests against alleged rights abuses” (6 August 2016. para.1).

Najat Hamza
August 6, 2016 at 1:19 PM
·
Irresponsible Reporting! Depolarable narrative! @Reuters
#ReportFactsNotFiction #GrandOromiaRally#OromoProtests #TogetherWeCan
Ethiopia's security forces use tear gas to disperse protests - witness
www.reuters.com

Figure 2 Examples of Activists' Protests Against News Media

5.2.2.3 Violence against peaceful protesters
Oromo activists not only highlighted state violence against the protesters, but they also
portrayed it as violence against peaceful protesters. For example, in his post on 11 August 2016,
Gabisa (2016a) shared a picture of Pastor Daniel with a Bible in his hand, leading a march of
people including many young children in opposition to the government. Gabisa described how
even a pastor, the symbol of peace, can be a target of the government violence. He wrote: “No
matter how eternally peaceful one could be in Ethiopia, TPLF military will shoot you!” (Gabisa,
2016a). Also, Gabisa pointed out that Pastor Daniel was targeted because of his identity and
being the voice of the people.
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His only crime is being Oromo and leading the voice of his people and his congregation
in opposition to the authoritarian regime of TPLF that killed over 700 Oromo people
since November of 2015, of which over 100 were massacred just over this past weekend.
(Gabisa, 2016a).
Mohammed (2016c) in his post on 6 August 2016 claimed that most protesters were
killed not even during the protests but afterward. He also portrayed the security forces’ response
as an act of revenge to “teach lesson” to the protesters. He wrote the following:
A very strange testimony almost from all provinces has emerged. Most of the victims
were shot NOT during the rally but AFTER they were dispersed while they were
returning home. Either they were shot by snipers or ambushed in narrow alleyways.
Why? The regime wanted to 'teach [] lesson. (Mohammed, 2016c, para. 2).
Oromo social media activists highlighted not only the government’s violence against
peaceful protests but also its refusal to help victims of the violence. For example, in his
discussion about Pastor Daniel, Gabisa (2016a) said Pastor Daniel was not only shot but also
denied medical assistance in hospital. Likewise, Gutema (2016b) reported the government’s
attempt to deny protesters access to medical help. For example, he wrote the following:
TPLF forces blocking wounded protesters on #GrandOromiaRally not to get hospital
treatments in different parts of Oromia” By citing a “personal witness” he said, in West
Arsi, “people are left helpless with their wounded family members because the military
closed the only public hospital available in the town.
5.2.2.4 Expression of solidarity, determination, and hope
Oromo social media activists also expressed their solidarity with the victims of state
violence, determination to continue the struggle, and hope for the future.
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Najat Hamza shared a post.
August 6, 2016 ·
W e stand with you Oromia! This darkest hour is our channel to get to a brighter free Oromia!
#MothersofTheStruggle #GrandOromiaRally #TogetherW eCan

Figure 3 Expression of Determination by Oromo Protesters

Some activists expressed their solidarity with the victims of state violence. For example,
sharing the above picture, originally posted by Merertu Geleta Kitila, a Facebook user, on her
Facebook page on 6 August 2016, Hamza (2016c) expressed her solidarity: “We stand with you
Oromia”! By metaphorically describing the experience Oromia was going through as the
“darkest,” but also as a “channel,” she talked about the “brighter” future: “This darkest hour
channel to get to a brighter free Oromia!” She further used hashtags that connect Oromia
(described as a mother of the struggle) with the size of the struggle (Grand Oromia Rally) and
hope (Together we can): “#MotherofTheStruggle #GrandOromiaRally #TogetherWeCan.”
Hamza (2016k) also expressed a mixed feeling of sorrow for the death of a young and
anger at the world for doing nothing. She shared a picture of a body of a young son and
expressed her emotion as follows:
Asasa, Oromia...young life slips away without notice and without a name...tossed aside
all alone with a shot right through his young heart! Nothing to see here...just another
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young Oromo kid killed while the world looks away!!! #GrandOromiaRally
#OromoProtests #TogetherWeCan.
Activists’ show of solidarity with the victims of the Oromo protests also involved sharing
of pictures of other people who showed solidarity. For instance, on 6 August 2016, Hamza
(2016d) a picture posted by Nuredin Sule, a Facebook user. A picture shows a group of people in
Atlanta, United States, gathered together to show solidarity with the Oromo protesters. The
people in the picture crossed their hands above of their head, a gesture used by protesters. Hamza
(2016d) described the picture saying “Atlanta, standing in solidarity with #GrandOromiaRally
#OromoProtests #TogetherWeCan right now!” (Hamza, 2016d).
Ararssa (2016b) also described the resolve with which the people were fighting and his
hope for victory. For example, on 6 October 2016, he argued: “the people are fighting back with
resolve. Confrontation is raging. [] Situation is tense…we shall overcome” (para.2). In his other
Facebook post, Ararssa (2016c) described the situation as a turning point saying, “we are on the
cusp…” Ararssa (2016d) also expressed determination to continue the struggle: “yet, we say:
“KILLING WON’T KILL OUR STRUGGLE.”
Hamza (2016e) also warned about the inevitable defeat of those who committed violence
against peaceful protesters because it will not last by saying:
[sic] Ethiopian regime needs to understand violence cannot be sustained indefinately [sic]
against the entire population of the country! Sooner or later the demand of the people
must be respected and answered! Those who have inflicted and continue to inflict harm
on peaceful civilian protesters will face justice.
Oromo social media activists also expressed their hope on the continuity of their struggle.
For example, on her Post on 6, 2016 Hamza (2016f) posted a video of small children singing
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“Oromia, Oromia, Oromia…” Hamza described the children as: “Little Oromian angels also
have something to say, after all [] we are fighting to give them [] freedom to live”
by…#GrandOromiaRally #OromoProtests#TogetherWeCan.” In her other post, Hamza wrote
about the solution to what she described as “hunger for freedom.”: “The hunger for freedom can
only be quenched with the sweet taste of liberation #GrandOromiaRally #OromoProtests
#TogetherWeCan” (Hamz, 2016g)
Like Hamza, Ararssa (2016g) also expressed both determination and hope in the face of
the violent response. For example, he posted a picture of very young protesters to indicate hope
of the future saying, “The future is calling…” (Ararssa, 2016g). On 8 August 2016i, he posted a
picture of young protesters holding up what many Oromos believe is a “resistance flag” and a
slogan that reads “‘WE WILL NEVER BE RULED BY TPLF.’” (Ararssa, 2016i) Ararssa
emphasized the slogan by writing on his Facebook page along with the picture: “We will never
be ruled by the TPLF’ say the children of hope. Moreover, what does TPLF say? I would rather
leave it unsaid.”
5.2.2.5 Warning to the government
Another theme of the message of the Oromo activists in their social media discussion was
warning to the Ethiopian government. For example, on 6 August 2016, Tsegaye Ararssa posted a
picture of a big crowd crossing their hands above their heads, a sign of protest used by the
Oromo protesters. He described those hands as “hands of peace,” and “hands of protests”
(Ararssa, 2016f). However, he also warned the government suggesting those hands would not be
peaceful forever saying, “Woe unto the regime the day these hands start to reach out for guns,
which the regime is inviting every passing minute” (Ararssa, 2016f). He also said of the same
picture in his other post, “Who knows? This may as well be the last appeal to the roughs in
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power to resolve problems peacefully…it might as well be time to shift gears further…”
(Ararssa, 2016g).
Similarly, Najat Hamza in her post on 6 August 2016 shared another Facebook post of
Ifaa (2016) which warned the government suggesting its violent response does not solve the
problem: ‘‘violence breeds violence. Bloodshed breeds more bloodshed.” (Ifaa 2016 quoted by
Hamza, 2016h). The post also warned the government of taking the country to a dangerous
course: “The EPRDF [Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Force] government is
driving the country off the cliff!” Furthermore, the post highlighted the choice the government
made as a root for the crisis: “Wanton killings of peaceful protest expressing the deep-seated
grievances…instead of addressing the underlying systemic political, economic and social
causes.” On her other post on 6 August 2016 she also shared a post by Getu Olana, another
Facebook user, who wrote, “‘LET IT BE CLEAR TO ALL, PEACE CANNOT BE
MAINTAINED BY FORCE OR BY THE GOOD WILL OF ONE SIDE’” (Olana, 2016 quoted
in Hamza, 2016i). The post further said:
‘Today, protesters are shouting bilisummaa [freedom] and the brutal forces of the
TPLF/EPRDF regime are firing at people and trying to contain the protest by force, in
effect turning the protests into violence. Let it be clear to all, peace cannot be maintained
by force or by the good will of one side. What happened and happens today is likely to
leave a permanent mark in the history of Ethiopia.’ (Olana, 2016, shared by Hamza,
2016i).
Hamza (2016i) reinforced Olana’s comment saying: “You can only maintain chaos with
violence not peace and order #GrandOromiaRally #Oromo protests.”
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5.2.2.6 Defending and praising protesters
Some social media activists defended the actions of the protesters. For example, Ararssa
(2016h) in his post on 6 August 2016, tried to defended protesters’ road blocking portraying it as
an act of self-defense. He posted a picture of roads blocked by stones and logs by protesters to
limit the movement of security forces. He defended the protesters as engaging in self-defense
who did not have an option but to resist the government violence: “When you meet a civil protest
with a military means, you turn everyone into a soldier. You turn a peaceful protest into a
militant resistance” (Ararssa, 2016h). He implied the shift from “peaceful protest” to a “militant
resistance” because of how the security forces responded to peaceful protesters.
Activists also praised the protesters by framing their cause as peace and dignity. For
instance, Tsegaye Ararssa portrayed the march in the face of violence and the sacrifice as a price
paid for peace and dignity: “They marched for peace even in the face of guns. They marched for
life even in the face of death produced in mass by a State killing machine. They marched for
dignity. And those who died, died with dignity, for the dignity of many more” (Ararssa, 2016j).
5.3

Reaction to Lilesa’s Gesture at Rio 2016 Olympics
BBC (2016, August 21) carried a news article titled: Ethiopian runner makes protest sign

as he crosses line in Rio” along with a picture of Athlete Feyisa Lilesa who raised his arms
above his head in a display of solidarity with the Oromo protest movement in Ethiopia. Lilesa’s
gesture at one of the biggest events in the world received significant attention. International news
media covered it for weeks. Users of social media shared and discussed it. Lilesa’s gesture also
marked a turning point for activists of the Oromo protest movement who, until then, needed
global attention so badly. This section presents the major themes highlighted by the Oromo
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social media activists and how they used them to fit into their narrative about the Oromo protest
movement.
The results of the analysis show that the Oromo social media activists highlighted three
major themes. First, they highlighted that the Oromo protest movement was receiving
international attention—"the whole world is watching us”—framing it as a “victory.” Second,
they devoted much of their attention to praising Lilesa for his gesture. They praised Lilesa as a
“hero.” Third, they emphasized the impact of Lilesa’s gesture on the protest movement,
portraying it as “inspirational.”
5.3.1 “We are getting global attention”
The “we are getting global attention” was a major theme the Oromo social media activists
highlighted in their discussion about Feyisa Lilesa’s gesture at the 2016 Rio Olympics. Activists
highlighted this theme both directly by discussing it and indirectly by sharing stories covered by
the news media.
All social media activists whose Facebook posts were studied for this project shared links
to international news media that covered Feyisa Lilesa’s gesture. Some activists shared their own
articles or interviews published or aired on other media outlets. The following table shows
examples of the news media stories, along with their titles, the Oromo activists shared on their
Facebook pages.
Table 4 Examples of the News Media Shared by Oromo Protest Activists
Activists
Mohammed Ademo

Henok G. Gebisa
Tsegaye Ararssa

News Media and Titles of Their Stories
“Ethiopia on the Precipice: The Regime's Armor Has Been Pierced”
(OkayAfrica, 23 August 2016).
“Uncommon courage at Rio Olympics: Ethiopia’s Feyisa Lilesa risks it all
for his people” (Opride, 22 August 2016)
“Silver medalist Feyisa Lilesa: ‘If I go back to Ethiopia, the government
will kill me’” (Olympics, 21 August 2016)
“Lelisa’s Message” (Jacobin, 13 August 2016)
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Geresu Tufa
Etana Habte

Jawar Mohammed

Girma Gutema

“Rio 2016 - Feyisa Lilesa shows solidarity with protests back in “Ethiopia
as he wins Silver in Men's Marathon” (Ethiotube, 21 August 2016)
“Dr. Awol Allo on the significance of Feyisa Lelisa's Olympic gesture”
(Arise News, 21 August 2016)
“With Fists Raised, Ethiopian Stirs Ghosts of '68 Olympics” (NBCNEWS,
23 August 2016)
“Runner Fears for Life After Showing Solidarity with Ethiopian Protesters”
(VOA, 21 August 2016)
“Rio 2016: Ethiopia’s Feyisa Lilesa gets a silver for running – and a gold
for bravery” (Daily Maverick, 22 August 2016)
“Running for more than medals” (Stephenville Empire-Tribune 22 August
2016).
Ethiopian marathoner makes protest gesture at Rio finish line. (CNN, 22
August 2016)
“Ethiopian runner fears Olympic protest could get him killed” (Fox News,
22 August 2016)
“Ethiopian marathoner makes political protest at finish line” (Yahoo
Sports, 21 August 2016).
“The Question: Can the Olympics ever be apolitical?” (The Irish Times, 27
August 2016).

Some activists both shared and commented on the news media that covered Feyisa
Lilesa’s gesture. For example, Hamza (2016m) shared Yisihak (2016), who posted a list of 13
media outlets which covered Lilesa. The media outlets on the list were The Daily Mail, CNN,
BBC, The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Independent, Mirror, The Daily Post,
News.com, Sports News, LetsRum.com, and Reuters. Yisihak described the news coverage as
evidence that Oromo protest movement was receiving global attention: “International media are
reporting about Ethiopian Athlete, Feyisa Lelisa, and his brave act Rio Olympic. He exposed the
dictatorial regime the brutal leaders in Ethiopia” (Yisihak, 2016 Shared by Hamza, 2016m).
Likewise, Mohammed (2016n) in Facebook post on 25 August 2016 stated that Feyisa
Lilesa received significant attention by mentioning the google search results saying, “When you
search Feyisa Lilesa’s name on google, you will find some 2 million results making it the most
widely reported personality from Ethiopia ever. (Mohammed, 2016n). Mohammed (2016i) also
thanked Fox News and shared its link to a short video clip that talked about Lilesa’s gesture at
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Rio Olympics: “Thank you Fox News for this in depth [] reporting on the cause of Feyisa
Lilesa’s heroic act of resistance (Mohammed, 2016i). Jim Gray, the contributor of the show,
cited unnamed activists who claimed that the protests in Ethiopia were in opposition to the
killings of protesters and the Masterplan. Gray portrayed the Masterplan as “a major [cause]
because many Ethiopians survive by farming” (Gray, 2016: 1:02 shared by Mohammed, 2016i).
In the show, Gray also described the cause of protesters as a demand for freedom for the Oromo
people. So, according to Gray, Lilesa was “drawing even more attention to the deadly protests
that are happening in Ethiopia” (0:44).
Similarly, Gutema (2016k) also shared a link to Reuters which ran a story titled:
“Olympics marathon medalist’s protest shines spotlight on unrest in Ethiopia (25 August 2016).
On 25 August 2016, Gutema (2016f) also posted a video of Feyisa Lilesa at the finish line of the
marathon race triumphantly raising his arms above his head. He pointed out that Lilesa made the
people’s voice, which was suppressed at home, heard around the globe: “TPLF [the dominant
party in the ruling coalition of Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front] suppressed
people’s voices inside the country only to make it heard in the whole world” (Gutema, 2016f).
Oromo activists also discussed how the news media reacted to Feyisa Lilesa’s gesture at
the Rio Olympics. For example, Mohammed Ademo on 21 August 2016 shared a link to his own
article titled: “Uncommon courage at Rio Olympics: Ethiopia’s Feyisa Lilesa risks it all for his
people” (22 August 2016). In the article, Ademo (2016a) expressed his satisfaction with how
Chris Chavez of the Sports Illustrated, Kevin Seiff of the Washington Post, and Piers Edwards of
BBC, described Lilesa’s action as follows:
Chavez was one of the first western journalists to recognize the significance of Lilesa’s
gesture and live-tweet the athlete’s post-race comments … the Washington Post’s Africa
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Bureau chief, Kevin Sieff, called it ‘the bravest act at the 2016 Olympics’ … BBC
Journalist Piers Edwards dubbed Lilesa’s display of courage an ‘extraordinary moment.’
They were right” (Ademo, 2016, para. 5 shared by Ademo, 2016a).
Ademo (2016b) also shared a link to www.okayafrica.com an article with the title:
Ethiopia on the Precipice: The Regime’s Armor Has been Pierced” (23 August 2016). Hassen
Hussen, the author of the article, underscored that Lilesa’s gesture at the Rio Olympics
challenged the Ethiopian government’s attempt to externalize the cause of protesters to some
members of the Ethiopian diaspora community:
After Lelisa’s display of solidarity for the protests at the Rio Olympics, after winning a
silver for his country in a marathon, it [Ethiopia] could not [] longer dismiss the troubles
as the handiwork of what it likes to call a handful extremist saboteurs in the diaspora.
(Hussen 2016, para. 14 shared by Ademo, 2016b).
5.3.2 Impact of Lilesa’s gesture
I think this is such a momentous, dramatic day not only for the Oromo people, but also
for the entire oppressed people within Ethiopia and beyond. The Oromo people have been
protesting since November of 2015. They were crying to be heard. And they were being
killed in hundreds just to be heard. And they were crying to be heard. (Allo, 2016, 1:17
interviewed by Arise News, 2016 and shared by Tufa, 2016a).
The above quote is an interview transcript Awol Allo, an Oromo activist, gave to Arise
News on 24 August 2016. It exemplifies how social media activists viewed the impact of Feyisa
Lilesa’s gesture at the Rio Olympics. Oromo social media activists highlighted the impact
regarding the global attention it received; the pressure on the Ethiopian government; and
implications on the Oromo protest movement itself.
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Some activists highlighted the impact of Lilesa’s action regarding grabbing the attention
of the international community. For instance, on 23 August 2016, Habte (2016g) shared a link to
People’s World, which ran a news story titled: “Ethiopian marathon runner uses win to protest
killings, oppression in his country” (23 August 2018). Robinson (2016), who wrote the article,
discussed among other things, the impact of Lilesa’s action. She described it as grabbing global
attention and pointed out that the news of Lilesa’s gesture quickly spread on social media.
Robinson also highlighted the diplomatic impact on the Ethiopian government by mentioning
Lilessa’s suggestion that the western governments had a role in the violence by supporting the
Ethiopian government: ‘“Now America, England, and France support this government. [] When
they give this support it buys machine guns, then they kill the people’” (Lilesa, 2016 quoted in
Chauncey, 2016, Lilesa’s impact section, para. 2 shared by Habte, 2016g). Neither Robinson nor
Lilesa explained the association between the western governments’ support to Ethiopia and the
latter’s violence against protesters. However, activists and human rights groups accused the
Ethiopian government of using the aid money to buy machine guns or to use it to silence
dissents.
Likewise, Tufa (2016a) shared Arise News’ video clip, which broadcast an interview with
Awol Allo. Allo discussed the significance of Lilesa’s gesture in telling the world the story of the
Oromo people by saying, “This is such a critical moment that sort of propelled the story of the
Oromo people into the global stage…the Oromo people had the opportunity to be heard for the
first time by the global audience” (Arise news, 2016, 3:43 shared by Tufa, 2016a). Allo in his
interview also discussed how the U.S. was also contributing to the oppression in Ethiopia, for
example, by mentioning that its top officials such as President Obama and Susan Rice portrayed
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Ethiopia as a democratic country. So, according to Allo, Lilesa exposed the reality on the world
stage:
…the most important message here is that … he [Lilesa] is saying, contrary to public
knowledge, contrary to these make-believe stories created by the Ethiopian government
and … aided by powerful figures such as President Obama…Ethiopian people,
particularly the Oromos, live under a very oppressive situation. (Arise News, 2016, 5:24
shared by Tufa, 2016a).
Similarly, Mohammed (2016j) shared an article by Daily Maverick (22 August 2016)
contributed by Simon Allison. Allison highlighted Lilisa’s impact on the Ethiopian government
in two ways: damage on its image, and the impact on the aid it receives from donors such as the
United States. Allison highlighted the likelihood that the Ethiopian government might moderate
its violence against protesters because of the aid money it receives: “With the world watching,
and precious aid money on the line, Ethiopia may be forced to moderate its response to further
protests” (Allison, 2016 para. 10).
Girma Gutema on his 24 August 2016 shared a tweet by Khaled Beydoun who described
the impact of Feyisa Lilesa’s gesture by comparing his silver medal with gold medals others
received at the Olympics: “‘Feyisa Lilesa’s Silver medal is more impactful than any & and all of
the Gold medal [] at the #Rio2016 #OromoProtests.’” (Beydoun, 2016 shared by Gutema, 2016i)
Social media activists also highlighted the contribution of Lilesa’s gesture to the Oromo
protest movement itself. For example, in his post on 21 August 2016, Jawar Mohammed
expressed his amazement by its impact in raising the spirit of the Oromo people:
“#OromoProtests What a day, Feyisa Lilesa raised his hand in solidarity and uplifted the spirit of
the nation mourning hundreds of its martyrs!!” (Mohammed, 2016g). Ademo (2016a) also
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described the possible impact of Lilesa’s gesture as empowering and inspiring for other athletes:
“To witness one of their own using the biggest stage of his life to make a bold and unmistakable
statement, it is to be inspired and empowered” (Ademo, 2016a, para. 6). He portrayed Lilesa’s
gesture as a source of hope and inspiration for Ethiopians in general and Oromo people in
particular:
Lilesa’s defiant protest may not generate similar attention only because the international
media pays little to no attention to Africans and African stories. But for millions of
Ethiopians, particularly the Oromo, the symbolic gesture offers hope for a better future. It
will serve as yet another inspiration to the 9-month old Oromo protests, which has
already shaken the foundations of the Ethiopian state. (para. 11).
5.3.3 Praise for Feyisa Lilesa
Praise for Lilesa was another major theme the Oromo social media activists highlighted
in their discussion Feyisa Lilesa’s gesture. Activists portrayed Lilesa as selfless, hero,
courageous, risk taker and brave. The table below shows examples of how Oromo activists
praised Lilesa for his gesture at the Rio 2016 Olympics.
Oromo social media activists highlighted how Lilesa’s action at the Rio Marathon was a
selfless act. For instance, Gutema (2016j) in his post on 24 August 2016 described Lilesa as
someone who took a risk to expose the grievance of the Oromo people to the world. Gutema
described Lilesa’s selflessness by juxtaposing what he risked, “his life” and “his career,” with
what his goal was, exposing “collective grievances” and “institutional discrimination:” “At [sic]
risk to his life, and at the sacrifice to his career, Lilesa was determined to express at the
Olympics the collective grievances and institutional discrimination his people suffer in the
Oromia region” (Gutema, 2016j).
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Mohammed (2016h) shared a link to VOA Amharic radio which aired Lilesa’s interview
on 22 August 2016. He showed how Lilesa’s act was selfless by directly quoting what he told the
VOA saying he did not have any material or personal problem: ‘“I drive a good car. I live in a
nice house. I have no personal problem. But others are being thrown out of their homes and
losing their lives. That’s why I had to speak up" #Feyisa Lilesa tells VOA Amharic”’
(Mohammed, 2016h). Lilesa compared himself with his people who were the victims of
government policy but chose to be on their side.
Table 5 Some Words of Praise Oromo Activists Shared on their Facebook Pages
“The hero, Feyisa Lelisa standing in grace and defiant showing the resistance gesture on the stage at
the press conference” (Gutema, 2016g)
“In Ethiopia, long distance runners are heroes. But Feyisa Lilesa must be the most heroic of the lot.
The marathon runner won a silver in Rio on Sunday, but it is what he did after he crossed the line
that will be remembered” (Allison, 2016 shared by Mohammed, 2016j.
“uncommon courage made common at Rio Olympics” (Ademo, 2016a)
‘“#FeyisaLelisa’s career with the Ethiopian Athletics Federation ended tonight. But his courageous
act of protests is one for the history books” (Ademo, 2016 cited by Robinson, 23 August 2016, para.
7).
“Kana kunooti nama jechuun kana” [“this is what it means to be a man”] (Suleeyman, 2016)—
shared by Mohammed, 2016k)
“yaa abaaboo fakkeenya hundaa, goota koo baga dhalatte, badhaasa harmee Oromiyaa, seenaa
gaarii raawwatte” [“you, the flower, the icon of everything, my hero, good that you were born. You,
the gift of the motherland, Oromia, you made history”]. (Bekele & Tadele, 2016)—shared by
Mohammed 2016L)
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“When Ethiopian marathon runner Feyisa Lilesa crossed the line at Rio he made a bold political
statement” (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2016—shared by Mohammed
“Feyisa Lelisa, the symbol of the moral courage we all needed to see in these very dark days...”
(Tsegaye Ararssa, 2016L).
“Feyisa Lelisa, the face of courage, determination, and of living for a cause that is larger than
himself, larger than even Olympic glory!!!” (Ararssa, 2016m).

On August 23, 2016, Gutema (2016h) shared by link to www.okayafrica.com which
published an article titled: “Ethiopia on the Precipice: The Regime's Armor Has Been Pierced”
(2016, August 23). Hussein (2016), the author of the article, praised Lelisa for exposing the
Ethiopian government to the world. Gutema (2016h) suggested his followers needed to read the
article by saying: “A MUST READ.” (Mohammed (2016j) also shared a post by The Daily
Maverick that published a story about Lilesa with a title suggestive of the worth of his bravery:
“Ethiopia’s Feyisa Lilesa gets a silver for running—and a gold for bravery” (22 August 2016).
Simon Allison, the author of the article, compared Lilesa’s reward for running—silver medal—
with his reward for “bravery”—the gold medal. Allison also compared Lilesa’s heroism with the
heroism of other Ethiopian athletes but highlighted that Lilesa’s heroism was better due to his
gesture at the Rio Olympics.
In Ethiopia, long distance runners are heroes. But Feyisa Lilesa must be the most heroic
of the lot. The marathon runner won a silver in Rio on Sunday, but it is what he did after
he crossed the line that will be remembered (Allison, 2016, para. 1 shared by
Mohammed, 2016j).
Furthermore, Allison compared Lilesa with other athletes “who realise that sport is about
more than running and jumping and kicking a ball” (para. 11). These athletes were Tommie
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Smith and John Carlos (Americans), Andy Flower and Henry Oonga (Zimbabweans),
Mohammed Ali (American). She compared them as follows:
Lilesa himself has joined that small pantheon of athletes who realise that sport is about
more than running and jumping and kicking a ball. It is an elite group that includes the
likes of Tommie Smith and John Carlos, who raised their fists in that iconic black power
salute in 1968; the Zimbabwean cricketers Andy Flower and Henry Olonga who wore
black armbands in a match against Namibia in 2003, to symbolise the death of democracy
in Zimbabwe; boxer Muhammad Ali, whose outspoken opposition to the Vietnam War
cost him his titles and his fighting licence []. (para. 11).
Allison used the simile, “Like” to compare Lilesa with the athletes saying, “Like them,
and at a great personal risk, Lilesa has used his 15 minutes of fame to bring the world’s attention
to an issue far greater, and more urgent than himself” (Allison, 2016, para. 12).
“I halready[sic] ear[sic] the sound of a new song in his name, a tune of longing for
freedom. A longing throbbing for expression in the hearts of millions and millions of Oromos
across the globe” (Ararssa, 2016l). On the day Feyisa Lilesa displayed his gesture in solidarity
with the Oromo protest movement, 21 August 2016, Ararssa (2016L) suggested a new song to
praise him. He suggested a song be sung in Lilesa’s name. He suggested what the song should be
about as follows:
A song of freedom much needed after a long, dark day…
To the masterful performance you displayed as an athlete;
To the courageous gesture of solidarity [] you expressed as an Oromo person;
To the incredible valor you showed in order to do what you did as a person;
and to you as a person, as a genuine hero
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...we pray tribute tonight.
We salute you ilma goototaa [the son of heroes]
You wrote a new chapter in history today
And as you belong to the more glorious archives of history, history will own you—to
remember you, to honor you, and to celebrate you for the ages to come (Ararssa, 2016).
Oromo social media activists also shared poems and songs that praised Lilesa for his
display of solidarity with the Oromo protest movement in Rio Olympics. Mohammed (2016k)
Umar Suleeyman, an Oromo singer. Umar Suleeyman’s video starts off by showing Lilesa
raising his hands above his head as he finishes the marathon race and showing the clenched fist
of his right hand, a body language that symbolizes victory. In the background is heard a round of
applause—a sign of praise. His action followed by a sound of a gunshot, symbolizing a struggle
for freedom. Then appeared Umar Suleeyman saying, “Kana kunooti nama jechuun kana” [“this
is what it means to be a man”], praising Lilesa as “the man.” He also praises his act saying, “hujii
jechuun tana. Hojjatan akkana” [“this is the right action; this is how you do the right thing”].
Suleeyman goes on to say, “Isinitti jabaa oduu gammachiisaa” [“I herald to you, the good
news”]. The “good news” he was referring to was what Lilesa did at the Rio Olympic: “Gootichi
Oromoo, Fayyisaa Lalisaa [“the hero of the Oromo, Feyisa Lilesa”], “Rio Olympic Biraazil
keessatti” [“at the Rio Olympics in Brazil”], addunyaatti ibse rakkoo saba isaa” [“told the world
about the grievance of his people”]. Suleeyman mentioned some of those problems such as
beatings, killings, arrest, and forced migration. He compared Lilesa’s gesture as (raising his arms
above his head) with a “shimala,” a traditional stick used by the Oromo men to defend
themselves from being hit.
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Mohammed (2016L) also shared a video by Mulu Bekele and Jagama Tadele, both
Oromo signers. On August 24, 2016, Mohammed (2016l). The video starts off by showing Lilesa
raising his arms above his head at the finish line of the marathon race. It showed untired and
determined Lilesa, after he ran the full-distance marathon of 26.2 miles. In the song, Jagama
Tadele says, “Ariitee baga dhaqabde. Addunyaa dha qaxxaamurte. Baga gammanne, baga
gammadde” [“Good that you chased and captured. You crossed the world. Congratulations to us,
and congratulations to you”]!
Then, Mulu Bekele praised him saying, “yaa abaaboo fakkeenya hundaa, goota koo baga
dhalatte, badhaasa harmee Oromiyaa, seenaa gaarii raawwatte” [“you, the flower, the icon of
everything, my hero, good that you were born. You, the gift of the motherland, Oromia, you
made history”].
Tadele also described Lilesa’s selfless act saying, “Qorraa fi aduudha hinjenne; beelaafi
dheebu osoo hinjenne; dadhabee boqonnaa hinjenne; kaayyoo keetti xiyyeeffattee; biyaa keetif,
lammii keetif, wabii dhaabbatte” [you did not care for the cold and sun; you did not care about
hunger and thirst; you did not say, ‘I am tired;’ you just focused on your goals. You stood for
your country, for your people.” Bekle also said, Lilesa, not the coward, deserve to be praised:
“…yartuu farsuun, lugna faarsuun anaaf naa hinta’tu.” [“I cannot praise the weak and the
coward”].
5.4

The Irreecha Event
The Irreecha Festival of October 2, 2016 was a significant event in the history of the

Oromo protest movement. The protests at the festival led to the death of more than 52 people,
according to the Ethiopian government, or more than 700 people according to the human rights
groups. The incident captured global attention. It received extensive coverage by the
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international media. Pictures of dead bodies and injured people widely circulated among Oromo
social media users. The incident added more momentum to the Oromo protest movements that
started nine months before the incident. This section sought to answer how the Oromo social
media activists responded to the Irreecha Festival protests by analyzing the major themes of their
discussion on Facebook. It uncovered five major themes: Complaining about news media
coverage, expression of grievance, expression of hope, information sharing, and call for a new
strategy
5.4.1 Complaints about the news media coverage
“It hurts to have lived through the pain when it happens. It hurts more when the story of
your pain is either ignored, distorted, un-understood, or misinterpreted” (Ararssa, 2026n).
The above quote is from one of the Facebook posts of Tsegaye Ararssa, an Oromo social
media activist of the Oromo protest movement. It is just one example of how many Oromo social
media activists reacted to the way the news media covered the Irreecha event of 2016. Tsegaye
Ararssa and other social media activists whose Facebook posts were studied reacted differently
to the news media coverage of the Irrecha incident. Some of them shared the news stories about
the incident on their pages without commenting, some shared but also invited others to read or
listen to those news stories, while others disputed how the news media framed the death of
protesters, mainly highlighting the cause of the deaths. Still some of expressed their anger at how
the news media framed the cause of the deaths at the Irreecha incident.
Some activists reacted to the news media by disputing the framing, particularly of the
causes of death, of protesters at the event. For example, the following is how Mohammed
(2016O), disputed the Washington Post’s frame of the cause of the death of protesters as a
“stampede.”
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[sic] Washington Post correct your stupid report. Stampede was not the main cause. The
stampede was a result of people running from machine gun bullets and teargas [] thrown
from helicopters. You want proof, ask those bunch of diplomats and foreign journalists
who were sitting there at the VIP lounge. They saw the whole thing and filmed it but
unwilling to speak the truth. (Mohammed, 2016o).
In the above quote, Mohammed, challenged The Washington Post’s Paul Schemm who
wrote the news article on October 2, 2016) on the cause of the death using assertive language:
“The stampede was not the cause.” Moreover, he provided an alternative frame without denying
the contribution of the stampede to the death by pointing to what caused the stampede itself:
“The stampede was the result of people running from machine gun bullets and teargas.” He also
suggested The Washington Post ask people (diplomats and foreign journalists) who were at the
scene.
However, the researcher noted that: The Washington Post’s article Mohammed (2016O)
alluded to was updated twice saying, “This article has been updated with new details throughout”
and “This article has been updated with more details and comment from the government”
respectively (2 October 2016). The researcher also noted that the article changed its title from
“Dozens of deaths during stampede at Ethiopia religious event” (2 October 2016) to “Dozens
killed during stampede at religious celebration in Ethiopia” (2 October 2012). The title of the
updated article shows a change in the frame of the cause of the death with the word “killed,”
which is more suggestive of how the protesters died: “dozens killed.…”
Like Jawar Mohammed, Etana Habte, another Oromo activist, disputed media
representation of the cause of the death at the Irreecha festival. In his Facebook post published
on 2 October 2016, Habte (2016h) expressed his disagreement with the way news media framed
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the death of protesters. He claimed that massacre, not the stampede, was the cause of the deaths
at Irreecha. He said the news media framing of the death otherwise hurts more than the death of
protesters for which he blamed journalists as being lazy, ignorant, and irresponsible: “What is
hurting even more than the death of hundreds of our beloved ones today at Irreecha is lazy,
ignorant and irresponsible journalism reporting the massacre simply as a stampede” (Habte,
2016h, para. 1).
Similarly, Tufa (2016b) disputed the news media’s frame of the cause as a stampede. He
even went further by equating portrayal of the cause of Oromo protesters’ death at Irreecha as a
stampede to supporting the “massacre.” As he put it, “Framing today’s #Massmassacare [] as
simply caused by #Stampede on the side of international media is [sic] amount [sic] to
condoning the massacre” (Tufa, 2016b)).
Likewise, Najat Hamza on 5 October 2016 shared a post by Asafa Jalata (which was
published on 2 October 2016), an Oromo and a professor at the University of Tennessee, who
accused among other things, the Western media of misrepresenting the cause of the death at
Irreecha. Jalata claimed that the Ethiopian security forces fired teargas and live ammunition into
the crowd. He blamed the Western media for “spreading inaccurate information about the tragic
events of this day” (Jalata, 2016, para.1 shared by Hamza, 2016n).
In addition to disputing the news media frame of the cause of the death at Irreecha, some
activists also expressed their feelings in different ways. Some of it involves the use of profanity.
For example, Habte(2016i) in his post published on 2 October 2016 called the BBC “idiot.” “
[sic] BBC is idiot.” Although Habte did not specify why he described it that way, The BBC he
was citing framed the cause of the death as “stampede” as opposed to what the activists prefer to
portray it as, a “massacre.” Likewise, Mohammed (2016p) questioned the quality of the BBC
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report without specifying the reason or saying which edition of the BBC he was referring to. He
just wrote: “Shame on BBC. What a shitty report. Who is their reporter who compiled this crap?”
(Mohammed, 2016p). Mohammed (2016O) also referred to The Washington Post’s news article
published on October 2, 2016 as a “stupid report.”
Tsegaye Ararssa also expressed his annoyance at the way the news media covered the
Irreecha incident. In his post on 2 October 2016, Ararssa (2016n) Ararssa used an emoji that
says, “Tsegaye Ararssa is feeling annoyed.” Without naming a specific media outlet that
annoyed him, he wrote about the foreign news media’s reluctance to cover what was going on in
Ethiopia. Ararssa listed the following as possible reasons for media hesitation to let the world
know about the incidents in Oromia:
Part of it is the result of the fear and self-censorship among their 'informants' close to the
event for fear of being arrested, tortured, or even killed by the regime. Part of it is their
deranged sense of history. But part of it is from their liberal fantasy of achieving
journalistic 'objectivity' and 'balance' in an environment that is so unfair and
asymmetrical in every imaginable respect. (Ararssa, 2016n, para.1).
He described the results of this as “annoying level of inaccuracy, distortion,
undervaluation or ignoring of weighty events/facts/incidents, decontextualization, and/or
misinterpretation” (p. 1).
5.4.2 Expression of grievance
Expression of grievance about the death of protesters at the Irreecha festival is another
theme that was highlighted by Oromo social movement activists. Oromo activists expressed their
grievances by posting pictures and videos with written messages of condolences.
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On his Facebook post on 2 October 2016, Ararssa (2016o) posted two pictures. The first
is a picture of a young man with a caption, “black Irreecha.” The picture reflects a young male in
isolation and despair. His posture suggests he is in deep sorrow and looking down while putting
his hands on his head. The image symbolizes the expression of grief in Oromo and many
Ethiopian cultures. The second picture shows a black background on which is written two
captions: #IrreechaMassacre and #ThanksgivingMassacre suggesting what happened was a sad
story that took place on an important religious event which was supposed to end peacefully.
Ararssa (2016s) also posted the following picture along with his feelings that suggested he was
speechless:
In the face of excess, the first one to fail is language itself. I guess it’s true, after all, that
extreme pain nullifies words (a la E. Scarry). Horror, material or discursive, is truly
unspeakable. So, … I am silent even while my mouth is open… wanting to say
something…Hence, the quiet noise… (Ararssa, 2016s).

Figure 4 Expression of Grievance at the Death of Oromo Protesters
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On his post on 3 October 2016, Tufa (2016e) shared a link to a short video clip that he
said shows the funeral service of Aberash Hailu who died at Irreecha. The video shows a big
crowd of people crying. Geresu wished her to rest in peace.
On 3 October 2016, Mohammed (2016q) also posted a photo of a young lady and a short
video clip. Mohammed in his comment section said the people of Najjoo received the body of
Lalisee Haftaamuu who was martyred in Bishooftuu. The photo was a picture of Lalisee
Haftamuu. The image shows a happy young lady posed for a camera. The video clip shows a big
crowd of people, many of them crying, as they receive the body of Lalisee Haftaamuu.
On October 3, 2016, Gebissa (2016) used metaphor and comparisons to highlight the
graveness of the violence at Irreecha. For example, he used the metaphor “Bloody Sunday” in his
article titled: “The Irreecha Massacre: Another Bloody Sunday for History.” He compared the
Irreecha incident of Sunday, October 2, 2016, to three other massacres that took place in history
on Sundays but different years: the Hamidian Massacre of October 1, 1985 (Armenia); Russia’s
Bloody Sunday of January 22, 1905; and the Bogside Massacre of January 30, 1972 (Ireland).
Gebissa (2016) attempted to show similarities between these incidents. For example, he
noted that all of them took place on Sundays saying, “Sundays seem to have been the chosen day
for perpetrating massacres” (para, 2). He also mentioned that all these massacres were committed
against civilians. Gebissa portrayed massacres as a sign of weakness on the part of governments:
“Governments perpetrate massacres as an act of desperations by officials who have completely
other avenues of maintaining legitimacy and stable rule” (Gebissa, 2016, para. 6).
Tufa (2016f) also invoked another metaphor, “Black Swan” implying what happened at
Irreecha was unfathomable and unexplainable to him when he asked, “What is the possible
#Black_Swan in Ethiopian politics?” (Tufa, 2016f).
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5.4.3 Expressions of hope
In addition to expression of grievances, Oromo activists also expressed hope of success in
their movement by highlighting that massacres do not achieve their goals. For example, Gebissa
(2016), mentioned that both massacres in Russia and Ireland did not succeed in that they did not
save the Tsarist aristocracy” (para. 8) or help “the British rule Ireland” (para. 9). He expressed
his hope one day that:
Oromo nation will rise from today’s pain and will sit in judgement of those who teargassed innocent people and annihilated hundreds. History has shown that clearly that
massacring people didn’t save the Ottoman Sultans, the Romanovs and British forces in
Ireland. (para. 13)
Similarly, Habte (2016L), shared a post by ገብረአብ (Gadaa) (2016) titled “ቢልሱማ በነፃ
አይገኝም” [“No freedom without sacrifice”]. The post sends a message of condolences saying, a
human being is born; and like a tree, he will get old and die; the same is true for a regime. ገብረአብ
(Gadaa) also glorified and congratulated them for making history. Furthermore, ገብረአብ (Gadaa)
portrayed the death at the Irreecha event as special death saying the Oromo have been dying, and
so the death in Bishoftu was a bless. ገብረአብ (Gadaa) argued that one’s death for agenda and land
is an honor, not a sorrow.
5.4.4 Information sharing
Social media Oromo protest activists shared information in the form of “news” on what
was going on in the country. For instance, activists Geresu Tufa, Etana Habte, Henok Gebisa,
and Tsegaye Ararssa shared different “news.” Here the quotation mark is used to differentiate the
information activists shared, which they received from friends or other activists through their
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inbox, from information on the news media. The activists put the “news” in quotation marks,
suggesting their friends in-boxed (received from their friends back home) them.
On 5 October 2016, Habte (2016k) shared a post from an unknown source by putting it in
quotation marks. The “news” stated the continuation of the “struggle” by mentioning an attack
on two government agents, six police officers, and a driver of a car that belongs to the
government. It also mentioned that two Kalashnikovs were confiscated from unnamed people.
Furthermore, the post stated that the targeted people had ignored repeated warnings given to
them. On 3 October 2016, Habte (2016j) also posted another message that says: "I received
credible information that a Bull dozer [sic] was set on fire at a construction site of Dambi
Doolloo University. The contractor who owns it is from Tigray. He was severely beaten by
Qeerroo and is now on the run or hiding." Qeerroo is the name of the Oromo youth who
spearheaded the protests against the Ethiopian government.
Likewise, Ararssa (2016q) on 2 October 2016 published “news” from a source he did not
mention about the death at Irreecha saying, ‘“hello [sic] dear: ayyaana ilalchisee hammi
bishaanitti gadi nam’ee hammaa du’e caala jedhamaa jira.” [It is being reported that those who
drowned are more than those died”]. Ararssa (2016p) also published his own information. For
example, he posted the following information on 2 October 2016:
DEVELOPING NEWS: The regime has opened live bullets on irreechaa celebrants in
Bishooftu killing several people on the spot. The attack is reported to come from the
Agazi on the ground and and [sic]from a helicopter hovering over the gathering in Horaa
Arsadii.
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Similarly, Hamza (2016o), on 5 October 2016, posted “news” on the arrest of Tilahum
Gemeda Wariyo, an opposition leader. She posted Wariyo’s picture and informed her followers
he was arrested while he was drinking coffee along with three other people.
5.4.5 A call for a change of strategy
Another theme highlighted by Oromo social media activists was a change of tactics and
strategies. The tactics and strategies were aimed at minimizing the risk of being identified by the
government security forces on the one hand and strengthening the protests on the other hand.
5.4.5.1.1 Minimizing the risk
Tufa (2016h) his post on 5 October 2016 suggested a specific action such as road
blocking to limit the movements of security forces. He told his followers to block roads in order
to limit the movement of the killer-soldiers and their killings. He advised on possible locations of
road blockade suggesting road blockade should not be in cities as doing so would lead to the
security forcing the people to remove the boulders. Tufa (2016h) also encouraged the protesters
to block roads at some selected and strategic locations far from cities.
Tufa (2016g) also provided further information. He warned protesters not to disclose the
locations of the roadblock and not to post a picture of it on social media as doing so would help
security forces to know about it in advance. He suggested that the protesters leave the area once
they blocked the roads. In another post on 2 October 2016 Tufa (2016c) called for the need to
defeat what he called the war the government waged on the Oromo people. He insisted that the
war, the kind of which has not been declared on human being, has been declared on his people
and has to be defeated. Oromo activists also challenged his followers saying if they deserve to
live while genocide was being waged on the people. For instance, Tufa (2016d) asked his
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followers if they deserve to live as usual while a genocide was taking place on the Oromo
people.
5.4.5.1.2 Change of #Hashtag
Another strategy suggested by some Oromo activists of social media was a change of
hashtag from #OromoProtests to #OromoRevolution. For example, Tufa (2016i) shared an
article by Bonsa (2016) article on his website. Tufa directly quoted Bonsa’s definition of the
“‘#OromoProtests was a short [sic]hand for a longer Oromo Peaceful Protests’” (Bonsa 2016
quoted in Tufa (2016i). The activists explained that the change of hashtag was needed because
the efforts to bring about change through a peaceful means “‘fell on deaf ears’” (Bonsa quoted in
Tufa (2016i).
5.4.5.1.3 Call for a military means
Some activists also suggested a change of strategy that involves a shift from peaceful
protests (political means) to military means. For example, Ararssa (2016r) in his post on 2
October 2016 suggested the use of military force to stop the death of people was the only option.
Ararssa (2016r) also expressed his doubt of peaceful (political solution). The following is a
direct quote of his message on Facebook posted on 2 October 2016:
Unfortunately, it has become increasingly more and more obvious that there is little
likelihood for political end to this carnage. Regrettably, only military solutions are
availing themselves. It has become abundantly clear that the matter now is going to be
settled on the streets and jungles of Oromia, not on the corridors of the political class in
Addis or on the diplomatic corridors of the regime's foreign patrons. This must be the
limit of politics, national and international. (Ararssa, 2016r, para.1).
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5.4.5.2 Call for unity
Strengthening unity among different tribes was also another theme that was highlighted
by some Oromo activists. For example, Gebissa (2016) stressed that “the Irreecha Massacre”
needed to be “seen as a new chapter in the epic of Oromo resistance against a kleptocratic cabal
parading as an Ethiopian government” (para. 15). He warned his followers if they did not follow
the advice of Martin Niemöller saying, “We were going to be doomed if we don’t heed the
counsel of Martin Niemöller applied to our situation” (para. 1). Gebissa borrowed from
Niemöller’s “First they came…” version to Ethiopia’s situation by taking the examples of
Sidama and Anuak tribes whose people were killed by the Ethiopian security forces in 2002 and
2004-2006 respectively. He described it as follows:
First [sic] they came for the Sidama, and we did not didn’t do much—because we’re not
all Sidama. Then they came for the Anuak, and we did not do much—Because we’re not
all Anuaks. Then they came for the Oromo, again and again, and we didn’t do much—
Because I was not an Oromo. Then they came for us—and there was no one left to speak
for all of us. They have no struck at the heart of what it means to be Oromo. (para. 15).
5.5

Summary
The aim of this chapter was to examine the themes highlighted by Oromo activists on

three major events during the Oromo protests: #OromiaGrandRally, the 2016 Rio Olympics, and
the Irreecha event of October 2016. Analysis of texts on #OromiaGrandRally event show that
Oromo protests highlighted difference themes. In their pre-rally social media posts, they
highlighted different demands they wanted the Ethiopian government to answer. These include
different political and economic demands; a call for an end to violence, which they framed as
state-terrorism; justice; and environmental protection. However, as violence erupted on the day
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of the rally, there was a change in the post-rally themes. That is, the post-rally themes
highlighted security force’s violence against the protesters, expression of solidarity with the
victims of the violence; and determination to continue the protests.
On the Rio Olympic 2016 event, where Feyisa Lilesa showed a defiant gesture at the
finish-line of the marathon race, Oromo highlighted three major themes: the “the world is
watching us” by mainly focusing on the news media’s coverage it received; expression of praise
for Lilessa, and discussion on its impact on the Oromo protests.
Analysis of the Oromo activists’ posts of the Irreecha event indicate they focused on five
major themes: complain about how the news media covered the incident; expression of
grievance; expression of hope; sharing information with the public; and a call for a new protest
strategy.
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6
6.1

ANALYSIS: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS

Introduction
This chapter analyzes the major themes and their framing by two international human

rights groups: Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International respectively, answering research
question 3. Like the news media and the Oromo activist social media texts analyzed in the
preceding chapters, human rights groups also highlighted three major themes: causes of the
protest, government action, and call for action. Both Human Rights Watch and Anesty
International framed the cause of the protests, government response, and call for action themes
as grievances, violence, and justice respectively.
6.2

Human Rights Watch
Analysis of the Human Rights watch indicated that three major themes—causes that

triggered the protest, the response of the government to the protests, and solutions. This section
analyzes each of the themes and how they were framed. Frames include grievances, violence,
and justice.
6.2.1 Causes of the protest
Human Rights Watch gave significant attention to the cause of the protests. It framed the
cause of the protest as a grievance. Its documents portrayed the Addis Ababa Masterplan as the
immediate trigger of the protest in Oromia. It highlighted the people’s concern as fear of
displacement from their ancestral lands.
Like the news media, Human Rights Watch documents framed the cause of the Oromo
protest movement as a grievance. Human Rights Watch documents mainly three grievances:
historical grievance, lack of democracy, and chain causes—grievances caused by the
government’s action against the protesters every time they demand something.
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6.2.1.1 Grievance rooted in history
Human Rights Watch put the cause of the Oromo protest movements into a broader
historical context emphasizing discrimination, marginalization, and different types of violence
against them. For example, in its article published on December 18, 2015, the Human Rights
Watch described the Oromo people faced history as follows:
Many Oromos have historically felt marginalized and discriminated against by successive
Ethiopian governments, and Oromos are often arbitrarily arrested and accused of
belonging to the Oromo Liberation Force (OLF), which waged armed struggle in the past
and which the government designates a terrorist organization. (Human Rights Watch,
2015, para. 16).
The Human Rights Watch also highlighted the impact of the historical grievance on
people’s feeling in exercising their rights. For example, in its dispatches authored by Horne
(2015a), it described how the feeling of marginalization and discrimination prevented the Oromo
people from opposing government policies saying: “many Oromos have felt marginalized and
discriminated against by successive Ethiopian governments and have often felt unable to voice
their concerns over government policies” (Horne, 2015a, para. 2).
6.2.1.2 Lack of democracy
The Human Rights Watch also associated the cause of the Oromo protest movement to
lack of democracy in the country. It mentioned government restrictions on people’s rights,
problems with elections, and questions on the independence of the judiciary system of the
country. For example, in its article published on October 6, 2016, Horne (2016b) suggested the
protests, which he described as “crises,” should not come as a surprise given the lack of
democracy in the country. Horne (2016b) maintained that:
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Ethiopia’s current crisis came as a surprise to many European policymakers, but it
follows years of systematic government attacks on fundamental rights and freedoms,
cutting off dissent. Despite widespread frustrations with the government, the ruling party
is able to hold every one of the seats in the federal and regional parliaments. The courts
have shown little independence on politically sensitive cases, misusing anti-terrorism law
to punish peaceful dissent. There is little scrutiny of abusive security forces in part
because of restrictions on independent media and NGOs. All of this has contributed to the
complete closure of political space, creating the perfect storm. (6 para. 7)
Human Rights Watch also portrayed the government’s suppression of rights as a root
cause of the Oromo protest movement. For example, in its statement to the European Parliament
on October 13, 2016, Human Rights Watch (2016c) framed the cause of the protest as “the
outcome of the government’s systematic and calculated suppression of fundamental rights and
freedoms that have closed political space and left few opportunities for the peaceful expressions
of dissent” (para. 6).
6.2.1.3 Chain of causes
In addition to portraying the Addis Ababa Masterplan and political grievances such as
lack of democracy as causes of the Oromo protest movement, Human Rights Watch documents
also indicate that the intensity of the protests was associated with the response of the government
to the protests. For example, the anger at government action at Irreecha on October 2, 2016
exacerbated the protest, which again prompted the government to announce the state of
emergency. So, by the time the government announced the cancellation of the Masterplan, the
initial demand of the protesters, more questions were added to the list of their demands. Human
Rights Watch (2016c) stated:
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By the time the government announced the cancelation of the master plan in January,
protester grievances had expanded to include condemnation of the brutality of the
security forces’ responses to the largely peaceful protests as well as decades of
marginalization and human rights violations of the Oromo people. (para 2).
Human Rights Watch also suggested that more violence against protesters would lead to
more protests. For example, in its letter to Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany who was
visiting Ethiopia at the time, Human Rights Watch (2016b) stated that the protests may lead to
“wider crisis” unless the Ethiopian government stopped violations against protesters saying:
Tensions and public frustrations over security force killings and other abuses against
protesters in Oromia, Ethiopia’s largest region, have spread to other parts of the country
in recent months and risk spiraling into wider crisis if the Ethiopian government doesn’t
change course. (Human Rights Watch, 2016b, para. 8).
6.2.2 Government response to the protests
Analysis of the Human Rights Watch documents also shows that the government
response to the Oromo protest movement was a major theme. Like the news media, Human
Rights Watch also framed the response against the protesters as violent.
Human Rights Watch used the violence frame to highlight the government’s treatment of
protesters, which include detention of protesters in unknown places without charge and torture.
For example, in its article titled: “Yet Again, a Bloody Crackdown on Protesters in Ethiopia,” (5
December 2015), Horne (2015), a senior Ethiopia and Eritrea researcher for Human Rights
Watch, described the experiences of Oromo students as follows:
Those I spoke with told me about the torture they endured as part of interrogations. But
countless others remained in detention. Some have been charged under Ethiopia’s
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draconian counterterrorism law for their role in the protests; others languish without
charge in unknown detention centers and military camps throughout Oromia. (para. 3).
The Human Rights Watch also used the violence frame to expose different types of rights
abuses against the Oromo protesters. For example, in its report titled “‘Such a brutal
crackdown’: killings and arrests in response to Ethiopia’s Oromo Protests” (15 June 2016),
Human Rights Watch (2016a) described the violations and denial of rights against Oromo
Protesters saying: “security forces have tortured and otherwise ill-treated detainees, and several
female detainees described being raped by security force personnel. Very few detainees have
access to legal counsel, adequate food, or to their family members” (Human Rights Watch,
2016a, para. 6).
6.2.2.1 Impact of violence against the protesters
The Human Rights Watch also used the violence frame to emphasize the impact of the
violence on the people. For example, in its dispatches published on 22 December 2016 it detailed
the impact on protesters. For example, Horne (2016d) narrated about “Iftu,” a 16 years old
student who took part in the protest in Oromia. Horne details the killing of her father by security
forces, the arrest of two of her brothers by the military, days after the funeral of her father, and
the disappearance of her mother and her other two brothers, her uncle who cannot walk due to
torture he sustained in prison, and her suspension from school because the military forces found
a protest song in her phone. Horne described how the government action ruined her family
saying: “Her family and her future have been torn apart because she, her fellow students, and her
father took to the streets to protest government policies” (Horne, 2016d, para. 3)
In dispatches published on 9 November 2016, Horne (2016c) also detailed the experience
of another case. Horne narrates the story of Meti, who participated in the protest against the
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Masterplan, ran when security forces started firing a gun, later saw her brother dead, found her
father and two brothers detained, and was finally told by school officials that she was suspended
from school due to her participation in the protest. Taking the story of Meti as an example,
Horne describes the impact of government officials’ violence against protesters saying: “Security
forces have killed hundreds, detained tens of thousands, and shattered the lives of countless
families over the last year” (Horne, 2016c, para. 4).
6.2.2.2 Violation of international law
Human Rights Watch also portrayed violence against the Oromo protesters as the
violation of international law. It did so by citing relevant principles of the international law. For
example, in its article published on 18 December 2015, Human Rights Watch (2015) stated the
following:
The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials provide that security forces shall as far as possible apply
nonviolent means before resorting to the use of force. Whenever the lawful use of force is
unavoidable, the authorities should use restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness
of the offense. (para. 10)
In its report on Ethiopia, Human Rights Watch (2016c) provided a broader context on
human rights violations in Ethiopia. For instance, in its statement to the European Parliament on
October 13, 2016, it described the overall human rights violations as follows:
Ethiopia is among Africa’s leading jailors of journalists, and there is little space for
independent journalists to operate. Ethiopian journalists and bloggers must choose
between self-censorship, arrest, or living in exile. Websites critical of the government are
blocked, radio stations are regularly jammed during sensitive times, and those providing
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information to journalists are targeted for arrest. At various times in the last three
months, the government has blocked the internet completely in some locations, restricted
access to social media, and jammed radio transmissions including German broadcaster
Deustche Welle (Human Rights Watch, 2016c, para. 7).
6.2.2.3 Restriction on the right to protest
In addition to the type of violence against protesters, Human Rights Watch (2016c) also
highlighted how the government prevented people from protests in the first place and how it
treats those who defy the restrictions. The following is another excerpt from Human Rights
Watch’s statement to the European Parliament that detailed the problem protesters face in
Ethiopia:
The authorities restrict public protests with routine denial of permits and arrests of real or
perceived protest organizers. Fear of opposing the government has historically kept
people from protesting, but that fear is rapidly dissipating. For those who do take to the
streets, as thousands have done in hundreds of locations over the last year, brutal force
from security forces is often the response. What avenues does this leave to express
dissent, to question government policies or to voice concern over abusive practices?
(Human Rights Watch, para. 9).
6.2.3 Call for action
The third major theme of the Human Rights Watch was the call for action. The call for
action theme includes two subthemes: an end to the violence, and investigation into the violence.
6.2.3.1 End to the violence
Human Rights Watch called on the government to stop the violence against protesters.
For example, Horne (2015) called on the government to “ensure the use of excessive force by its
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security forces stops immediately” (para. 6). Likewise, the Human Rights Watch (2016a) in its
report published on June 15, 2016 demanded the government officials release all those who were
detained without legal process saying: “the Ethiopian government should drop charges and
release all those who have been arbitrarily detained” (para. 11).
6.2.3.2 Call for investigation
The Human Rights Watch also demanded government officials to investigate the violence
against the protesters. The demands include suggesting the steps the government officials have to
take. For example, Human Rights Watch (2016a) demanded that the Ethiopian government
“should support a credible, independent, and transparent investigation into the use of excessive
force by tis security forces, it should discipline or persecute as appropriate those responsible and
provide victims of abuses with adequate compensation” (para. 11). Likewise, Horne (2015a)
called for similar action in the report on December 5, 2015, saying it should help with the
investigation of “an independent and impartial inquiry” on how security forces handled the
protests (para. 6).
6.2.3.2.1 Accountability
In its call for investigation, Human Rights Watch emphasized accountability. It
demanded holding those responsible for the violence to account. For instance, Horne (2015a)
stated that “those responsible for serious abuses should be fairly prosecuted” (para. 6). The
Human Rights Watch also framed holding those responsible to account as a way for the
government to show it cares about the violence, that it doesn’t support the violence, and that it
makes sure those who broke the law are punished. Accordingly:
This would the best way for the Ethiopian government to show its concern about the
deaths and injuries inflicted on the students, that it does not condone the use of live
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ammunition against peaceful protests, and that those who break the law are appropriately
punished. (Horne, 2015a, para. 6).
6.2.3.2.2 Justice
Human Rights Watch framed investigation into the violence to bring justice to the
victims of the violence. For instance, Felix (2016c) on November 9, 2016, called on the
Ethiopian government and international community. He wrote, “the Ethiopian government and
its international allies should refocus on the need for justice, accountability, and meaningful
reform” (para. 8).
6.2.3.2.3 Call for intervention of the international community
Human Rights Watch also called for intervention of the international community in the
process of justice seeking. In its report titled: “Lethal Force Against Protesters: Military
Deployment, Terrorism Rhetoric Risk Escalating Violence” (18 December 2015), Human Rights
Watch (2015) called on Ethiopia to involve human rights experts from the African Union and
United Nations. Likewise, in its letter to Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, on October 8,
2016, Human Rights Watch (2016b) asked Germany to pay attention to the human rights
violations in Ethiopia. The letter asked the chancellor to end the use of “excessive force by
security forces,” release the protesters, “express support for a credible, international investigation
into the deaths…,” and called for the “lifting of government restrictions on media reporting and
access to the internet and social media” (para. 7).
Human Rights Watch also called on the European Union (EU) to intervene in the human
rights situation in Ethiopia. For example, in its article titled: “EU Needs a New Approach to
Ethiopia,” (6 October 2016), Horne (2016b), the author of the article, criticized Frederica
Mogherini, EU’s High Representative, for working on a joint declaration called ‘“Towards an

140

EU-Ethiopia Strategic Engagement’” with Hailemariam Desalegn, Ethiopia’s prime minister. It
characterized the declaration as “business as usual” (para 4). He blamed the EU for being silent
as demonstrators were being shot, journalists and opposition members locked up, and peaceful
activists punished…” (Horne, 2016b, para. 4). It portrayed the EU’s long-term relations with
Ethiopia as negligent on human rights issues. The Human Rights Watch characterized the EU
relations with Ethiopia a “quiet diplomacy approach” for being “among many donors that have
historically been silent about Ethiopia’s human rights abuses, afraid to risk strategic partnerships
on development, migration, peacekeeping, and security” (Horne, 2016b, para. 8).
6.2.3.2.4 Abuse of aid money
Human Rights Watch accused the Ethiopian government of abusing the aid money it gets
from foreigners, including the European Union, to buy silence from the people. Horne (2016b)
described the abuse of aid money as a common practice in Ethiopia. He said, “Offering
government benefits in exchange for silence is something many Ethiopians, particularly in rural
area, have known for years” (para.9). Horne further said the government “carefully controls
access to the benefits of development including seeds, fertilizers, food aid, and jobs, much of it
funded by the EU and its members” (para. 9). Human Rights Watch (2016c) framed the abuse of
aid money as ‘“a political capture of aid”’ which involves government officials’ “misuse of
development assistance…. by ensuring that only those who are ruling party members or
supporters receive the benefits of aid, including access to seeds, to jobs, and to training
opportunities” (para. 11). It also warned of the negative consequence of the “political capture of
aid” saying:
While EU development assistance makes an invaluable contribution to much-needed
poverty reduction efforts in Ethiopia, it also has the unintended side effect of increasing
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the government’s repressive capacity, by contributing to the reliance that Ethiopians have
on the government for their livelihoods and ultimately for their survival. (Human Rights
Watch, 2016c, para. 11).
6.2.3.2.5 Solution
As a solution, the Human Rights Watch calls for a new EU approach to Ethiopia. It
warned of the danger of not do so saying its “strategic relationships will become obsolete if
Ethiopia plunges further into crisis” (Horne, 2016b, para. 12). He demanded the EU to “push
Ethiopia to respect divergent views, and rein in forces that rapidly turn to bullets, beatings, and
mass arrests” (para. 12). Horne called on the EU to push for international investigation into the
violence in Ethiopia:
The EU and its member states should continue to push for an international investigation
into the killings, press the government to grant the UN access to investigate, and urge the
government to hold to account security forces members responsible for abuses. By taking
these steps, The EU and its member states can improve the potential to be stable longterm partners. (Horne, 2016b, para. 13)
6.2.3.2.6 Lack of trust in the Ethiopian government.
Human Rights Watch’s call for international investigation into the violence against the
protesters was due to a lack of trust in the government. For example, in dispatches published on
July 28, 2016, Horne (2016a) criticized the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission for claiming
the force used by the government against the protesters was proportionate. He characterized the
claim as “sending an ominous message to Ethiopian that security force members can shoot
unarmed protesters with impunity” (para. 4). For example, he portrayed the killing of more than
400 people by security forces that did not prompt the government to conduct “meaningful
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investigation” as indication of the absence of “effort to hold security forces accountable” (para.
3). Human Rights Watch (2016a) called on the international community. It said: “given that a
national process is unlikely to be viewed as sufficiently independent of the government, the
inquiry should have an international component” (Human Rights Watch, 2016a, para. 12).
6.3

Analysis of Amnesty International Documents
Like the news media, social media users, and Human Rights Watch, analysis of the texts

of Amnesty International reports focused on three major themes: causes of the Oromo protests,
government response to the protests, and call for action. The frames are the same as the frames
of Human Rights Watch which are grievances, violence, and justice.
6.3.1 Causes of the protest
The causes that triggered the Oromo protests is one of the major themes of Amnesty
International’s documents. But unlike texts of other actors such as Human Rights Watch and the
news media, which went further to include historical grievances (marginalization and
discrimination), the Amnesty International reports focused mainly on the immediate trigger of
the protests—the Masterplan. For example, Amnesty International (2015), Amnesty International
(2016c); Amnesty International (2016f), and Amnesty International (2016g) portrayed the
Masterplan as a factor that triggered the Oromo protests.
In their articles published and October 5, 2016 and November 9, 2016, Amnesty
International (2016f) and Amnesty International (2016g) respectively portrayed the cause of the
protests as “opposition to the Addis Ababa Masterplan.” The Amnesty International focused on
the underlying reason for the opposition to the master plan as a fear of the consequence i.e., the
fear of what might happen to the people if the Masterplan was implemented. For instance,
Amnesty International (2016f) described the underlying reason to oppose the Masterplan as fear
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of “mass displacement of people from their homes” (para. 9). Amnesty International (2016c)
also described the cause as “dispossession of land without adequate compensation in the Oromia
region” (para. 3).
Amnesty International also described the intention of the Masterplan in terms of an
administrative government frame. For instance, Amnesty International (2016f) and Amnesty
International (2016g) wrote that the aim of the Masterplan was to “extend boundaries of the
capital Addis Ababa into parts of Oromia (para. 9) and “to extend the capital Addis Ababa’s
administrative control into parts of Oromia” (para 2) respectively.
6.3.2 Government response to the protests
The government action theme received significant attention from Amnesty International.
Like Human Rights Watch and the news media, Amnesty International also used the violence
frame to describe the government response against the Oromo protest movement. It detailed
different forms of violence against protesters such as detention, torture, and killings. The
violence frame also highlighted the way the government officials carried out the violence.
6.3.2.1 Levels of violence
The violence frame used many descriptive phrases to indicate the level of violence by
government officials against protesters. These phrases include “use of excessive lethal force,”
“heavy-handed response,” “the most severe crackdown,” “brutal crackdown,” and “lethal force.”
For example, in its article published on January 14, 2016, Amnesty International (2016a)
described the violence against “peaceful protests” saying the government officials “responded
with excessive force…. including by use of live ammunition against protesters, among them
children as young as 12” (para. 12). Likewise, Amnesty International (2016d) described the
violence against political opposition leaders who it said were “beaten and forced to appear before
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court inadequately dressed” (para. 1). For example, referring to a complaint by Bekele Gerba, an
opposition leader and one of the detainees, to the court, the article said: “…. some defendants
were beaten while in detention, and prison officials confiscated all the defendant’s black suits,
which they intended to wear to court. The rest of their clothes were taken by other prisoners”
(para. 2).
Amnesty International (2016d) framed the violence against the detainees as immoral or
“a new low.” For example, citing Micelle Kagari, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional
Director for East Africa, the Horn and Great Lakes, it wrote: ‘“aside from the beatings they [the
detainees] suffered in detention, degrading the defendants by making them attend court in their
underpants is a new low in the behavior of the prison authorities and a total outrage”’ (para. 3).
Amnesty International ((2016a) used the violence frame to describe the continued use of
violence against protesters as worrisome escalation. For example, it cited Mandeep Tiwana,
Head of Police Research at CIVICUS, who said the ‘“use of excessive and lethal force against
protesters, coupled with mass arrests of peaceful demonstrators and human rights defenders
represent a worrying escalation of the government’s ongoing campaign to silence any form of
dissent in the country’” (2016, para. 4).
6.3.2.2 Manner of violence
The violence frame was also used by Amnesty International to describe the manner of the
violence against Oromo protesters. Amnesty International used different descriptive adjectives,
for example, to describe detention of protesters as “arbitrary”, and the killings as “unlawful.” For
instance, in its June 3, 2016 report, Amnesty International (2016d) criticized the government. It
stated that the government security forces “arbitrarily arrested thousands of people, and several
hundreds of people participating in the protests have been unlawfully killed by the security
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services” (para. 8). In an article published on June 2, 2016, Amnesty International (2016c) also
accused the government of arbitrarily detaining peaceful protesters even by ignoring a call by
different groups. It accused as follows:
Despite repeated calls from CSOs, independent UN experts, the European Parliament,
and numerous governments, including the United States, the Ethiopian authorities
continue to arbitrarily detain and prosecute scores of peaceful protestors for exercising
their rights, using the broad provisions of the ATP [Anti-Terrorism Proclamations] to
criminalize peaceful expressions of dissent (para.7).
6.3.2.3 Made-up allegations
Amnesty International used the violence frame to indicate security force’s use of illegal
means against protesters. For example, in its article published on February 17, 2016, with a title:
“Detained Oromo Protesters Must Be Release,” Amnesty International (2016b) narrated the
story of Dejene Tafa, a member of the Oromo Federalist Congress, an opposition party that
supported Oromo protests. It mentioned that police searched Dejene Tafa’s house illegally
(without warrant), planted a banned opposition party’s flag and other items in his house only to
accuse him of having them, detained him but denied him access to his lawyers, restricted visits
by his family, and prevented him from discussing the pain in his eyes.
6.3.3 Call for action
The Call for Action theme is one of the dominant themes of the Amnesty International
reports/texts. For instance, the following six articles by Amnesty International have a theme that
calls for action in their titles (see Table 6):
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Table 6 Reports of Amnesty International that Called for Action

▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪

“Ethiopia: After a year of protests, time to address grave human rights concerns” (Amnesty
International, 2016g)
“Ethiopia: Renewed protests underline need to investigate after dozens killed in stampede”
(Amnesty International, 2016f).
“Ethiopia: Civil society groups urge international investigation into ongoing human rights
violations” (Amnesty International, 2016e)
“End use of counter-terrorism law to persecute dissenters and opposition members”
(Amnesty International, 2016c)
“Further information: Detained Oromo protesters must be released” (Amnesty International,
2016b)
“Civil society groups urge the international community to address killing of Oromo
protesters” (Amnesty International, 2016a).

6.3.3.1 A call for an end to violence
Amnesty International also called for an end to all forms of violence such as detention,
mistreatment (torture), and killings. As the above table shows, its documents asked for an end to
violence with a sense of urgency (e.g., “time to address grave human rights concerns…,
(Amnesty International, 2016g) and necessity, as in “…underline the need to investigate ….”
(Amnesty International, 2016f). In its article published on June 3, 2016, Amnesty International
(2016d) called on government officials to “immediately stop the ill-treatment of political
members and human rights defenders who were beaten in detention and then forced to appear
before the court inadequately dressed” (para.1).
6.3.3.2 Repeal the law and procedures responsible that justify the violence
Along with the call for an end to the violence, Amnesty International called for the repeal
of the underlying laws and procedures that justified the government’s use of violence against
protesters, e.g., the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 652/2009(ATP). Amnesty International
justified its call for repealing the law by 1) questioning its quality, and 2) arguing that the
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government officials used it as a tool of oppression. For example, in its article published on June
2, 2016, Amnesty International (2016c) characterized the law as not meeting international
standards. It accused the government of “using laws and judicial processes that fail to meet
international human rights standards to harass and stifle dissent, targeting activists, human rights
defenders, opposition party leaders, and activists” (para. 2).
Amnesty International also portrayed the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation law as giving the
government officials too much power to suppress dissidents. For instance, in its article published
on December 12, 2015 Amnesty International (2015) criticized the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation
652/2009 (ATP) for granting the govern officials “unrestrained force” to silence opponents. In its
call for repealing the law, Amnesty International juxtaposed the provisions of the law with the
impact it had on the people as follows:
Ethiopia’s Anti-Terrorism Proclamation 652/2009, permits the government to use
unrestrained force against suspected terrorists, including pre-trial detention of up to four
months. People that have been subject to pre-trial detention under the anti-terrorism law
have reported widespread use of torture and ill treatment. (Amnesty International, 15
December 2015, para.7-8).
Furthermore, Amnesty International portrayed the use of the law as a cover up to target
people who hold a view different from the government. For instance, Amnesty International
(2016c) it cited Hassan Shire, the Executive Defend Defenders who said “‘The Ethiopian
government’s use of counter-terrorism as a smokescreen to target the peaceful work of human
rights defenders is an affront to its regional and international obligations”’ (para. 8).
Amnesty International also called for the repeal of the law suggesting it both justified the
violence against the protesters and contributed to the protest itself. For example, Amnesty
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International (2016g) cited Micelle Kagari, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director
for East Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes, demanding that government officials change. She
said: ‘“They should also repeal the repressive laws that imprisoned them in the first place,
including the draconian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation that has also contributed to the unrest”’
(para. 4).
6.3.3.3 Investigation of the violence
Amnesty International also called for investigation into the violence against the
protesters. It called for truth and accountability and independent and impartial investigation. A
third aspect of the call for action is also a call for investigation into the violence against the
protesters. It framed the call for investigation as doing justice for victims of the violence. It also
framed the purpose of the investigation as finding the truth. For example, in its article published
on October 5, 2016, Amnesty International (2016f) quoted Michelle Kagari, Amnesty
International’s Deputy Regional Director for East Africa, the Horn and the Great Lakes who
said: it is “‘critical that an investigation be held to unearth the truth and to identify law
enforcement officers criminally responsible and hold to account in open and fair trials”’ (para.
5). Amnesty International also suggested that truth and accountability aimed at helping the
victims of the violence as well. For instance, in its article on 14 January 2016, Amnesty
International (2016a) demanded that government officials help victims. It wrote: “the Ethiopian
authorities must ensure that victims of human rights violations by law enforcement officials have
access to an effective remedy and obtain adequate reparation, including compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition” (para. 11).
In its call for truth and accountability, Amnesty International documents also highlighted
the need to conduct independent and impartial investigation into the violence against the

149

protesters. The emphasis on the independent and impartial investigation emanated from lack of
trust of the government of Ethiopia. For example, in its article on 30 August 2016, Amnesty
International (2016e) cited Sarah Jackso, Deputy Regional Director for East Africa, the Horn and
the Great Lakes who “lack of independent and transparent investigation of human rights
violations in Ethiopia strongly implies that the Ethiopian government’s investigation of the
ongoing human rights crises will be independent, impartial, and transparent” (para. 4). For the
lack of trust of the government of Ethiopia, it also referred to Ethiopia’s National Human Rights
Commission’s statement on the violence saying:
Ethiopia’s National Human Rights Commission, which has the mandate to investigate
rights violations in Ethiopia, has failed to make its own June report on the Oromo
protests, while concluding in its oral report to Parliament that the lethal force used by
security forces in Oromia was proportionate to the risk they faced from protesters. (para.
10).
In its call for independent and impartial investigation into the violence, Amnesty
International also specified the type of violations that needed to be investigated. It suggested
investigation into human rights violations in general, and the killings and arrests of the protesters
in particular. For instance, it reflected on a civil society group’s call for: “an independent and
impartial international investigation into human rights violations in Ethiopia, including the
unlawful killing of peaceful protesters and a recent spate of arrests of civil society members
documenting this crackdown” (Amnesty International, 2016e, para.1).
6.4

Summary
This chapter answered RQ3, that is, the main themes and frames highlighted by

international human rights organizations (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International).
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Like the news media, both Human Right Watch and Amnesty International focused on three
major themes: the cause of the protest, government response to the protest, and a call to action
(solutions). Human rights organizations framed the cause of the protest as a grievance. But while
the Human Rights Watch focused on the political and historical grievances, Amnesty
International emphasized the economic grievance, especially the Masterplan. Both Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International framed the government response to protests as
violence. Like the news media, they highlighted on the different types of violence such as
killings, mass arrests, and torture of the protesters by security forces of the Ethiopian
government. The call for a solution also focused mainly on justice to the victims.
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7
7.1

ANALYSIS: THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Introduction
This chapter analyzed texts (statements and interview transcripts) of the Ethiopian

government officials on the Oromo protest movement to answer research question 4. As with
other actors (the news media, social media activists, and international organizations), three major
themes—causes of the protest, violence, and solutions—were highlighted. However, the
government officials framed all themes differently than other actors. It attributed the cause of
protests to internal forces, a frustrated youth in Ethiopia, and external forces or diaspora
Ethiopians and foreign countries who want to overthrow the government. It framed the violence
theme as violence caused by the protesters against security forces, civilians, and public
infrastructures. The government framed the solution theme as “deep reform within the
government” in order to grow the economy and serve the interests of the people.
7.2

Cause of the Problems
The Ethiopian government officials highlighted the causes of the Oromo protest

movement. They attributed the causes of the problem to two factors: internal factors they framed
as “frustration” by the people, especially the youth, due to “unmet expectations,” and external
factors they characterized as forces that sought to use the protests to destabilize the country and
seize government power.
7.2.1 Internal factors
The government described the Oromo protest movement as an “expression of
frustration.” It portrayed the sources of the “frustration” as a disappointment by the youth about
“unmet expectations” on economic and political issues. For example, in his interview with the
Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC) on 7 October 2016 Getachew Reda, the minister of

152

Government Communications Affairs, mentioned the economic factors as inequality in wealth
distribution and unemployment. However, Reda also used vague language at times. For example,
in similar interviews, he described the “inequality” as “real and perceived inequality” indicating
that protesters’ claims were inaccurate or exaggerated.
Although the government admitted that economic issues such as wealth distribution and
unemployment explain “frustration” among the youth, it also sought to put a positive spin on it.
For example, it claimed that the big expectation on the part of the youth was in part the result of
the country’s success in economic growth. For example, while it cited sending millions of
students to school as a source of pride, it also admitted that it did not meet the raised expectation
about job opportunities for the graduates.
The government officials also depicted youth frustration as a frustration created by
economic development, saying the economic growth in the country did not trickle down to some
parts of the society, especially the youth. So, the frustration was the “result of a very success that
which the EPRDF has unleashed as a result of progressive policies” (EBC, 11 September 2016,
1:52). Reda mentioned the “result of progressive stories” such as sending millions of students to
schools and graduating every year but not getting a job. Reda described this as “unmet
expectations.” “We have been victims of our own successes” (EBC, 11 September 2016, 3:35).
The government also attributed the “frustration” to political factors, such as issues of
good governance and corruption. Like social media activists and international news media, the
government officials then blamed bad official practices. However, unlike the Oromo protest
activists or the international news media, which portrayed the problem as the problem of the
government system itself, the officials portrayed it as a problem with “some officials” who
“abandoned their responsibility.” For example, Reda said, “With some government officials’
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practices ur departing slightly er and even in some cases significantly from the kind of
developmental er focus that EPRDF has been er known for.” (EBC, 7 October 2016, 2:42). These
officials, according to Reda, do not represent the government which “was basically a serviceoriented government, a government which was, which puts the interest of the public front and
center” (EBC, 7 October 2016).
The Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Masterplan that triggered the Oromo protest
movement was also highlighted in the officials’ discussion about the protest, especially in the
context of responding to the protests. However, unlike the Oromo protest activists, who framed
the masterplan as a “landgrab” intended to displace farmers from their lands, the government
officials portrayed it as the “development plan” aimed at improving the lives of the people. They
represented the Masterplan as mutually beneficial to both Addis Ababa and surrounding towns of
the Oromia region. For example, in his interview with The Ethiopian Reporter on 30 August
2015, Hayelom Tawuye, the Deputy General Manager of the Addis Ababa City Development
and Management Office said the following:
እነዚህ አካባቢዎች በተቀናጀ መንገድ ቢያድጉ ሁሉም ተጠቃሚ ይሆናል፡፡ ማንም ይኼን ያምንበታል፡፡ ይህንን
ድንቅ ሐሳብ አዕምሮውን ክፍት አድርጎ የመተለከተ ሁሉ የሚያደንቀው ነው፡፡ [“If these areas [Addis
Ababa and Oromia towns] growth together all will benefit. Everyone believes this.
Anyone who sees this with an open mind will appreciate this novel idea”]. (The
Ethiopian Reporter, 30 August 2015).
Tawuye counteracted opposition to the Masterplan saying it was caused due to
misunderstanding. He said that integrating a cities’ masterplan with surrounding areas is a
common practice in other countries, without mentioning those countries by name.
Tawuye explained what the integration plan means and how it can benefit Addis Ababa
and Oromia towns as follows:
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ግለሰቦች ከግንዛቤ ጉድለት ወይም ሆን ብለው ችግር ሊፈጥሩ ይችላሉ፡፡ ነገር ግን ማቀናጀት ምን ማለት ነው?
የተወሳሰበ ጉዳይ አይደለም፡፡ አንተ እንዳልከው ቁምነገሩ ማኅበራዊ፣ ኢኮኖሚያዊና አካባቢያዊ ጉዳዮችን እንዴት
እናሳድግ የሚለው ነው፡፡ የአንድ አካባቢ ዕድገት ከተጎራባቹ ጋር አብሮ መሄድ ይኖርበታል፡፡ የአዲስ አበባ ዕድገት
በዙሪያው ያለውን ይዞ መሄድ አለበት፡፡ አዲስ አበባ ውኃ ከልዩ ዞኑ ትጠቀማለች፡፡ ሌሎች ሰፋፊ ጥቅሞች
ይኖራሉ፡፡ በተመሳሳይ ልዩ ዞኑም ከአዲስ አበባ የሚጠቀመው ይኖራል፡፡ መንገድ ስትሠራና ባቡር ስትዘረጋ አንድ
ላይ የተሳሰረ ነው፡፡ መዋቅራዊ ፕላኑ ለሁሉም የሚበጅ ግዙፍ ዕቅድ ነው፡፡ የሁለትዮሽ ጥቅምን በሚመለከት
መንግሥት የጠራ ግንዛቤ አለው፡፡ የጋራ ማስተር ፕላኑ ይህንን ከግንዛቤ ከቶ የተዘጋጀ ነው፡፡ [Individuals may
create a problem either because of lack of understanding or intentionally. However, what
does integration mean? It is not a complicated issue. As you said, the important thing is
how we can address the social, economic, and environmental issues. Development in one
area should be integrated with the development of the neighboring areas. The
development of Addis Ababa should go along with the areas that surround it. Addis
Ababa will get water supply from the special zone [Oromia]. There are other benefits. In
the same way, there are benefits the special zone gets from Addis Ababa. When you
construct roads and railways, you link the two. The Masterplan is a big plan that benefits
all. The government has a clear understanding regarding the mutual benefit. The
Masterplan was prepared to take this into consideration]. (The Ethiopian Reporter, 30
August 2015).
In his interview with The Ethiopian Reporter published on 27 December 2015, Fekadu
Tesemma, the head of the Oromia Regional Government Communications Affairs, also
highlighted the benefits of the master plan. He described the masterplan as “infrastructural plan”
aimed at promoting trade and investment, protecting the environment by ensuring mutual
benefits of Addis Ababa and surrounding towns of the Oromia regions. He further stressed the
benefit the masterplan gives to Oromia towns saying Addis Ababa was a big market.
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Government officials also sought to dispel the fears by the Oromo people concerning the
quality to the masterplan by highlighting the master plan was prepared based on the experience
of other countries and with the participation of international experts. For example, in his
interview with The Ethiopian Reporter on 13 September 2015, Diriba Kuma, the Mayor of Addis
Ababa, explained that the Masterplan was prepared by professionals from France. He indicated
that it took the experience of the city of Lyons (France) and the experience of how cities in
Europe integrated and developed together. He also described the master plan as a sign of
modernity, not a source of the problem.
In addition to highlighting the benefits of the master plan in terms of development,
government officials also highlighted the master plan as unproblematic. For example, in his
exclusive interview with The Ethiopian Reporter TV on 30 November 2015, Prime Minster
Hailemariam Desalegn said the master plan would not cause any problem. He said the protest
against the masterplan was unnecessary as it was not ratified by the Parliament, and hence open
for discussion with the public. Like other officials, he portrayed the master plan as a
“development plan” aimed at building infrastructures that connect Addis Ababa with
surrounding towns of the Oromia region. He mentioned railway, electricity, and water supply as
an example.
Hailemariam Desalegn also counter-framed protesters accusation that the master plan was
aimed at expanding the territory of Addis Ababa Oromia lands. For example, he said the
following:
“የአዲስ አበበ ማስተር ፕላን ሲሰራ ኦሮሚያ ዙሪያ ያሉ የኦሮሚያ ከተሞች ማስተር ፕላኑ አካል ሆነው ቢሠሩ
ከአዲስ አበበ ጥቅም ያገኛሉ። ይህ ማለት አዲስ አበበ በአዲስ አበበ የኦሮሚያ ከተሞች በኦሮሚያ እየተዳደሩ ማለት
ነው” [“If the design of the Addis Ababa Masterplan includes Oromia towns, the Oromia
towns will get benefit from Addis Ababa. This means Addis Ababa will be administered
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by Addis Ababa, and Oromia will be administered by Oromia”] (The Ethiopian Reporter
TV, 30 November 2015, 1:22:42).
Hailemariam went further saying: “አዲስ አበበ የራሷ ድንበር አላት። ከድንበሩ አንድ ኢንች ወደ ኦሮሚያ
አትገባም አዲስ አበበ” [“Addis Ababa has its own territory. It will not expand an inch into Oromia”]
(The Ethiopian Reporter TV, 30 November 2015, 1:23:55). Diriba Kuma, the mayor of Addis
Ababa also tod The Ethiopian Reporter the same thing saying the following:
ሁለት የአስተዳደር አካላት የተቀናጀ ዕቅድ ይዘው መሥራታቸው በምንም ዓይነት አንዱ የሌላውን አስተዳደራዊ
ሥልጣን የሚነካ አይደለም፡፡ ቁም ነገሩ በጋራ እንልማ ነው፡፡ አንዱን መሬት ወደ ሌላ የመውሰድ ዓላማም
የለውም፡፡ በቅንጅት የማልማት ጉዳይ ነው፡፡ [“For two administrations (Addis Ababa and Oromia)
working on integrated plan does not interfere into the jurisdiction of another
administration. It has no plan to take other’s lands. It is about growing together].
7.2.2 External factors
The Ethiopian government officials also attributed the cause of the protests to external
forces. It divided the external forces into state and non-state actors. For example, in his interview
with EBC on 7 October 2016, Getachew Reda mentioned three types of actors: nation states, the
diaspora-based Ethiopian activists, and opposition political parties. By state actors, the Ethiopian
officials allude to Egypt and Eritrea. Egypt has always been considered a country that does not
want peace in Ethiopia because of the long-standing issue over the water politics, the Nile River.
Egypt depends on 85% of its water needs from the Nile, which gets 85 percent of its water from
Ethiopian highlands. Ethiopia’s ongoing construction of a huge dam on the river created fear in
Egypt that it may lose some water from the river. Likewise, Eritrea was considered an enemy
country that supported oppositions against the Ethiopian government. Ethiopia and Eritrea fought
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a bitter border war in 1998-2000 that resulted in the death of more than 80,000 people from both
sides (Gebrekidan, 2018). They portrayed these forces as forces that want to destroy the state:
But there are also other explanations here, especially with the government being very
serious about addressing the kinds of challenges…the people are facing, meeting the
demands of the people, there are some elements which are in the business of, in fact,
allowing the government to, to itself because, they are ready to take …every opportunity
at their disposal to make sure this government and the state apparatus is dismantled.
(EBC, 7 October 2016, 9:06)
Reda suggested that these forces do not want the government to reform itself because if it
does, they would not have an excuse to protest. He said: “Of course, they are trying to take
advantage of the situation because if the government manages to reform itself, which it will, and
then, they will have lost their rallying cry” (EBC, 7 October 2016, 9:35).
The Ethiopian officials portrayed the diaspora-based Ethiopians as the “rejectionist
elements” who want to overthrow the government. Here is how Getachew Reda explained who
these elements are saying, “the rejectionist elements in the Ethiopian diaspora who have always
been trying every means, every means at their disposal to short-circuit the process to power”
(EBC, 11 September 2016, 9:54). Reda described the Ethiopian diaspora group as wanting to
dismantle the constitutional order to overthrow the government.
7.3

Violence
As with the international news media, Oromo social media activists, Human Rights

Watch, and Amnesty International, violence was a major theme of government officials’
discussion about the Oromo protest movement. However, unlike these actors, who framed it as a
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state-violence against peaceful protesters, the government officials highlighted the violence by
the protesters.
7.3.1 The cause of the protests is also the cause of the violence
For protesters and other actors, the cause of the protesters—the government officials who
caused the economic, social, and political grievances—also responded violently to peaceful
protesters for demanded their rights. For the government, the source of the protests, especially
the external forces—foreign states (Egypt and Eritrea) and the “rejectionist diaspora-based”
Ethiopians caused violence in order to “dismantle the constitutional order.”
7.3.2

“Protesters cause is not the real cause”
Government officials rejected the claim that the Masterplan was the cause of the

protesters. They rejected the Masterplan as a “cover-up.” For example, in his press conference
on 17 December 2015, Getachew Reda, Minister of Government Communications Affairs,
rejected this as a “cover-up” saying, “የማስተር ፕላን ጥያቄ ሽፋን ነበር እንጂ የመጨረሻ ጥያቄ አልነበረም [“The
question of the master plan was a cover-up; it was not their ultimate question”] (Awramba Times,
17 December 2015, 3:51). According to government officials, although there was a
misunderstanding on the Masterplan by some people, it was hijacked by “some elements” inside
and outside the country who want to overthrow the government through violence. For example,
the following was how he described opposition political parties who operate in the country
legally:
እዚህ ሀገር ላይ በህግ የሚንቀሳቀሱ ሀይሎች አሉ። በህጋዊ ስባል ያው ለምዝገባ ሲባል ህጋዊ የሆኑ በተቻለ መጠን
ግን በግርግርና በሁከት አመካኝቶም ቢሆን ራሳቸውን ቤተመንግሥት እናገኘዋለን የሚል ቅዠት ያለቸው ወገኖች
አሉ። [“in this country, there are folks who operate legally. But ‘legally means just for the
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sake of registration [by electoral commission] but as much as possible use the violence to
find themselves in the Palace”]. (Awramba Times, 17 December 2015, 4:49).
The “terrorists” the officials were alluding to are Ethiopian opposition parties who
engaged in armed struggle to overthrow the government. Three political parties: the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and Ginbot 7 were
deemed terrorist groups by the Ethiopian Parliament.
7.3.3 Self-defense
The Ethiopian government portrayed the violence against protesters as an act of selfdefense and maintaining law and orders by security forces. By denying the accusation of the
violence against the protesters, they justified the use of force as an action that was done to
protect security forces. For example, in his interview to Al Jazeera’s Inside the Story, Getachew
Reda, the minster of the Ethiopian Government’s Communications Affairs, said, “Look, security
forces are taking measures when there are violent protests, and when people are particularly
using deadly forces against security forces and civilians in the name of protests” (Al Jazeera, 14
August 2016, 08:13). Reda framed the violence by security forces against protesters as a
response to the violence by the protesters. For example, in his answer to Al Jazeeera’s Fuli
Batibo’s question to explain the justification for the killing of 30 protesters in the City of Bahir
Dar, he answered the following, “… there was a violent incident involving people among the
protesters throwing grenades at institutions and at people, and of course, security forces …
would normally respond when there is a violent reaction” (Al Jazeera, 14 August 2016, 9:03).
7.3.4 Exaggerated number of casualties
The Ethiopian government officials also contested the numbers of casualties that were
reported by the activists and the news media. For example, he described the information on
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casualties by activists as “being plucked out of thin air” (Al Jazeera, August 14, 2016, 8: 28). He
described exaggeration of the casualties as aimed at “creating a cloud of suspicion and fear
throughout the country” when he said, “…simply because we are trying to inflate figures of
casualties and fatalities simply to because we are trying to create a cloud of suspicion and fear
throughout the country” (Al Jazeera, 14 August 2016, 12:12).
7.3.5 Demonizing the protests
The Ethiopian government official not only externalized the problem to outside forces,
political parties, and diaspora-based terrorists, he also demonized them as such. Getachew Reda
framed the organizers of the protests as “gannen”[demon]. በነገራችን ላይ ሁከት የጠራው ወገን፣ ጋኔን
የጠራው ወገን ጋኔኑም ራሱ መቆጣጠሩ እርግጠኛ አይደለም። [“by the way, the folks who called for the
violence, the folks who were called by the demon, even the demon himself is not sure if he can
control it”]. (Awramba Times, 17 December 2015: 6:07).
7.4

Solution
Solution to the problems was also a major theme that was highlighted by the government

officials in their discussion about the Oromo protests movement. The solutions, according to
government officials, were “deep reform” or “deep renewal.” “Deep reform” or “deep renewal,”
according to Getachew Reda in his interview with the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation on 7
October 2016) was “to bring EPRDF [The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front]
back to its fundamental …to its original promises to its people … to revitalize the state in such a
way that it will once again become at the service of …of the people” (EBC, 7 October 2016,
6:43). The government officials maintained that the EPRDF government is the government of the
people that always prioritizes the interests of the people. So, the purpose of the “deep reform,”
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according to Getachew Reda, was to create a “servant state” in which officials do not use the
state power for personal gains, saying:
It will once again become the kind of servant state and government that it is …expected
to be with the renewal line. Also make sure state power is not source of private gain and
private wealth, but a platform to serve the interest of the public (EBC, 7 October 2016,
7:10).
7.4.1 The source of the problem is the source of the solution too
By framing the source of the economic problem as economic growth, the government
officials also suggested the same as solutions to the problem: “So, the government clearly
realizes that the best way to address this youth bulge, to address this frustration, through more
not less growth, through more, not less change, and of course, this is what the government is
doing” (EBC, 7 October 2016, 15: 09).
7.4.2 Defending government policy
In contrast to the Oromo social media activists, the news media, and international
organizations, the Ethiopian government officials sought to defend its policy. That is, they
admitted problems with ‘some officials” and they portrayed the policy as having no problem.
For example, in his interview with EBC, Getachew Reda defended his government policy as a
policy with no problem although some government officials did not deliver to the people. The
following is how he defended the government policy:
Of course, our policies are proven they are mettle, proven they are caliber…throughout
the last 15 years but…frustrations here and there are manifestation of the kind of
departure, some practices are taken from...what I said the renewal line is clearly spelt out
15 years back. (EBC, 7 October 2016, 7: 14).
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The officials also sought to defend government’s policies by comparing its government
with other governments of African states. For example, in his two interviews on EBC on 7
October 2016 and 11 September 2016, Getachew Reda compared the Ethiopian government with
the governments of other African countries which he described as “predatory states.” The
following is how he differentiated the Ethiopian state from African states:
EPRDF is not a quintessential predatory er African governments. What EPRDF er
succeeded [in] in the last 20 years is to er create a state apparatus that is absolutely
different. A clear departure from the traditional predatory Africans states, which uses []
the state power to in a manner that benefits the people at large. Not as a source patronage
mechanism used to line the pockets of officials and their their their cronies. (EBC, 11
September 2016, 4:06).
In contrast to African states he characterized as “predatory states,” the Ethiopian state
“has been very successful in creating state apparatus that is primarily driven by the need to
protect the interests of the people” (EBC, 11 September 2016, 4:42).
7.5

Summary
As discussed in this chapter, government officials also highlighted the major themes

emphasized by other actors but framed them differently. They stressed the cause of the problem
as both internal and external factors. As internal factors, they emphasized economic and political
grievances. On the economic grievance, the government officials attempted to frame the problem
as caused by the fast-growing economy which led to unfulfilled expectations by the youth. On
the political grievance, they framed it as an issue caused by a “few” governments officials. This
contradicts other actors’ frames that accused the government as a system, not as a “few”
officials.
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Like other actors, government officials also highlighted the government response. But
unlike other actors who framed it as violence against peaceful protesters, they highlighted the
violence created by protesters. They magnified the attack of public properties by protesters. They
framed their actions as a government duty to maintain peace and order.
On the solution, the government officials focused mainly on addressing the economic
grievance by growing the economy so that the people benefit from economic development. On
the political grievance, they highlighted “deep reform” as the solution. “Deep reform” according
to government officials refers to sticking to the ruling party’s “revolutionary democracy.”
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8
8.1

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction
This project aimed to discover the frames highlighted by media and non-media actors on

the Oromo protest movement in Ethiopia. To be clear, it aimed at uncovering the major themes
and their framing by the news media, activists, human rights organizations, and the Ethiopian
government officials. The qualitative framing analysis was used to discover the meanings,
concepts, themes, and frames of each actor to answer the following research questions: (1) What
were the major themes of the international news media? (2) What were the major themes
highlighted in social media posts by key Oromo activists? (3) What were the major themes of the
human rights groups Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International? (4) What were the major
themes of the Ethiopian government officials? (5) How did the international news media frames
compare with the frames of other actors (activists, human rights groups, and the Ethiopian
government officials)?
The data of the study were the texts of the news media (news reports, blogs, editorials,
videos); social media messages of the Oromo protest activists; press statements and interview
transcripts of the Ethiopian government officials; and reports and press releases of the human
rights groups (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International).
This chapter has four sections. The first section provides summaries of the findings of
the analysis of the texts of each actor that was studied (answering research questions 1 – 4). The
second section of the chapter presents the results of the study. It outlines the patterns of each
theme and discusses the similarities and differences between and among the themes and their
framing. It also discusses theoretical implications of these patterns (this answers research
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question 5). The third section describes the limitations that may have a bearing on the study. The
last section concludes the chapter by suggesting areas of future studies.
8.2

Major Findings
Analysis of the texts of each actor indicates that three themes dominated discourses about

the Oromo protest movement. The themes each actor addressed are 1) causes of the protest (such
as political, economic, and cultural grievances); 2) government response to the protests (typically
framed as violence); and 3) and a call for action (for example, an end to the violence). The study
revealed the similarities in how the actors framed those themes, especially on the grievance and
violence frames. However, it also showed some disparities in how they framed themes,
especially the government and the call for action theme.
8.2.1 Major themes of the news media
As indicated in Figure 12 below, the three major themes that dominated the international
media’s discourse about Oromo protests—cause of the protests, government response to the
protest, and a call for action—have several subthemes framed differently.
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Major Themes of the International
News Media

•Cause of the Protest
•Grievance
•Economic grievances
•Landgrab
•Impact
•Past experience
•Political grievances
•Inequality
•Minority rule over majority rule
•Lack of democracy
•Historical grievances
•Past political grievance
•past economic grievance
•Response to the Protest
•Violence
•Killings
•Beatings
•Arrests
•Torture
•Call for Action
•Third-party Intervention
•Political intervention
•Economic intervention
•Justice

Figure 5 Themes of the International News Media Coverage of the Oromo Protests

The news media framed the causes of the Oromo protest movement as a grievance. Three
types of grievances were identified: economic, political, and historical. In their discussion about
the economic grievances, the news media focused mainly on the immediate trigger of the protest,
the Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Masterplan, also known as the Masterplan. The
Masterplan was framed as a “land grab,” a frame that also resonated well with the frame of the
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Oromo protest movement activists. The news media also highlighted how the Masterplan would
have affected the lives of the Oromo people by underscoring past experiences of the people who
were displaced from their lands. Some media outlets also magnified how important the land is
for the Oromo people. Furthermore, the news media highlighted grievances by putting Oromo
grievances in historical contexts. The political grievances highlighted by the news media were
inequality, minority rule over the majority, and lack of democracy.
The news media also highlighted the theme of the government response to the protesters.
They framed the government response as state violence against peaceful protesters. The news
media used the violence frame to highlight different types of violence such as killings, beatings,
arrests, and torture of protesters by government security forces.
In the theme of call to action, the news media highlighted the need to end government
violence against peaceful protesters. They called for an investigation into the violence, which
they framed as justice. In addition to the investigation, some news media also called for thirdparty intervention, which involves calling on others to pressure the Ethiopian government to end
the violence. For example, The Washington Post in its three editorials called for the United
States and the European Union to use the economic and diplomatic clout they have on Ethiopia
to end the violence.
8.2.2 Major themes of the Oromo activists’ social media messages
Analysis of social media (Facebook) posts of the Oromo social media activists indicated
that three major themes—causes of the protest movement, government response to the protest,
and call for action—were highlighted. Oromo activists framed the causes of the protest as a
grievance. As Table 7 below shows, Oromo activists highlighted three main grievances: political,
economic, and violent. They used political grievances to highlight administrative issues (e.g.,
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self-rule); democracy (e.g., freedom of the press and freedom of religion); and rights (e.g.,
human rights and language and identity). They used the economic grievance frame to emphasize
the masterplan and its possible consequences such as displacement of Oromo farmers from their
ancestral lands, and environmental issues. And they used the violent grievance frame to portray
the government as unjustly violent against innocent Oromo people, causing the need to rise up in
protest.
In the government response theme highlighted by the Oromo activists, they highlighted
different types of government violence against Oromos, such as killings, arrests, torture, and
disappearance of protesters. Activists used the news media, human rights groups (Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch), and sometimes their “anonymous” sources as a source
of information about these types of violence.
The call for action was also a major theme highlighted by the Oromo social media
activists. The activists called on both the government officials, third-party intervention, and the
protesters themselves. They called on the government to address their demands, i.e., address their
political and economic demands. They also demanded an end to violence they highlighted such
as killings, arrests, torture, and disappearing of activists. The Oromo activists also called on their
fellow protesters to continue the protest. The protest was used not just as an expression of
disapproval of the government policy but also as a means to an end, i.e., to put pressure on the
government to address their demands. For example, in their discussion about Feyisa Lilesa’s
gesture at the Rio Olympics, they highlighted its significance in telling the world about the
protest and its impact on the government. Activists also encouraged more protests; praised those
who protested as “heroes”; and paid homage to those who lost their lives as “martyrs.” So, the

169

call for action theme was not only aimed at ending the violence against the protesters but also
answering the major economic and political demands (grievances that caused the protests).

Table 7 Summary of the Themes of Oromo Activists

Causes (Grievances)
•

•
•
•

Political Grievances
• Administrative (e.g. self-rule),
• Democracy (e.g., freedom of
the press, freedom of religion),
• Rights-oriented (e.g., human
rights, language and identity)
Economic grievances (landgrab,
Environmental issues)
Grievances related to state violence

Government Response
(Violence)
•
•
•
•
•

Killings;
Beatings,
Arrests,
Torture,
Disappearances

Call for Action
• Call for more protests
• Call on others (third
party for justice)
• Call on the government
to address their
demands
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8.2.3 Major themes of the human rights groups
Human rights groups (Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) emphasized
three major themes: the causes of the protest, government response to the protest, and calls for
action. As Table 8 below shows, each major theme has several subthemes framed differently.
Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International portrayed the cause of the protest as a
grievance. As the following figure shows, Human Rights Watch used the grievance frame to
highlight both political and historical issues as major causes, while Amnesty International
emphasized the economic aspect, especially the masterplan.
Table 8 Summary of the Themes of International Human Rights Groups

Human Rights Watch
•

•

•

•

Causes of the Protests (Grievances)
o Historical Grievances
o Political Grievances
o Chain of Causes
Government Response (Violence)
o Impact of the violence
o Violation of international law
o Violations of rights
Solution
o End the violence
o Investigate
- Justice
- Accountability
Third-Party Intervention
- Use of diplomacy
- Use of aid money

Amnesty International
•
•

•

Cause of the Protest (grievances)
o Economic grievance
Government Response to the Protests (violence
grievances)
o Level of violence
o Manner of violence
o Made-up allegations
Solution
o End the violence
o Change laws
o Investigate
- Truth and accountability
- Independent and impartial investigation

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International highlighted the ‘government response’
theme and framed it as violence against peaceful protestors. However, while the Human Rights
Watch used the violence frame to highlight the impact of violence and describe the violation of
international law and human rights, Amnesty International used the violence frame to talk about
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different types of violence such as killings, arrests, torture, and disappearance. Amnesty
International also blamed the government officials for “made-up allegations” against the
protesters.
The ‘call for action’ theme was highlighted by human rights organizations. They framed
the needed action as the government serving justice to the victims of the government violence.
They called for an end to violence and an investigation into the violence.
8.2.4 Major themes of government officials
Like all other actors, analysis of the government officials’ reports and interview
transcripts also yielded three major themes—causes of the protest, government response, and call
for action. The government officials linked the cause of the protests to internal and external
factors. They portrayed the internal factor as a grievance due to “unmet frustration” on the part
of the youth on political and economic spheres. The government officials framed the political
and economic grievances differently from other actors. That is, unlike other actors who framed
political grievance as caused by the government system, the government officials framed it as a
problem of “good governance,” such as corruption by “a few” government officials, not the
whole system of the government. Likewise, they framed the economic grievance, not in
connection with the land grab, but portrayed it regarding the fruits of the development not
trickling down to the youth. In other words, the government boasts of its economic achievement
but regrets its inability to enable the youth to receive the benefit of it.
The external factors the government officials wanted to associate with the cause of the
protest were the diaspora-based Ethiopians, opposition parties, and foreign governments, who
want to change the government by force. According to the government officials, the diasporabased Ethiopians and opposition parties wanted to overthrow the government through violence to
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take the state power. However, it also accused foreign governments of inciting a takeover,
specifically Eritrea with which it fought a border war, and Egypt, which for geopolitical reasons
wants to maintain its share of water from the Nile River, where it gets 85% of its water from
tributaries in Ethiopia.
The theme that received significant attention was the government officials’ response to
the Oromo protests. The government officials highlighted violence by the protesters and
characterized the response by the government security forces as a measure taken to defend
citizens and government institutions against violent protesters. A solution was also highlighted in
the government reports and interview transcripts. The solution suggested by the government
officials was “deep reform,” which means adhering to the revolutionary democracy.
8.2.5 How did the frames of all actors compare?
As the discussion in the preceding paragraphs indicate, all actors—the news media,
Oromo activists, the human rights organizations, and the government officials highlighted the
basic themes of 1) causes of the protest (problem), 2) the government response, and 3) a call for
action (solution). In answering the last research question (number five), this section (8.2.5)
describes similarities and differences of the major themes and their frames. The following
section (8.3) will then discuss theoretical explanations for the similarities and differences in
framing of the themes, according to scholarly literature. It particularly focuses on why the news
media’s framing of the themes was congruent with activists and human rights groups while it
was not generally congruent with the government’s framing.
8.2.5.1 Similarities and differences of themes and their frames.
As Table 9 below shows, the findings indicate that some themes, especially those
highlighted by the news media, were congruent with the themes highlighted by the Oromo social
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media activists and human rights groups. The government was the outlier in terms of not having
its frames supported and reflected by other actors in most cases. Regarding the cause of the
protest, all actors except Amnesty International (AI) highlighted political grievances while the
news media and Human Rights Watch (HRW) emphasized historical grievances and the chain of
causes as well. Chain of causes refers to the grievances caused by security forces’ response to
past protests such as killings and detention. For example, the killings and arrests of protesters
who went out to the streets to protest the masterplan will become another cause for the next
protests.
In discussing the government’s response to the protests, all actors (besides the
government officials) portrayed it as government violence against protesters by highlighting the
killings, mass arrests, beatings, and tortures by the security forces. The government officials, by
contrast, justified their response as a duty to maintain peace and security, the government also
emphasized its duty to protect citizens from the violence by the protesters and different forces
who wanted to overthrow the government and others who wish to disturb the peace and security
of the country (for geopolitical reasons).

Table 9 Similarities and Differences of the Major Themes by Actors
Major Themes
Cause of the protest
News media

Grievances
- Political
- Economic
- Historical

Oromo activists

Grievance
- Political
- Economic
- Ongoing state violence

Government
response
Violence
- Killings
- Arrests
- Torture
- Disappearances

Calls for action
End to violence
- Investigation into
the violence
- Third-party
intervention

Violence
- Killings
- Arrests
- Torture

End to violence
- Address the
political &
economic demands

174
- Disappearances

Human Rights Watch

Grievance
- Political
- Historical

Violence
- Killings
- Arrests
- Torture
- Disappearances

- Third-party
intervention
- More protests
End to violence
- Investigation into
the violence
- Third-party
intervention

Amnesty
International

Grievance
- Economic

Violence
- Killings
- Arrests
- Torture
- Disappearances

End to violence
- Investigation into
the violence
- Third-party
intervention

Government officials

Grievance
- Economic (inequality)
- Political (corruption by
some gov’t officials)

Protesters are
violent. Gov’t
duty to maintain
peace and safety
of the citizens
and gov’t
institutions

“Deep reform” and
grow economy

The calls for action by the news media, human rights groups, and activists all aimed at
ending the violence against the protesters. They called for an investigation for justice and thirdparty intervention to pressure the Ethiopian government to stop the violence. Activists also called
upon the government to answer their economic and political demands, not just to stop the
violence against protesters. While the news media and human rights groups called on the
Ethiopian government and international countries such as the United Nations, European Union,
the United States, and the United Kingdom to get involved, Oromo activists additionally called
on the Oromo people to keep protesting.
The protest dynamic of framing and counter-framing between Oromo activists and the
government is interesting, as Oromo activists and the government officials framed their issues in
different ways, not surprisingly. The first has to with the emphasis each gave to grievances.
While Oromo activists highlighted many aspects of the grievance frame (political, economic,
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rights violations, environmental issues, language and identity), the government emphasized
mainly just the political and economic grievances issues, admitting to some problems but making
them less severe and comprehensive.
The second framing dynamic between Oromo activists and government officials concerns
how each framed the government—the target of the protest. The activists framed the whole
government structure as a culprit. But the government officials counter-framed this using two
framing strategies: defensive and externalizing. They defended the government structure by
portraying the culprit as a “few” officials who did not conform to the government policy and
ideology of the developmental state revolutionary democracy. They used the externalizing frame
strategy on the whole protest by portraying the protests as being manipulated by external forces
who have a hidden agenda. As discussed in chapter 7, the foreign countries are mainly Egypt and
Eritrea, whom they accused of wanting to destabilize Ethiopia for geopolitical reasons, and the
Ethiopian opposition political parties, whom they blamed for wanting a short-cut to the
government power. It contradicts the activists’ frame that portrayed the protests as a protest by
the Oromo people, for example, by using the hashtags #OromoProtests and #OromoRevolution.
The third dynamic relates to using the same issue to put the blame on each other. For
example, Oromo activists and government officials did not deny the existence of violence, but
they blamed each other for it. While activists used the violence frame to highlight government
actions such as killing, beatings, mass arrests, and tortures of the protesters and Oromo people
more broadly, the government used the same frame to blame the protesters by highlighting road
blockades and attacks on government facilities. Even for the violence to which they admitted, the
government officials tried to justify it as a duty to maintain peace and security.
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Both the international news media and human rights groups seem to reflect and support
many collective actions frames of Oromo activists, which the government officials did not. The
media and human rights groups reinforced the grievance frame of the cause of the protest and
counteracted the government claims in some cases. For example, in countering the government
officials’ frame of externalizing the cause of the protest, the Washington Post in its Editorial
Board wrote:
Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn blamed ‘anti-peace forces,’ and ‘foreign enemies’
whom he claimed are trying to destabilize Ethiopia. But attempts to point to foes abroad
masks the truth that unrest is being fueled by a deep sense of anger at home. (2016,
October 11, para. 4).
The Washington Post framed the “anger” as economic (land), political, and violence against the
protesters by the government officials saying, “anger over plans for reallocating their land,
political disenfranchisement and detention of opposition activists” (para. 2). This contradicts the
government officials’ frame of the masterplan as a “coverup,” political, and as a “hidden agenda
of external forces.” Human rights organizations also counter-framed the government officials’
use of the externalizing frame to accuse the protesters of being manipulated by others who have a
hidden agenda. In its article on 18 December 2015 Human Rights Watch quoted Lefkow (2015),
deputy Africa director at Human Rights Watch as saying: “the government’s labeling of largely
peaceful protesters as terrorists and deploying military forces is a very dangerous escalation of
this volatile situation” (para. 3)
The news media and human rights groups also reinforced activists’ violence frame of the
government action. For example, as the analysis in chapter 4 shows, the Washington Post in the
title: “Ethiopia meets protests with bullets” (2016, October 11) highlighted the government
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officials’ violence by suggesting the perpetrator (the government), the victims (protests), and the
means of violence (bullets). Similarly, Human Rights Watch carried the title “Yet Again, a
Bloody Crackdown on Protests in Ethiopia” (2015, December 5). Amnesty International also
counter-framed government claims of use of the law to maintain peace and security. For
example, in the article published on 2 June 2016, it carried a title, “End use of counter-terrorism
law to persecute dissenters and opposition political members” by highlighting the need for a call
for action.
There are also visible supportive frame dynamics between Oromo activists and the
international news media and international human rights groups, especially on how they framed
the call for action theme. Both the international news media and human rights groups
emphasized an end to the state violence as the main goal. But Oromo activists went beyond just
an end to the violence call and demanded the government address grievances that caused that
triggered the protests in the first place. The international news media (especially op-eds and
opinions piece) called for a third-party intervention aimed at ending the state violence and
bringing justice to the victims of the violence through economic (e.g., cutting aid) and diplomatic
means. Unlike Oromo activists who also demanded economic justice as a solution, the
international news media and human rights groups focused primarily on the human rights aspects
of the grievance.
8.2.5.2 Political explanation of similarities and differences of media and activist frames
As discussed in chapter two, the Western media give little coverage to issues in Africa,
and when they do, they focus on areas where the Western countries have interests. So, it is no
wonder that the protests in Ethiopia have received wide coverage from the Western media. The
Western countries, especially the United States and Europe have geopolitical interests in
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Ethiopia. Ethiopia is the ally of the United States in the fight against terrorism and peacekeeping
missions in Africa (Shinn, 2013). These countries have cooperation on intelligence, and Ethiopia
allowed the United States to use its territories to launch drone attacks against terrorist bases in
Somalia (Shinn, 2013; Gettleman, 2016). In return, the United States provides Ethiopia’s military
with funds for training and equipment (Shinn, 2013). Likewise, Ethiopia has a strong relationship
with the EU countries. In addition to the war on terrorism in Somalia, the EU countries need
Ethiopia to help with African refugees that cross into Europe, most of them from the Horn of
Africa including Ethiopia. As a result, The EU supports Ethiopia with financial aid (Toga, 2014).
Hence, what explains the Western news media’s framing that was supportive of Oromo
activists and human rights organizations’ frames might be a shift in the Western countries’
policies towards Ethiopia that favors the protestors. For example, on June 28, 2016, 19 U.S.
lawmakers issued a Resolution titled: “Supporting respect for human rights and encouraging
inclusive governance in Ethiopia.” The Resolution highlighted different human rights abuses by
the Ethiopian government, which they suggested contradicted with one of the United States core
policy towards sub-Saharan Africa: “… to advance peace and security, including supporting
sector reform.” (p. 2). Different high-level United States government and EU officials also
publicly expressed their concern about the human abuses in Ethiopia. For example, Samantha
Power, the United States Representative to the United Nations on October 18, 2016 put up a
tweet that says: “#Ethiopia must end crckdwn on peaceful oppo. Mass arrests, incl rearresting
Blen Mesfin, show cont'd backslide on rts & are self-defeating.” The news media and social
media users of Oromo activists widely quoted this tweet and other statements by officials of the
United States and the European Union.
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The reason the news media’s coverage of the Oromo protests was congruent with the
preferred frames of the Oromo protests might also explain the media’s frame congruence with
the human rights organizations (who were supportive of the local activists in Oromo). However,
since the literature on the link among the news media, human rights organizations, and grassroots
activists is sparse, future studies might be needed to expound on this dynamic.
8.3

Discussion
To round out an explanation of research question five, this section discusses the

implication of the findings in the context of media studies and social movement framing
scholarship. It also makes some theoretical propositions for future studies.
8.3.1 News media and Oromo activists
The findings of the study support existing scholarly arguments for example, by
Klandermans (2014) and Gamson and Wolfsfeld (2001), that the news media covers the
existence of social movements, sets a stage for collective action, provides definitions and
interpretations, and takes part in the creation of the situations. That is, the news media covered
the existence of the Oromo protests by making them the headlines of their news stories. They
also set stages for collective action by framing the issue (causes of the problem and solutions).
Furthermore, some news media provided broad historical contexts to the Oromo people’s
struggle for freedom in general and the 2015-2016 protests in particular.
The findings on the news media and Oromo activists support previous studies on the
relationship between social movements and the media. For example, Gamson and Wolfsfeld
(2001) pointed out that protest activists use the media for validation, mobilization, and scope
enlargement. The Oromo social media activists not only shared the media that covered the
Oromo protest movement, they also took it as evidence that the world was paying attention to
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their protests. Some activists listed the media outlets that gave coverage to the protests. Others
added their commentaries by highlighting the idea in the news media that resonated with their
views.
The findings on the news media and Oromo social media activists also concur with
previous research evidence that suggests media and protest movements are engaged in a
“struggle over framing” (Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 2001), as media framing and protesters’ issues
framing do not always match, as argued by Ryan (2001) and Undrakhbuyan (2001). For
example, as discussed in chapter 6, there were times when Oromo social media activists
complained about the misrepresentations of issues related to the Oromo protest movement. Some
activists contested the new media’s framing of the causes of the deaths of protesters; others
disputed the choice of words used to describe the death of Oromo protesters (e.g., stampede vs.
massacre regarding the death at Irrecha), and even the number of deaths. For example, in his
Facebook post on October 2, 2016, Ararssa (2016n), one of the Oromo activists, wrote the
following:
So frustrating to listen to the hesitation and the all-too-odd non-committal posture of
foreign journalists in covering Oromo/Ethiopian affairs. Part of it could be explained by
the barrier (political, linguistic, and physical) between them and the sites where the
events take place. Part of it is the result of the fear and self-censorship among their
'informants' close to the event for fear of being arrested, tortured, or even killed by the
regime. Part of it is their deranged sense of history. But part of it is from their liberal
fantasy of achieving journalistic 'objectivity' and 'balance' in an environment that is so
unfair and asymmetrical in every imaginable respect. The result is this annoying level of
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inaccuracy, distortion, undervaluation or ignoring of weighty events/facts/incidents,
decontextualization, and/or misinterpretation.
The literature on media framing of social movements suggests association between the
news media and social movements’ framing congruence and mobilization efforts (Cooper, 2002).
But this dissertation did not look at whether the framing contest between the news media and
Oromo activists on some issues did affect the Oromo protesters’ mobilization. As discussed in
the preceding section, the major frames of the news media were congruent with the frames of the
Oromo activists.
The findings on Oromo social media activists also concur with existing literature on
social movements’ “collective action” framing of issues. The three types of collective action
frames identified by Snow & Benford, (1988)—diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational
frames—were highlighted by the Oromo social media activists and often by the news media.
According to Snow and Benford (1988) the diagnostic frame of social movements “involves
identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality” (p. 200). The cause of the
protest theme highlighted by the news media fits this type of framing. As discussed in the
analysis part (chapter 4) and summary of the findings in the preceding section, the news media
identified the triggers (causes of the Oromo protests), which they framed as grievances. These
grievances include political, economic, and historical grievances. The news media attributed the
political grievance of the Oromo protest movement to inequality, minority rule over the majority
rule, and lack of democracy. Some news media highlighted the 2015 parliamentary election in
which the ruling party won 100%. They make the government officials mainly responsible for
the politically motivated arrest of journalists and opposition political leaders. Likewise, the news
media also attributed the economic grievances of the Oromo people to policies such as land use.
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The news media was also involved in prognostic framing. Prognostic framing involves
“the articulation of proposed solutions to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, or and the
strategies for carrying out the plan” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616). The news media suggested
solutions to the problems. Under the “call for action theme” in this study, the news media called
for an end to violence. As a strategy, instead of calling on the Ethiopian government, the main
culprit of the violence, the news media called for a third-party intervention. For example, CNN,
on its opinion piece called on the United States to stop its diplomatic and economic support to
Ethiopia, suggesting it would help solve the problems. Similarly, The Washington Post in its
editorials called on the United States and the United Kingdom to stop supporting the Ethiopian
government through financial aid.
The news media also engaged in motivational framing which, according to Benford and
Snow (2000), aimed at providing “‘call to arms’ or rationale for engaging in ameliorative
collective action, including the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive” (p. 617). The
motives were reflected in justice and equality frames which might emanate from news media’s
tendency to focus on human rights issues and promote democratic values. The news media used
the violence frame under the “government response.” As indicated in chapter 4, they used
different terms to describe the types of violence such as killings, tortures, forced disappearance,
and arbitrary arrests to describe the violence as the violation of human rights.
As discussed in Section 8.2.5.1, the international news media collective action frames
were supportive of the collective action frames of Oromo activists. In the cause of the protest
theme, they engaged in collective diagnostic (problem) framing by focusing on the political,
economic, and historical grievances. This was reflected not just in how they framed the
collective action frames of the Oromo protests but also on how they counter-framed the
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government officials’ frames when they were not congruent with activists’ frames. In prognostic
(solution) framing, the news media highlighted an end to violence by demanding justice. In the
motivational framing of human rights violations, they portrayed the government as unjust toward
innocent people.
However, it is important to note that there were differences in emphasis on some frames.
For example, in the call for action theme, the news media did not include one of the solutions
demanded by the protesters. That is, the solution of the news media focused on a halt to the stateviolence, while the protesters' solutions also included the demand to solve political and economic
issues that caused the protests in the first place. In other words, while the media focused more on
immediate human rights abuses during the protests, the protesters stuck to their original demands
as well that preceded the protests. This focus on public violence during protests might be
explained by the news media’s tendency to focus more on episodic coverage of news than the
thematic coverage (Iyengar 1991; Amenta, Gharrity, Gardner, Tierney, Yerena, & Elliot, 2012,
p. 89).
The findings also do not support that results of previous studies on the Western media
coverage of Africa. For example, previous studies suggested that the Western media coverage of
Africa were influenced by stereotypical tribalism (Gruley & Duvall, 2012; McGulty 1999) or by
colonial stereotypes (Gruley & Duvall, 2012; Vladisavljevic, 2015). ). Ethiopia is a multinational
and multilinguistic country with more than 80 different groups. It is not only a country where
Muslims and Christians live together, but it shares borders with many countries in East Africa
such as Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Ethnicity, tribalism, and religion are causes of
conflict. Furthermore, it is in the region where the terrorist groups like Al-Shabab operate.
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However, the Western media analyzed in this study of the Oromo protests did not use
ethnicity, tribalism, and religion frames which characterize most of their coverage of Africa.
Ethiopia's uniqueness as the only African country that did not fall under the Western
colonization may explain why the Western news media did not use the stereotypical tribalism or
colonial stereotypes.
8.3.2 Human rights groups
Like the news media, similar patterns also emerged in the texts of human rights groups—
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. That is, causes of the protest, violent response
by the government, and call for action dominated the texts produced by these actors. However,
there was a slight difference in how these actors framed the themes. For example, all of them
framed the causes of the protests as a grievance. That is, while the news media frames
highlighted three types of grievances (economic, political, and historical grievances), Human
Rights Watch focused on the economic and political, and Amnesty International focused on the
economic grievance only. The disparities in emphasis on framing grievances among actors may
have to be studied in the future.
Human rights groups also framed the Oromo protest movement in a way that fits the
Snow and Benford (1988) elements of collective action framing —diagnostic, prognostic, and
motivational framing. They focused on the causes of the problem being various grievances
(diagnostic framing) and solutions or a call for an end to the violence and investigation into
rights abuses and third-party intervention (prognostic framing), and emphasis on violence,
highlighting it as a violation of human rights (motivational framing).
The findings also reveal a symbiotic relationship between human rights groups and
grassroot activists and the media. For example, the news media and Oromo activists used human
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rights groups as sources of information and vice versa. Whether actors' use of each other as a
source of information explains the similarity of themes was beyond the scope of this dissertation.
But the sharing of information between the news media and activists may be explained by
Gamson and Wolfsfeld’s (1993) assertion that the media-movement relationship is characterized
by interdependence in which both need each other. That is, the news media help social
movements for “mobilization, validation, and scope enlargement” while social movements
provide news media with “drama, conflict, and action; colorful copy; and photo opportunities”
(p. 116 - 117).
As discussed in Chapter 2, scholars have indicated the growing interdependence between
the news media and NGOs such as human rights groups. The changing political economy of the
news media and the desire of the human rights groups to get their stories out in the news media
makes this relationship a necessity. As indicated in this study, the fact that both international
news media and human rights organizations engaged in collective actions frames that somehow
reflect that of activists may also show the existence of the interdependent relationship among the
three actors. The news media and human rights organizations can be allies for grassroots
democratic activist groups.
8.3.3 Government Officials
As indicated in Section 8.2.4, the Ethiopian government officials constructed their
version of reality which fits scholarly arguments that both social movements and government
officials are “signifying” agents engaged in meaning construction (Noakes, 2005). The findings
also prove the suggestion by Benford and Snow (2000), McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996),
Noakes, (2005), and Zald (1996) that collective action frames are a contested arena of framing
and counter-framing an issue. For example, the government officials counter-framed the
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masterplan, which activists framed as a “landgrab,” and as a “development project” plan aimed
at connecting Addis Ababa with surrounding cities and towns Oromia through infrastructures.
Government officials and Oromo activists used different counter-framing techniques
identified by scholars in previous studies. They used the “discrediting frame” technique
identified by Boscarino (2016). Oromo activists used this technique to portray the government
officials’ “development project” frame as a “landgrab” aimed at selling their lands to foreign
investors. The government also used the “discrediting frame” to counter-frame activists’
“inequality” frame of the economic grievance. For instance, Getachew Reda, the minister of the
Government Communications Affairs Office counter-framed saying “real and perceived
inequality,” questioning the accuracy of the claims and at the same time suggesting that it was
exaggerated.
Both the government officials and Oromo activists used three framing techniques
(“polarization-vilification,” “framing saving,” and “frame debunking”) identified by McCaffrey
and Keys (2000). Activists used the “polarization-vilification” frame to describe the protest as
the opposition to the government project (the masterplan), as the war between the Oromo people
on the one side, and the TPLF-led Ethiopian government on the other side. But the government
officials counter-framed this by portraying the opposition to the master plan between the
government (not the TPLF) and external forces who have a hidden agenda.
Oromo activists also used the “frame-debunking” strategy to make the government
official’s frame of the masterplan look negative. They debunked the government “development
project” frame of the masterplan with “the master plan is master killer” slogan. While the
government officials framed opposition to the “development project” as a few misinformed
people who did not understand its purpose, the protesters framed it as opposition by millions of
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people. This was reflected in their use of different hashtags such as “#GrandOromiaRally,”
#OromoProtests, and #OromoRevolution.
The government officials’ framing of issues related to the Oromo protest movement
conforms to Benford and Snow’s (2000) assertion that actors cannot “construct and impose on
their intended targets any version of reality they would like” because they may face counterframing by those targets (p.625). It is worth noting that the findings suggest that the counterframing of issues by government officials mainly focused on the diagnostic and prognostic
frames of collective action and not the motivational frames. It conforms to the arguments made
by Benford and Snow (2000) that opponents of social movements (the government officials in
this case) challenge mainly the diagnostic and prognostic collective action frames.
8.4

Conclusions
This project shed some lights on the discourses by media and non-media actors

surrounding the Oromo protest movement. It used the qualitative framing analysis to identify the
themes highlighted by these actors and the resulting broad categories (cause of the protest,
government response to the protest, and call for action). Hence, from the findings, the following
summary can be made:
1. The news media described the Oromo protest movement as an expression of
grievances (economic, political, and historical) that was met with state violence
(killings, beatings, arrests, and torture) that needs some intervention (third-party
intervention) to stop the violence against the protesters or to also address their
ongoing issues with government oppression of Oromo people.
2. The Oromo activists described the Oromo protest movement as an expression of
grievances (economic, political, and historical) that was met with state violence
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(killings, beatings, arrests, and torture) that needs some intervention (third-party
intervention + further protests by the movement against the government) to address
them.
3. The human rights groups (Human rights Watch and Amnesty International) described
the Oromo protest movement as an expression of grievances (political and economic)
that was met with state violence (killings, beatings, arrests, and torture) that needs
some intervention (third-party intervention) to stop the violence against the protesters.
4. The government officials described the Oromo protest movement as an expression of
grievances (economic and political) that led to violence by the protesters (killing of
members of security forces and damaging of properties) that needed some
intervention by the government 1) to maintain peace and stability, and 2) to address
protesters’ grievance through “deep reform” and the acceleration of economic
growth.
In conclusion, the findings fit with social movement framing literature that actors in
social movements are “signifying” agents engaged in collective actions frames—diagnostic,
prognostic, and motivational frames. Like the news media, human rights organizations are also
involved in constructing collective action frames. Both the news media and human rights
organizations engaged in collective action frames that reflected the collection frames of social
movement activists, although at times there were frame contestations, especially between the
news media and activists. However, government officials engaged in counter-framing the frames
of the three actors—activists, news media, and human rights groups.
The results of the study also concur with literature that social movement activists need
news media for validation, mobilization, and scope enlargement. It also conforms to previous

189

studies on social media (e.g., Surzhko-Harned & Zahuranec, 2017; Royas & Davis, 2017; &
Moscato, 2015) who characterized social media as a forum where activists organize social
movements for mobilization, motivation, and scope enlargement, a role previously dominated by
traditional media, but also as a vital framing tool.
This study also indicates the different ways activists use social media by posting links to
content (news articles, videos, and pictures) of online news media and human rights
organizations’ documents by sharing them on their Facebook pages. The activists whose
Facebook posts I studied do this for different reasons such as to give the impression that “the
whole world is watching us,” when the news media and human rights organizations give
favorable coverages to their causes, or to challenge them when they frame their causes in
unfavorable ways.
This study which focused on protests in Ethiopia did not find evidence that supports
previous findings that suggested stereotypical tribalism and colonial stereotype influenced the
Western media’s characterization of conflict in Africa. This is perhaps because of Ethiopia’s
uniqueness for being one of the two African countries that was not colonized.

8.5

Limitations of the Study
The project shed some lights on the themes highlighted by each actor and the interaction

among the actors. It uncovered similarities and differences of themes and the frames underscored
by each actor. However, it is also worth mentioning the limitations of the study.
First, this project analyzed the messages of each actor. Although different aspects of
social movements and the link between social movements and the media could be studied, this
study focused only on themes and how those themes were framed. It did not examine, for
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example, the type of media the protesters used, how they used them, and why, or their
motivations for selecting different media. It rather studied messages, their themes and how those
themes were framed. Also, as this project aims only at understanding the themes and their
frames, not their impacts; it did not conduct audience analysis, nor did it assess achievement of
goals by movement actors.
Second, the study was limited in scope. Although there were protests across Ethiopia,
mainly in Oromia and Amhara regions, the project focused on protests in Oromia only. So, the
results of the study should not be generalized to protests, news media, social media activists,
human rights groups and government officials in the world, or even in Ethiopia.
Third, this project looked at texts only. That is, it analyzed publicly available Facebook
posts, news stories, reports, press releases, and government officials’ public statements. It did not
conduct interviews with any actor, nor did it do an ethnographic study.
Fourth, now the Oromo protests movement ended in victory. Some of the Oromo
activists’ questions were addressed. The government leaders including the prime minister of the
country were replaced by those who have wide acceptance among the people. Some government
officials, including the director of the government communications affairs, whose statements
were analyzed in this study, were fired. Most Oromo social media activists, whose social media
posts were studied for this project, are back home now. Tens of thousands of prisoners were
released. Political dissidents who live in foreign countries have been allowed to return to their
home countries. The ban on media outlets was lifted. The new leaders also promised more
political reforms that address all the protests grievances. So, this project focused on materials
produced before the changes. Thus, the results do not reflect the whole process of the protest
movement, although one could surmise that the Oromo protests were effective, perhaps in part to
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the strategic messages and the support they received from international media and human rights
groups.
Fifth, the project used a qualitative approach aimed at understanding a particular issue,
the major themes highlighted by different actors. So, the result of the study should not be
generalized to all movements in the world, various movements in Ethiopia, or even to Oromo
protests that happened many years back.
8.6

Areas of Future Study
Based on the findings of the study, the following suggestions could be made on areas that

need further study. First, future studies could benefit from adding in interviews for more in-depth
analysis of the motivations involved and rationales for highlighting some themes by different
actors. Second, future studies may also benefit from conducting an audience analysis, especially
to understand the impact of both the themes covered by different actors and how those themes
are represented. Studies so far focused on the interaction between media and social movements.
Although other actors, particularly human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International were included, this project did not look at the cause-effect relationship
between these actors and how the theme of one actor might have influenced the theme of another
actor or variables involved. Therefore, focusing on these areas may also shed some lights on the
role of human rights groups in not only covering social movements but in framing them.
Third, as discussed in the foregoing section, the Oromo protest is now over with some
degree of success. However, this project focused only on the protest itself rather than how it
succeeded. So, further study on the evolution of the protest movement from start to the end, with
success or failure, and of different actors’ (news media, social media activists, government
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officials, and human rights groups) would further contribute to the literature on strategies for
democratic social movements.
In conclusion, this study uncovered that more actors are involved in shaping the discourse
about social movements. That is, although scholars on social movements have so far typically
limited their scope of study on the discourse of the social movements, the media, and the
government officials, this study indicates that international human rights organizations play a
key role as well. Gamson’s and Wolfsfeld’s (1993) concept of media-social movement
independence should lead scholars to look into the existence and nature of interdependence
among different actors, especially non-media actors such as Non-Governmental Organizations.
For social movements activists, the findings of this study have significance.
Understanding the supportive role of international human rights organizations may provide them
with an additional instrument to devise communication.
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